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PREFACE 
The development of industrial unionism 1n Oklahoma's 
coal industry was a long and difficult process. First 
organized under the Knights of Labor in the 1880s, and in 
the 1890s under the United Mine Workers , the men who worked 
i n the mines o f Indian Territory, a nd l ater Oklahoma. toiled 
under some a~ the harshest conditions in the United States. 
Not only d id they endure working in the most dangerous m1nes 
i n the nation. but also the miners found little relief a b ove 
ground. The communities in which the miners and their 
families lived were classic examples of the company town and 
a ll the outrages a ssociated with that system. 
These conditions led t he miners to turn to un1on1sm so 
they might have a say in their own working and living 
conditions. Through unionism the miners sought 1mprove 
s afety in the m1ne s, to e arn a l iving wage, and to bring 
about the end of the company town system. At the beginning 
this seemed almost unachievable. The legal s tatus o f Indian 
Territory put the coal barons nearly beyond t he l aw. In 
many ways, t he coal barons were the law in Oklahoma's coa l 
towns in the early years o f the industry. Working in 
alliance with the authorities, whether they were Indian, 
state , or f e deral, the barons h ad mighty forces a t t heir 
disposal. They turned to these forces often in their 
i ii 
recurring struggle with the miners. The coal belt of 
Oklahoma was the battleground for a classic conflict of 
labor and management. This industrial war, fought over a 
fifty year period, left many scars on both sides. But 
despite the long odds, the miners and their unions survived 
to the dying days of the industry. While Oklahoma's coal 
industry fell victim to competition, over-production, and 
the oil and gas industry in the 1920s and 1930s, the union 
persevered. Even when they were broken and scattered in 
189~, and again in the late 1920s, the miners preserved the 
spirit of unionism. Both times they regrouped and lived on 
to fight another day. This dogged tenacity was typical 
among Oklahoma's coal miners. One had to be tough to 
survive in the mines and under the company town system. To 
ameliorate these harsh conditions, the miners turned to 
unionism. Bringing together miners from dozens of diverse 
nations and cultures, the union provided an umbrella for all 
those who toiled and lived in the coal towns. 
This study will examine the development of industrial 
unionism in Oklahoma's coal industry from 1870 to 1935. 
This period encompasses the rise of the industry, its 
heyday, and decline. After a period of dormancy in the late 
1920s, the union experienced a rebirth in 1931. With the 
onset of the New Deal and the pertinent sections of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act, the union became a 
permanent fixture in the coal fields of Oklahoma until the 
industry played out following World War Two. It is that 
i v 
period from the beginnings of the industry in the 1870s to 
the mid-1930s and the advent of the New Deal that this study 
will examine. 
In order to draw the most complete picture possible of 
life in Oklahoma's coal towns, this study draws from a 
multitude of sources. The papers of the United Mine Workers 
local at Krebs, housed in the Oklahoma State University 
Library Special Collections, provides a glimpse of the era 
from the perspective of the union local. From this material 
inferences on the day-to-day functions of the union local 
can be made. The Peter Hanraty Collection, housed in the 
Archives and Manuscripts Division of the Oklahoma Historical 
Society, gives insight into how the union functioned at the 
district level. Other important sources at the Oklahoma 
Historical Society were the Choctaw Tribal Papers, which 
present the Indian side of the story, and the Edwin Ludlow 
Papers, which offer details of events from the operators' 
perspective. Another important source was the extensive 
newspaper collection housed in the Oklahoma Historical 
Society building. The local newspapers of the 
coal towns were important in providing detail on the day-to-
day life in these communities. 
The Western History Collection at the University of 
Oklahoma was another important source for this study. 
Housed there are the Franklin Bache Papers. Bache was a 
leading independent operator in Oklahoma, and his papers 
give ins i ght into that perspecti ve of the i ndustry. 
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The Catholic University of America Library Archives 
house other manuscript collections utilized in this work, 
including the John Mitchell Papers. Mitchell was president 
of the union in the 1890s and 1900s, one of the most 
important periods for the union. Also housed at the 
Catholic University Library Archives are the Mary Harris 
Jones Papers. "Mother" Jones often traveled through 
Oklahoma during this period, offering support and fiery 
speeches to the union faithful. I am indebted to Archivist 
Anthony Zito and his assistant, Sister Ann, S. S. J., for 
making my research at Catholic University a pleasant and 
rewarding experience. 
The National Archives in Washington, D. C. houses 
federal government papers that were important to this study. 
Department of Interior records from the period illustrate 
the federal government's role when strikes 
occurred. These records reveal the close relationship 
between the coal barons and the federal government. 
An equally close relationship is highlighted in the 
papers of Oklahoma's governors during the period from 1907 
to 1935. Most important are the J. B. A. Robertson and 
Martin Trapp Papers, both housed at the State of Oklahoma 
Department of Libraries Building in Oklahoma City. Both 
governors' administrative papers illuminate their 
willingness to use the offices of state government to 
intervene on behalf of the operators. 
I wish to express my gratitude to several members of 
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the Oklahoma State University History Department. I wish to 
thank Dr. Roger Biles for taking on the responsibilities 
associated with being my committee chairman. His careful 
editing, comments, and criticism were essential in the 
completion of this project. I also wish to thank Dr. 
Richard Rohrs. His enlightening expertise on historical 
methods and grammatical details helped polish the rough 
edges of the text. I am also indebted to Dr. George Carney, 
who opened my eyes to seeing history from a geographical 
perspective. Finally, I wish to thank Dr. George Jewsbury, 
who took time out from his busy schedule to sit on my 
committee. Thanks also to Brian Schulz for his cartography 
skills and assistance. I also wish to thank the Oklahoma 
State University History Department for the gracious 
awarding of a Ray Estep Fellowship and a Townsend 
Dissertation Fellowship, which helped finance my research. 
I must also thank my parents, Donald and Myrtle Sewell. 
They provided both moral and financial support during the 
hard times. Last but not least, I must thank my wife Sharon 
for putting up with me during this project. Not only did 
she have to act as a sounding board for my ideas, but she 
put food on the table while I leaned over the computer 
keyboard. Without her love and support I might never have 
finished. 
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THE EARLY YEARS: 1870-1893 
Nowhere did the robber barons of the Gilded Age 
exercise more control over their employees than did the coal 
operators of what was then Indian Territory. Beyond state 
goverr~ent, nearly beyond the federal government, Indian 
Territory provided an opportunity for the coal barons t o 
create an industrial situation molded according to their own 
wishes, needs, and philosophy. Easily dominating the 
rapidly-weakening Indian governments, the robber barons ran 
nearly unfettered in Indian Territory. The result was an 
industry that was a horror for those who worked in it. 
Laboring in isolated company towns, the miners had no say 
over many parts of their lives. Where they lived and 
shopped, where they worked, the conditions in which they 
worked, the wages they earned - the coal baTons dictated 
all. Whenever they questioned the status quo, the miners 
met resistance from not only the operators, but from the 
Indian and feder al governments. Few places were more 
suitable for the growth of industrial unionism than the coal 
towns of Indian Territory. 
In 1903, a s the miners were in the final stages of a 
1 
2 
five-year strike, a union miner put his thoughts into verse. 
He declared that "I am a union miner living in a union 
camp .... The capitalist tells me that my needs they are but 
few .... I want to have a living, so I want a living wage ... 
I'm a union miner." This attitude was a result of thirty 
years under the coal barons' lash.' 
The folklore surrounding J. J. McAlester and his role 
in the origins of Oklahoma's coal industry is present in 
much of the literature on the topic. Early histories of the 
state successfully turned McAlester into a nearly mythical 
character. After the Civil War, McAlester acquired a map 
revealing the location of valuable coal deposits in the 
Choctaw Nation. After marrying into the tribe in order to 
gain legal access to the deposits, McAlester eventually 
parlayed his good luck and business acumen in the mercantile 
trade into a fortune. Although the presence of coal 
deposits in the region had been known for decades, 
McAlester's contribution was that he was the first to find 
commercial markets for the product.e 
Commercial exploitation began with the arrival of 
railroads in Indian Territory. When McAlester learned that 
the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railroad, a southern branch 
of the Union Pacific, was contemplating building a track 
through "Cross-Roads," where the California Trail crossed 
the Texas Road, he promptly displayed a wagon load of the 
area's coal to officials of the railroad at Parsons, Kansas. 
"Cross-Roads," which was later to become McAlester, was 
where the rising entrepreneur had considerable investments. 
McAlester planned to convince the railroad's management of 
the superior nature of the region's coal, hoping it would 
weigh the scales to his advantage. Congressional railroad 
subsidies and McAlester's alluring offer of high-quality 
steam coal made the decision easy for the company's 
officials. 3 
3 
First to penetrate the region, the M. K. & T. quickly 
came to dominate the Indian Territory coal industry. The M. 
K. & T. was part of a complex web of railroads controlled by 
Jay Gould. In fact, Gould's domination of the Indian 
Territory coal industry was so complete that a joke 
circulating around Wall Street at the time referred to "Jay 
Gould's railroad, his Territory, and his Indians." Loosely 
allied with Francis Gowen's Choctaw, Oklahoma, and Gulf 
Railway, which opened up the coal fields between McAlester 
and Ft. Smith, Gould and Gowen were a potent force in the 
regional coal industry. But their dominance was not 
absolute. The Choctaw Nation's financial records indicate 
that by 1883 at least six railroads were doing business in 
Indian Territory.~ 
The M. K. & T. (Katy) railroad controlled the two 
largest mining companies in the Indian Territory coal 
industry. In the early 1870s McAlester sold his Oklahoma 
Mining Company to a larger concern that he and several 
partners had just founded, the Osage Coal and Mining 
Company. Soon thereafter the Katy acquired an interest in 
the firm and by 1888 owned it outright. The Osage Coal and 
Mining Company developed mines at Krebs and McAlester. The 
company sold its product to the Katy and had a virtual 
monopoly on commercial coal mining in Indian Territory until 
18 81.:5 
The second major producer during the 1880s was the 
Atoka Coal and Mining Company. Also owned by Gould's Katy 
Railroad, the Atoka Coal and Mining Company operated mines 
at Savanna and Lehigh, supplying locomotive fuel to Texas 
railroads that Gould also owned. The company's operations 
at Savanna ceased after an explosion there killed eighteen 
miners. The company moved its entire operation at Savanna, 
including 135 company houses, to Lehigh.• 
Indian Territory coal production mushroomed in the 
1880s. In 1881, when the Atoka Coal and Mining Company was 
established, an estimated 150,000 tons were produced. By 
1887, mines in the Choctaw Nation were producing over 
600,000 tons annually. Production totaled over three-
quarters of a million tons annually by the end of the 
decade, a five-fold increase. Development of the Indian 
Territory coal industry continued on into the 1890s at a 
rapid pace. 7 
In 1885, after a field survey disguised as turkey hunt, 
Edward D. Chadrick, a capitalist from Minneapolis, persuaded 
5 
another titan of the railroad industry, the Lehigh Valley 
Railroad, to build a line that would tap the coal fields 
around Wilburton. The result was the incorporation of the 
Choctaw, Coal and Railway Company in 1887 and the 
construction of a sixty-seven mile line between Wister and 
South McAlester that was completed in 1890. This road 
permitted development of the coal fields at Wilburton, 
Alderson, and Hartshorne. Financial trouble due to land 
speculation and poor management put the firm into 
receivership in 1891, and the railroad was reorganized as 
the Choctaw, Oklahoma, and Gulf in 189~. Francis Gowen, 
appointed as the firm's receiver during its financial 
trouble in 1891, became president of the reorganized C. 0. & 
G. in 189~. Gowen of Philadelphia drew from his experiences 
in the Pennsylvania coal industry, where the Gowens brought 
in the infamous Pinkertons to infiltrate the Molly Maguires 
in the 1870s. The C. 0. & G. remained the territory's 
largest producer until acquired by the Rock Island Railroad 
in 1902. Its mining subsidiary, the Rock Island Coal and 
Mining Company, continued to be one of the most powerful 
entities in Oklahoma's coal industry until the Depression. 
Other important railroads that entered Indian Territory and 
its coal industry during this period were the Kansas City 
Southern, the Midland Valley, the Frisco, and the St. Louis 
and San Francisco.• 
By the turn of the century a well-developed railroad 
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network criss-crossed Indian Territory. The Fort Smith and 
Western, associated with Henry C. Frick, entered the Indian 
Territory from Fort Smith shortly after 1900. The 
railroad's subsidiary, the San Bois Coal and Mining Company, 
operated mines at McCurtain, first known as Chant. When the 
Denison and Washita Valley Railway Company completed a spur 
between Lehigh and Coalgate in 1889, it allowed the 
Southwestern Coal and Improvement Company to develop coal 
properties at Coalgate and Midway. Later, the Sante Fe 
extended its lines to Lehigh and acquired an interest in the 
Coalgate field, one of the most important in the state. One 
smaller-scale line was the Split Log Railroad, which ran 
from Siloam Springs, Arkansas to the Indian Territory coal 
mining communities of Panama, Poteau, Howe, and Heavener. 
The railroad traversed a wooded region that supplied lumber 
for use in the coal industry as timbering material and 
railroad ties. While local Indians refused to work in the 
mines, they supplied much of the timber used in the mines.• 
Smaller-scale independents operated among the huge 
railroad-associated mining companies. One of the most 
successful was Dr. D. M. Hailey, who owned and operated 
mines at Wilburton and Haileyville. Naming communities 
after themselves never troubled the coal barons, for they 
had few inhibitions about trumpeting to the world their role 
in the development of the region's coal industry. 10 
Many Indian Territory coal towns were named after the 
7 
owner or operator of the local mine. Haileyville, Dow, 
Wilburton, Adamson, Alderson, and Phillips are only a few 
examples. (See Figure 1.) Located on lands leased from the 
Choctaws, these towns were beyond the reach of government in 
many respects. One source argues that "these towns were 
entirely without civil government." In Indian Territory 
coal towns, the coal barons were the law. 11 
The rapid development of the Indian Territory coal 
industry resulted in a labor shortage. With local Indians 
reluctant to work in the mines, operators sent agents to 
eastern states and Europe to recruit laborers. While the 
influx of labor drove wages down, many of these new laborers 
were experienced miners from Illinois, Pennsylvania, and the 
British Isles. Part of their cultural baggage was a strong 
sense of industrial unionism. ll! 
The first union local organized in Indian Territory was 
a Knights of Labor assembly at Midway. The local was 
established in August 1882 by two miners recently arrived 
from Gillespie, Illinois. The national organization nearly 
immediately granted a charter to the assembly. The local at 
Midway was a "mixed assembly," meaning laborers from all 
trades were welcome, but nearly all its members were coal 
miners. While the Knights could successfully bring together 
skilled and unskilled laborers, racial attitudes of the era 
hampered complete organization of the miners. British and 
American miners flocked to the Knights locals, but little 
"S'igure 1. Railroads a nd Coal Towns (1900) 
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effort was expended to recruit Southeastern Europeans. 13 
Less than a year later, the first strike in Indian Territory 
occurred. After the operators slashed the wage scale, the 
miners struck on May 1, 1883. A joint-meeting of the 
Savanna and McAlester miners was held on the prairie near 
Savanna. At the meeting a committee was selected to appeal 
to Chief Jack McCurtain of the Choctaw Nation to intervene 
in their behalf. McCurtain's response was not what the 
miners had hoped for. He threatened to have the miners 
deported unless they called off the strike. McCurtain 
directed the committee to inform the striking miners to 
either return to work or "get ready to take an Arkansas 
bed." The miners then called off the month-long strike and 
returned to work at the reduced wage scale. 1 " 
Despite this initial setback, Indian Territory miners 
continued to organize. Additional Knights assemblies were 
established at Krebs, McAlester, and Savanna, with a total 
membership of fifteen hundred. Better organized, the miners 
again struck in 188~. This time they demanded a nine and 
one-half hour day and a uniform wage scale of $2.50 a day, 
an increase of fifty cents over the prevailing rate. Not 
wanting to derail the increasing production from their 
mines, the operators immediately acceded to the miners' 
demands. The victory spurred the miners to continue their 
efforts to bring all Indian Territory miners into the 
union. ' 5 
11 
The Knights continued to organize Indian Territory 
miners for the next decade. There were occasional work-
stoppages, and the miners still lacked the capacity to bring 
the operators to the bargaining table, but the miners' 
numbers grew throughout the period. By 1889 nearly two 
thousand miners were in Indian Territory coal mines, most 
working for the three largest firms, the Osage Coal and 
Mining Company, the Atoka Coal and Mining Company, and the 
Choctaw Coal and Railway Company. These miners had 
organized into ten local assemblies. The Coalgate district 
was particularly well-organized with at least five 
assemblies at Coalgate, Lehigh, and Atoka.a 
By the 1890s the Knights were entrenched in many Indian 
Territory coal towns. The miners continued to bide their 
time until they had garnered the strength needed to bring 
the operators to the bargaining table. In the interim, they 
continued to espouse the virtues of worker solidarity as 
they brought new arrivals into their union. 
In the Spring of 189~ the United Mine Workers launched 
a nation-wide strike. At the same time the mine operators 
of Indian Territory announced a wage reduction. Responding 
to this action, the miners of the Territory, organized under 
the Knights of Labor, also struck. The result was the first 
large-scale labor disturbance in the history of Indian 
Terri tory. 17 
12 
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CHAPTER II 
LIFE AND WORK IN OKLAHOMA'S COAL TOWNS 
Oklahoma's coal miners worked in the most dangerous 
mines in the United States. As a result, the miners turned 
to industrial unionism to improve the conditions they toiled 
under. Add to their hazardous working conditions the 
classic outrages of the company town system, compounded by 
the unique situation that territorial status created and 
that the coal barons found easy to exploit, and the coal 
towns of Oklahoma were ripe for the growth of industrial 
unionism. 
Oklahoma's coal belt stretches in an a:rc across the 
southeastern part of the state. The center of mining 
activity ran from Lehigh to McAlester, then turned northeast 
to McCurtain. (See Figure 2.) With few exceptions, the 
most notable being the Henryetta district, the lion's share 
of production came from this region. 1 
Oklahoma's coal miners worked in three main types of 
mines. They worked in strip mines when the coal seam lay 
just below the surface. Plows and scrappers first removed 
the overburden, exposing the coal. Miners then broke up the 
coal with picks and shovels. Then they loaded the coal into 
15 
Figure 2. Oklahoma Coal Deposits 
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coal in Oklahoma as of January 1, 197 4 (Source: Oklahoma 
Geological Survey Gi~-17, p. 10). 
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railroad cars if it was for industrial use or onto wagons 
ifthe coal was for local consumption. If the coal was too 
far beneath the surface for strip mining, mine engineers 
sank a shaft to reach the coal seam. Sometimes shaft mines 
reached six hundred feet underground. If the coal 
outcropped on a hillside, miners reached the coal with a 
slope mine, following the coal seam as it went down and into 
the hill. Slope mines dominated in Oklahoma's coal belt. 
This was largely due to the hilly nature of the region, but 
it was a bonus for the account books, because slope mines 
required far less capital investment than shaft mines and 
their expensive haulage systems.e 
The miners began by driving a "main entry" to reach the 
coal seam. Employing the room and pillar system, miners 
opened up side tunnels that veered off the main entry at 
right angles. They then cut rooms into the coal seam. Huge 
pillars of coal remained standing between rooms to provide 
roof support. Miners, typically two to a room, then began 
the process of blasting down and loading the coal into cars 
for transport to the surface. The miner began by 
undercutting the coal using a pick. Because of Oklahoma's 
relatively thin coal seams, this practice forced the miner 
to work while virtually lying on his side, often in standing 
water. Undercutting was a time-consuming process that often 
took two or three hours. After completing undercutting, the 
miner hand- drilled a powder- hole. 3 
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Miners prepared a shot-cartridge by wrapping a stick 
with pieces of newspaper, then withdrawing the stick and 
filling the paper tube with black powder. After placing the 
shot-cartridge on the end of a five foot iron "miners 
needle," he inserted the shot-cartridge into the mouth of 
the charge-hole. This was a dangerous step, because 
sometimes gas collected in the charge-hole and the act of 
inserting the cartridge drove the gas out of the hole and 
into contact with the miner's open-flame lamp, igniting it. 
If everything went according to plan, the miner would then 
tamp in the cartridge with clay, sometimes in the early 
years with bits of coal, a very dangerous practice. Finally 
the miner would remove the needle and insert the squib, a 
portion of wax paper with a small amount of powder at its 
end that served as a fuse. After lighting the squib, the 
miner immediately departed for safer regions of the mine. 
The blast that followed routinely brought down a ton of 
coal." 
After the blast, the miner cleared away any rock and 
placed it in "gob" piles along the sides of the tunnels and 
in worked-out areas of the mine. Then the miner laid rails 
to his room and up to the face of the coal seam. Only then 
could the miner load lump coal into the coal cars, placing a 
metal tag on the car to inform the weighman aboveground who 
was to be credited for the load. The coal companies paid 
only for lump coal, sifting it through screens before 
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weighing. The practice of paying only for lump coal became 
a central grievances of the miners' strike of 1899-1903.s 
Until 1900 Oklahoma's miners worked an average of nine-
and-a-half hours daily, 250-300 days annually. Wages 
amounted to around $2.50 per day. Most miners worked on a 
tonnage rate basis. Here lay a core problem that led to 
many accidents. Miners often ignored safety precautions 
because the tonnage rate was the basis of the wage system. 
This compounded an already dangerous situation. Eventually 
operators began hiring men as "day miners." They earned a 
flat daily rate. "Day miners" took care of many of the 
"dead work" tasks in the mine. These included laying of 
rails, timbering, and haulage, among many other tasks. 
Miners had long protested performing such jobs when they 
received no pay for them.• 
Oklahoma's mines had the highest death rate in the 
nation per million tons produced. There were ten major 
disasters prior to 1914 that claimed a total of three 
hundred lives. (See Figure 3.) This figure is deceiving, 
as actually over seven hundred miners died in the mines of 
the district prior to 1914. This is because the term 
"disaster" is misleading. At least five miners had to die 
in an accident before it qualified as a "disaster." Most 
miners died alone or in small groups of two or three. 7 
On January 3, 1910, John Wollock arrived for his shift 
at the Rock Island Coal Mining Company's Mine Number Five at 
Figure 3. Major Coal Mining Disasters 
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Alderson. He never finished the shift. According to the 
State Mine Inspector's report, Wollock died when he "was 
suffocated by afterdamp from an explosion caused by a windy 
shot." Almost as an afterthought, the three-line accident 
report noted that Wollock left a wife and six children. 
Wollock's death was just one of many that occurred during 
the early days of the coal industry in Oklahoma.• Death or 
injury could come from a multitude of causes and occur 
literally in a flash. 
In the early years of the coal industry in Oklahoma, 
ignorance created almost carefree attitudes in the mines. 
Blasting went on throughout the day, leaving the mines 
filled with coal dust and powder-smoke. During the 1870s 
and into the 1880s, miners prepared and fired their own 
shots, which routinely brought down a ton of coal.9 When 
the procedure did not go as planned, miners resorted to 
holding "on to the props and rails to keep from being blown 
away by windy shots at firing time." Miners coined the term 
"windy shot" to describe an explosion gone awry. Peter 
Hanraty, one of the first miners in Oklahoma and later a 
union leader and the state's first mine inspector, recalled 
that miners would laugh as coal dust from windy shots 
enveloped them. 10 
"Windy shots" occurred when the explosive charge was 
either under- or over-sized. Improper tamping had the same 
result. Too often sparks from the blast would ignite 
"firedamp," a combination of methane gas and oxygen.'' 
This led to a far larger and uncontrolled explosion. 
"Blown-out shots" caused many accidents and were especially 
severe when they touched off a secondary explosion of the 
surrounding coal dust .'e 
Many accidents occurred during shot firing. This was 
an extremely dangerous vocation, simply the most perilous 
job in the mines.' 3 During a three-year period in the 
early 1880s, Pete Hanraty was the only individual among a 
group of twenty shot firers in the McAlester district who 
1 i ved to tell about his experiences.'" The United States 
Bureau of Mines considered the job so hazardous that "only 
the most reckless men are willing to act as shot firers. 11' 5 
A series of disasters of this type plagued Indian 
Territory's coal industry in the 1880s and 1890s. In 1885 
an explosion at an Osage Coal and Mine Company mine near 
Krebs killed thirteen men. At Savanna in 1887 a windy shot 
touched off an explosion that killed eighteen men. Only six 
died in the initial accident, but afterdamp suffocated 
twelve would-be rescuers when they entered the mine. Large-
scale mining at Savanna ceased after the explosion.'" A 
local poet penned "The Explosion" to document the tragedy. 
It was ten o'clock at night 
When this dreadful thing befell 
The camp was wrapped in slumber 
When there came that blast of hell. 
We knew 'twas an explosion 
Oh, Heaven, 'tis No. 2; 
And men were buried there alive 
Oh, God, what can we do? ... 
Ten men, whom we should honor 
While heros we admire; 
Unheeding danger's warning 
The deadly damp and fire. 17 
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On January 7, 1892 one of the worst accidents to occur 
in Oklahoma's coal mines struck at the Osage Coal and Mining 
Company's Mine Number Eleven at Krebs. In his haste to 
begin his duties, a shot firer began work while the men of 
the preceding shift were still in the mine, a violation of 
guidelines. The subsequent "windy shot" ignited the 
surrounding gas and coal dust, leading to an explosion that 
swept the entire mine. One hundred men lost their lives, 
and injuries crippled another two hundred. The disaster was 
the third worst mining accident in the United States prior 
to 1900.18 
The scene left by the blast was hellish. Among the 
first to view the gory results of the explosion was Peter 
Hanraty .'• Three hundred and fifty men had been in the 
mine at the time of the explosion, most congregated at the 
bottom of the shaft, waiting for the cage to lift them to 
the surface. One report stated that "the foot of the shaft 
is one mass of dead bodies." The Kingfisher Free Press 
noted that "limbs, arms and headless bodies were stacked in 
a pile and only five out of twenty-four [found up to that 
point] could be identified. Six small boys who attended the 
fans were mutilated so badly that their own parents could 
not recognize them and they will be buried side by side. teo 
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Miners came from as far as Lehigh, fifty miles away, to act 
as emergency workers. They carried the injured to company 
houses and private residences that served as makeshift 
hospitals. 'u 
A local songwriter commemorated the Krebs disaster with 
the following: 
'Neath the ground in the coal mines, 
In damp and darkness drear, 
Where God's sunlight never shines, 
Grim death is watching there. 
But duck diamonds we must dig, 
To buy the children bread, 
In danger work, we cannot beg, 
And work is poorly paid. 
Death watches for a careless hand, 
To light a fatal blast, 
He crouches in the crumbling roof 
And fires the dreadful gas. 
Pity the ones left desolate 
The children and the wife .22 
Following the Krebs disaster the residents of Indian 
Territory demanded appointment of a federal mine inspector. 
Congress had passed an act in 1891 that created the post, 
but the Harrison administration never filled the position. 
John Mitchell, president of the United Mine Workers of 
America by the end of the decade, applied for the position. 
but Harrison selected Luke Bryan, who both the Grover 
Cleveland a nd William McKinley administrations retained. 
With support from Choctaw Chief Green McCurtin, Bryan 
remained the mine inspector for Indian Territory until 1901 
when he entered priva te business.u 
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The effectiveness of the office of the federal mine 
inspector for Indian Territory was questionable. The 
position produced few concrete results. The inspector's 
duties were more as a chronicler than as an inspector. The 
mine inspector annually sent a comprehensive report to the 
Secretary of the Interior, but it was little more than a 
listing of the previous year's accidents and production 
figures. Accidents continued to increase. 24 
Despite resistance from the operators, changes did 
occur in the shot firing process in Indian Territory mines. 
Miners had fired their own shots in shaft mines until 1885 
and in slope mines as late as 1892, but by 1897 operators 
employed men specifically as shot firers "in most of the 
mines that were dusty. nes Still, in 1902 The South 
McAlester Capital reported that operators "do not regard the 
firing of shots during the day as dangerous to the men at 
work below. neo Despite some operators' views on the 
subject, they met with the federal mine inspector and the 
miners on December 1, 190~. In this meeting the operators 
adopted guidelines regulating shot firing, but for the most 
part they disregarded these rules due to a lack of an 
enforcement mechanism. 87 Strict regulation would come only 
with statehood. 
Explosions were not the only threat to Oklahoma's coal 
miners, for there were a variety of gases or damps that 
endangered them. The term "damp" probably derived from the 
German word dampf, meaning vapors or gases .ea Methane was 
a constant threat. Trapped in pockets, methane seeps into 
mines, occasionally under great pressure. Methane burns 
with a blue flame. Alone it will not support combustion, 
but when mixed with oxygen it became "firedamp," a highly 
explosive mixture that ignited with the slightest spark. 
"Firedamp" collected near the roof at the face of the coal 
seam. Miners detected "firedamp" with safety lamps that 
flared harmlessly when gas was present.e9 
Another gaseous threat was "white damp." Created in 
"firedamp" explosions but also during routine blasting, 
"white damp" was a noxious mix of gases composed mostly of 
carbon monoxide. "White damp" causes drowsiness, stupor, 
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and acute back pains followed by delirium. A concentration 
of 1 percent will cause instant death. Miners discovered 
its presence by the faint smell of violets. When ignited 
"white damp" also burned with a blue flame.30 
More common was "black damp," also known as "choke-
damp." Actually carbon dioxide, "black damp" in small doses 
causes numbness, joint aches, nausea, headache, and choking; 
greater amounts causes death by suffocation. While 
colorless and odorless, miners detected it by its "peculiar 
sweetish taste," but only "when inhaled in large 
quantities." Miners also occasionally broke into pockets of 
"stink damp" (hydrogen sulfide). 31 
Miners used the term "afterdamp" to describe the 
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combination of "white" and "black" damp left in a mine after 
an explosion. "Afterdamp" caused unconsciousness in seconds 
and death so suddenly that men died still clutching their 
tools, even their lunch. 32 It was one of the greatest 
threats miners faced. Chief Mine Inspector Hanraty 
estimated "that fifty percent of the shot-firers" killed in 
accidents died "from the effects of afterdamp. 't33 
Miners surrounded by these gases commented later that 
they were "amongst the damp." Miners referred to these 
various "damps" in an almost mystical, spiritual manner. To 
be "amongst the damp" was to experience something only a 
miner could. Coupled with the strong, skilled artisanal 
attitudes miners held about their craft, these beliefs led 
to a certain aura around the profession of coal mining. 
Many old miners noted that although they would never want 
their sons to find employment in the mines , they were proud 
to have been miners . 3 " 
Oklahoma's coal mines were notorious for their high 
concentrations of explosive methane - so high that many 
mines often had to be closed due to presence of the gas. 
One of the most infamous was Rock Island's Mine Number Eight 
near Hartshorne. The State Mine Inspector's reports 
referred to the mi ne as "one of the large st mines i n the 
district," but also "one of the most gaseous." Year after 
year the mine inspectors referred to the mine as "very 
gaseous." With this omnipresent da nger, it was only a 
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matter of time before an accident occurred. In 1910 a 
methane gas explosion there killed ten men.3~ Finally, 
after repeated accidents, the operators abandoned the mine, 
unable to overcome the problem of inadequate ventilation. 
One miner recalled that those who worked at the mine did it 
at great risk as "it was full of gas." 30 One mine 
superintendent noted that "ventilation was always a 
problem. " 37 
In those early years ventilation was rudimentary. Some 
mines had only "natural" ventilation. Other mines had a 
furnace at the bottom of the shaft that created an updraft 
that pulled dangerous gases out of the mine, but a burning 
furnace in a coal mine was an obvious fire hazard. When a 
miner detected gas in a particular room, the miner brushed 
out the gas with his coat or a piece of canvas. But most 
often the remedy was simply to mark off the area as 
"gassy. usa 
Many miners believed that proper ventilation with large 
exhaust fans would reduce the possibility of gas explosions 
in the mines. They noted the relationship between poor 
ventilation and explosions. 39 The sound of the exhaust 
fans, which could be heard twenty-four hours a day in the 
coal towns, provided "constant assurance" to the miners' 
families. "0 Some miners contended that many operators were 
reluctant to invest in ventilation systems, ignoring one 
mine engineer's argument that "the safest mine is the 
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cheapest. 1141 
Mine inspectors' reports corroborated this opinion. 
They were littered with references to inadequate 
ventilation. In 1909 the Chief Mine Inspector's report on 
the Adamson Coal and Mining Company's Mine Number Three 
noted that "the condition of this mine is bad. There 
appears to be no effort made to conduct the air to the 
working faces .... The whole mine shows that the management 
has been very careless or utterly incompetent." All too 
common in the Mine Inspectors' reports were comments such as 
"ventilation bad in this place" and "bad condition, not 
sufficient ventilation." One mine in Henryetta had "no 
ventilating system" as late as 1910 .4 1! Mine inspectors had 
the authority to levy fines, but penalties for violating 
federal ventilation regulations certainly provided little 
incentive for mine operators to comply with the law. The 
fine for such a violation was "not to exceed five hundred 
dollars. 1143 With fines so light, operators had little 
compulsion to adhere to regulations. 
Insufficient ventilation led to disastrous methane gas 
explosions. One of the worst occurred at McCurtain on March 
20, 1912. On that day a blast ripped through the San Bois 
Coal Company's Mine Number Two, the seventh explosion at the 
mine in the decade since it opened. Each resulted in 
fatalities. 44 Witnesses reported that a fifty-foot tongue 
of fire and smoke erupted from the mine's entrance. 
Miraculously, several miners survived by jumping into a 
side-room as the explosion rumbled by. "5 The Oklahoma 
Miner reported: "At 9:05 o'clock a.m. without a moments 
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warning, and in the winking of an eye, 73 sturdy men were 
swept into eternity by the awful explosion.".,. The 
McAlester Democrat noted that the "disaster whiffed out the 
life lamps of seventy-five miners." Somehow twenty-five 
lucky survivors "were rescued from the black pit of 
death. ""7 One, a sixteen year old boy, began to recount 
the experience to his rescuers when abruptly "a pallor 
spread over his face" as he fell dead .... 
Rescuers found nightmarish scenes as they entered the 
mine. Twenty bodies, "blackened and mutilated almost beyond 
recognition," were brought past "rows of grief stricken 
relatives, who clamored for a view of the dead." As the 
rescue operation stretched into the following day, those 
involved discovered much to their own distress that they had 
been "trampling over the mangled forms of three men since 
yesterday without knowing it."u 
The San Bois disaster left McCurtain "in mourning, 
there is scarcely a home that some relative was not a victim 
of the disaster, the most appalling in the history of the 
southwest." With their men dead, over three hundred women 
and children became homeless, evicted from company housing. 
Towns in the McCurtain vicinity responded to the tragedy by 
collecting money for a disaster fund. 50 Local sources 
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raised $38,000, including $15,000 from the Carnegie Hero 
Fund. The San Bois Coal Mining Company wrote checks to the 
survivors the same day as the disaster, then declared 
bankruptcy. 51 
Eventually government regulations and union pressure 
forced mine operators to install exhaust fans. Though 
exhaust fans greatly improved ventilation and reduced the 
likelihood of explosions in the mines, they never completely 
eliminated the danger. The inherent dangers of coal mining 
precluded this objective from ever being obtained. 
Oklahoma's coal mines had the reputation as the most 
dangerous in the United States, partially due to certain 
practices of both the operators and miners. Fierce 
competition in the regional coal market led operators to 
redouble their efforts to reduce costs, often ignoring 
safety concerns in the process. The result was a wage 
system that promoted production at the expense of safety. 
Wages based on a tonnage rate adversely affected safety. 
Miners had little incentive to spend time engaged in "dead 
work" such as timbering and undercutting of the coal seam, 
both vital safety precautions for which they received no 
pay. The policy of "robbing" the mine's support pillars to 
fill rush orders worsened an already dangerous situation.5 e 
Nonpayment for "dead work" led to a practice called 
"shooting from the solid." The only preparation for 
blasting the coal down was to drill holes for the explosive 
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charge. No effort was made to undercut the coal to enhance 
the effectiveness of the charge. Often instead, "unusual 
charges of powder [would] weaken the roof and pillars" in 
the mines. This led to an abnormally high number of cave-
ins and rock falls, the leading causes of death in the 
mines. In one of the worst accidents of this type, a cave-
in at Adamson in 1914 killed thirteen men, "permanently 
entombing" them.~3 The United States Bureau of Mines 
reported in 1911 that "shooting off the solid .. . has been 
responsible for more accidents to miners and more loss of 
property than almost any other mining practice."~" 
An additional drawback of "shooting from the solid" was 
that it pulverized a large part of the coal. This greatly 
increased the possibility of coal dust explosions. By the 
turn of the century the dangers of "shooting from the solid" 
became recognized nation-wide, and the practice fell into 
disuse. Still, as late as 1913, 80 percent of Oklahoma's 
coal was "shot off the solid." By 1929 production by this 
technique amounted to only about 20 percent of the state's 
output.~~ 
All too often planned explosions in the mines went awry 
and ignited coal dust near the charge-hole. This was far 
worse than a firedamp explosion, which normally only 
affected a localized area in the mine. Coal dust explosions 
created a rolling explosion effect. The initial blast 
lifted great clouds of coal dust. The explosion would feed 
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upon this dust as it continued along the mine's tunnels, 
preceded by a shock wave that warned miners to dive into an 
opening before the flame swept by. Coal dust explosions 
traversed "miles of rooms and entries," and often "wreck[ed] 
structures at the entrance to the mine. "5 • In an accident 
at Wilburton in 190t.., "a sheet of flame was seen to shoot 
out of the mouth of the slope to a height of over a hundred 
feet." The explosion hurled two one hundred pound blocks of 
coal three hundred feet from the mine's entrance. 57 
Miners could be far from the starting point of an 
explosion and still feel its terrible effects. On March 12, 
1903, W. S. Burgess and his son Jess prepared a shot charge 
in Great Western Coal and Coke Company's Slope Mine Number 
Two. They were over a thousand feet away from the charge 
when an explosion ignited by a "windy shot" outran them. 
"The force of the explosion threw both men with such force 
that Jess was killed instantly," his "head crushed to 
jelly." His father fared little better, so severely injured 
that he died two hours later .511 
Spectacular explosions that took many lives captured 
newspaper headlines, but accidents that resulted in the 
death of an individual or a small group were more common. 
In one example from 1909, William Hutchinson, a fifty - three 
year old Scotsman, prepared a shot-charge in the McAlester 
Coal Mining Company's Mine Number Six. After lighting the 
fuse, Hutchinson move d on to the next room to prepare a 
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charge there. Unfortunately for Hutchinson, the coal pillar 
between him and the first charge was inadequate for 
protection from the blast. The shot blew through the pillar 
and the flying coal hit Hutchinson with such force that he 
was thrown across the room and "almost completely 
disembowelled. '15" 
Carelessness caused many accidents. One engineer 
survived a trip into a mine in 1910, but in the process of 
examining the machinery that lowered men down the shaft, he 
leaned forward just as miners below called for the cage to 
be lowered. It was, "catching Mr. Greene's head and killing 
him instantly.'~o In another accident in 1910. Hugh McLary 
was preparing a shot-cartridge when a spark from his open 
flame lamp ignited the powder. The Mine Inspector's report 
noted that "it is almost useless to moralize on this 
accident, as it has occurred so often in the past in 
different places, and I wonder why men grown old in the 
mines will still insist on making up the cartridges with a 
flaming torch on their head, but such is the fact. 1161 
In the mines a moment of thoughtlessness could result 
in instant death. This occurred at the Milby and Dow Coal 
Company's Mine Number Nine in November, 1911. While sinking 
a new shaft, two men died when they connected a shot-charge 
to electrical wires still attached to a battery. The 
Superintendent of the Mine noted that "the accident was a 
strange one ... the engineer ... must not have disconnected 
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the wires from the switch."u 
Inadequate training was a contributing factor in many 
mine accidents. In the 1870s mine operators faced a labor 
shortage. Most local Indians refused to work in the dark, 
damp, and dangerous mines.•3 As a result, operators hired 
immigrants to fill their need for labor. The first were 
from the British Isles. Part of their cultural baggage was 
a strong sense of industrial unionism. Not happy with such 
a labor pool, mine operators began hiring eastern and 
southern European immigrants in the 1880s. One repercussion 
of the mine operators' decision to alter the ethnic 
composition of their work force was a loss in personnel with 
experience in mining." 
In 1908, ~3 percent of miners in Oklahoma had previous 
experience in the industry , but only 9 percent of the 
Italians did, and they comprised the largest immigrant group 
in the mines. A Mine Inspector's report from the period 
noted that "most of the operators in the Indian Territory 
have suffered from a lack of skilled miners, and have had to 
put in their places ignorant and inexperienced men. "•' 
This shift to inexperienced personnel compounded what were 
already extremely hazardous conditions in Oklahoma's coal 
mines ... 
Immigrants responded to the dangerous working 
conditions by forming mutual aid societies. In the early 
yea rs of the coa l industry in Oklahoma, operators provided 
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no form of accident or death benefits, so miners created 
their own institutions to deal with these needs. Italian 
immigrants created the La Minature, Viltorio Emanuel III. 
and Christiforo Colombo fraternal and beneficial societies. 
Among other benefits, disabled miners received compensation 
for up to a year following an injury. Other ethnic groups 
in the mining communities also formed social and fraternal 
orders~ Slovaks established the First Catholic Union. 
Mexicans organized a National Beneficial Society, and the 
Poles founded the National Polish Society. Surprisingly. 
the mutual aid societies were seldom a platform for 
political activity. One source characterized those who 
created them as "church-centered people who had no taste for 
radical politics. 1167 
Miners also responded to their dangerous working 
environment by turning to unionism to improve conditions. 
Safety'r;concerns were a central component of contract 
negotiations. The by-laws of the United Mine Workers called 
for actions "to reduce to the lowest possible minimum the 
awful catastrophes which have been sweeping our fellow 
craftsman to untimely graves by the thousands."08 
Statehood and the poor safety record of Oklahoma's coal 
mines led to the esta blishment of a Chief Inspector of Mines 
in 1907. The first individual to occupy this office was the 
long-time Oklahoma labor leader and miner, Peter Hanraty. 
But establis hment of the position did littl e to improve 
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safety conditions in the mines. In the year ending on June 
30, 1912, there were 103 fatalities in Oklahoma's coal 
mines. The result was 30,610 tons of coal mined "for every 
man killed."69 The President of the Oklahoma School of 
Mines lamented that "one man is killed on the average, in 
the Oklahoma Coal Fields, every week, and one man is 
crippled every day that the mines operate! The number of 
widows and orphans and cripples in this district would make 
an army . " 70 
Eventually strict enforcement of mining laws lessened 
the dangers of the occupation. At the same time, the United 
Mine Workers continued to press for improved safety in the 
mines. Under pressure, the operators came around to the 
view that "the safest mine is the cheapest." "Shooting off 
the solid" fell into disuse. Slowly mine operators improved 
ventilation, installed water sprinkers, and implemented the 
practice of spreading inert rock dust throughout the mine, 
all of which reduced the likelihood of disastrous 
explosions. Mining officials found shale dust an especially 
effective fire retardant. Piled upon elevated planks in the 
mine, an explosion's shock wave knocked the dust into the 
air, stopping the advdncing flame that followed. A Bureau 
of Mines Inspector, writing in the mid-1920s, noted that 
although the value of "rock dusting" had been documented for 
at least ten years, the "coal-mining industry of this 
country did not seek to adopt the practice until 
4:0 
recently. 1171 
Mechanization and a switch to the long wall method of 
mining coal in the 1920s reduced reliance upon the dangerous 
room and pillar method, which was prone to cave-ins. 7 e 
Despite its advantages, mechanization was a double-edged 
sword for the coal miner. Though it eased physical demands 
on the miner, it robbed men of their jobs as machinery 
replaced them. Mechanization also created new dangers. 
Miners often lost arms and legs to the whirling blades of 
the machines. Hanraty lost both his legs in such an 
accident. 73 Another type of accident made common by 
mechanization occurred when the red-hot blades of a mining 
machine came in contact with and ignited pockets of methane 
gas. In one such accident. the gas flared, burning off two 
black miners' ears; only their clothing and hard-hats 
prevented more severe injuries. 7~ Electrification added a 
new element of danger in mining. Contact with the 250 volt 
lines that brought power to the mining machines meant 
instant death. 75 
Medical treatment for those injured in the mines was 
woefully inadequate for the first quarter century of the 
coal industry in Oklahoma. Miners usually received medical 
care from the coal company doctor . The companies deducted 
$1.00 per month from the miners' wages to pay the doctor's 
salary. Until the 1890s no hospitals existed in the coal 
towns. A drug store established in Krebs in 1885 doubled as 
t.l 
a make-shift hospital. Hokey's Drug Store stocked vaseline 
in five hundred-pound lots and iodine in ten-pound amounts, 
and ordered linseed oil fifty barrels at a time. 7 • 
The horrendous disaster at the Osage Coal and Mining 
Company's Mine Number Eleven in 1892 overwhelmed Hokey's 
Drug Store. The accident killed one hundred men and injured 
two hundred more. Responding to the need, Bishop Francis 
Key Brooke of the Episcopal Church appealed for funds. 
After an anonymous donor contributed the necessary money, 
Bishop Brooke established All Saints Hospital in 
McAlester. 77 Beginning as an emergency measure capable of 
caring for about a dozen patients, the hospital grew to a 
hundred bed facility by 1900.n In 1896 a local newspaper, 
with unabashed boosterism, proclaimed that "South McAlester 
... has the finest and best hospital ... in the 
territory. 1179 By the end of 1899 the hospital had provided 
treatment for more than one thousand patients.•o A 
September 191t. patient roster listing "two Mexicans, two 
Russians, six Negroes, two Assyrians, three Italians, one 
Australian, one Bulgarian, one Greek, one Englishmen, two 
Germans, one Canadian, and three Indians" illustrates the 
wide range of nationalities who worked in Oklahoma's coal 
mines. 81 
After statehood, efforts by private humanitarian 
organizations as well as both the state and federal 
governments helped improve safety in the mines of Oklahoma . 
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The Mine Rescue Association, acting in conjunction with the 
American Red Cross, gave lectures throughout the coal 
fields.•e The state established a School of Mines at 
Wilburton and placed rescue trucks equipped with fire-
fighting apparatus in the coal district.•3 The federal 
government contributed a railroad car stocked with mine 
rescue equipment and assumed control of a mine rescue 
station in McAlester. The rescue station, privately funded 
in 1910, was one of only six in the United States at that 
time.•~ The problem was that these efforts focused 
primarily on treating accident victims instead of on 
prevention. 
Since the earliest years of the coal industry in 
Oklahoma, operators, miners, and government inspectors 
wrangled continuously over who was responsible for the many 
accidents that plagued the state's mines. Mine operators 
denied any responsibility at all, arguing that "the miner is 
responsible for his own safety."•~ Chief Mine Inspector 
Hanraty noted that "some cowardly corporation officials, 
when they have an explosion, claim that the explosions are 
the acts of God." Hanraty went on to state that "here in 
Oklahoma we have too much respect for God Almighty to blame 
Him .... Corporations should be held responsible for the 
death or injury of every one of its employees. nab Miners 
not surprisingly placed blame for many accidents on the mine 
operators, contending that they failed to invest 
~3 
sufficiently in ventilation and other safety practices. 87 
Whenever a major accident occurred in the mines, the 
usual ritual was for management and labor to point a finger 
at each other in assessing blame. An explosion on December 
17, 1929 at McAlester killed sixty-one men in the Old Town 
mine. The operator blamed the accident on a miner lighting 
a cigarette, arguing that the miner's match touched off a 
gas explosion.•a But the widow of a miner killed in the 
disaster alleged in a $25,000 lawsuit that the operators 
violated many safety regulations. The lawsuit's most 
serious allegation was that the main ventilation fan was 
inoperative at the time of the explosion. In 1931 a 
McAlester court awarded $75,000 dollars to the families of 
those killed in the disaster. After legal fees and court 
costs were deducted the families of the sixty-one who died 
received $53,000 dollars. 89 
Miners sometimes looked to the metaphysical to explain 
accidents. On Christmas Day, 1902, The South McAlester 
Capital reported: 
The days of superstition are not passed. 
Monday only about sixty miners went to work in 
No. 5 mine, all on account of a prediction made 
by some woman that on that day No. 5 would blow 
up. As absurd as it might appear, over 200 men 
refused to go into the mine on that day." 90 
Also, miners were very uneasy about women entering the 
mines; they perceived a connection between a woman's visit 
and any accident that followed soon thereafter.•• One 
black miner, surveying the results of an explosion at 
4:4: 
Wilburton in January, 1926 that took ninety-one lives, noted 
that "colored folks have a superstition connected with mine 
explosions .... When a negro miner dreams that one of his 
children is burned, he won't work in a mine on the day after 
the dream. One of the men who laid off yesterday morning 
had a dream like that and his life was saved." Another 
miner noted that the disaster had occurred on the thirteenth 
day of the month and the thirteenth day of the year.•e 
While miners and bereaved survivors struggled to come 
to grips with the harsh realities of fatal accidents, they 
had much the same problem with life in the coal towns. The 
amenities of the company town did little to offset the 
miners' strenuous work in a dangerous environment. 
Exploited below ground, miners found little respite in the 
grimy company towns. 
After completing his shift, the miner trudged home to 
his company house. After a hot bath and a meal prepared 
from groceries bought at the company store, the exhausted 
miner soon fell asleep, only to awake all too soon for the 
next day's shift. Miners seldom saw the sun, beginning work 
before sun-up and leaving for home long after dark. Perhaps 
it was for the best. The sight of the company town did 
little to raise one's spirits. 
The typical Oklahoma coal town was little more than an 
"appendage to the coal mine." It had distinctly "semi-
feudal characteristics." The company owned all buildings 
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and houses, built on leased land from the Choctaws in the 
territorial period. It was not until after the watershed 
agreement of 1903, in which the union won recognition and 
many other gains, that the strength of the company town 
waned. Statehood pummeled the coal company town system 
further, but it did not die out until the 1920s. For nearly 
fifty years, the company town system provided ample fuel for 
the growth of industrial unionism among Oklahoma's coal 
miners. 93 
Coal company towns were dreadfully plain. All 
architecture centered around function; little, if any, 
effort was put into a "city beautiful" movement in these 
communities. Dying when the vein played out, these towns 
lacked a sense of permanence, instead exhibiting a sense of 
crude exploitation that betrayed their primary reason for 
being. Oklahoma's coal towns owed their existence to the 
mineral resource that lay beneath them. 94 
The mining companies typically built and rented nearly 
all housing in the early years of a coal community. Company 
houses were uniform in every manner. Usually painted a dull 
red, the standard company house had two to five rooms. 
Built with cheap local lumber, each house cost as little as 
$50.00 to construct. Company houses rented for $1.80 to 
$2.00 per week. Operators deducted rent from wages and 
often withheld income for "damages" when the miner moved out 
of the house. •::~ 
Company houses illustrated the fleeting nature of the 
coal towns. Lacking solid foundations, most rested two to 
three feet above the ground upon piles of stone or brick. 
When a particular coal town's economic viability waned, 
operators often literally moved the town to a new location. 
This occurred at Savanna after the disaster there in 1887. 
Company housing was usually better in towns than in remote 
coal camps, and miners quickly turned to private housing 
when and where it became available.•• When company housing 
was scarce, miners often built their own two-room box 
houses. 97 Also, the practice of two families sharing a 
four room house was common. 98 In the most primitive coal 
mining communities, "most of the miners lived in tents.""" 
The row after row of identical houses in these isolated 
communities only reinforced the uniformity of the company 
towns. After a rain, the dirt streets quickly became nearly 
impassable. In the houses amenities were at a minimum. 
Coal towns seldom had sewage systems. Each residence had an 
outhouse behind it, and typically four houses shared a 
community water well. Often the water out of these wells 
was laden with minerals. One miner remarked that "the 
water is so hard that when you want a drink you have to 
break off a piece and then pulverize it with a sledge hammer 
before drinking it. " 100 
Miners lived a frugal lifestyle - so frugal that some 
estimated $50,000 in savings lay buried below one coal town. 
Most single men lived in groups to cut costs. 101 Families 
often took in boarders to help supplement their income. 
This often was crucial income, averaging nearly 20 percent 
of family income; for the Lithuanians it was an astounding 
62 percent. aoe Around the turn of the century, boarders 
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paid $18.00 monthly for room and board. This consisted of a 
bed and two hot meals a day plus a lunch to take to work. 
The exception was three hot meals on Sunday. 103 
Boarders were much more common in the households of 
immigrant miners than in those of native-born Americans. In 
one survey of 476 households, eighty-three took in men, and 
of those, eighty-one were immigrant households. Overall, 
about 20 percent of immigrant homes had boarders. 
Lithuanian families had the highest percentage, some 55.6 
percent. Among immigrant families the Welsh took in the 
fewest. Only one out of twenty-seven Welsh households had 
boarders. But the practice led to high congestion in these 
households. In some of the immigrant households, the 
average numbers of persons per sleeping room reached as high 
as 3. 2 7, the average was 2. 54. 104 
Despite the starkness of the coal town, miners took 
pride in their community and engaged in lusty booster 
battles with nearby towns. Lehigh and Coalgate were 
constant rivals, as were the "twin cities" of Hartshorne and 
Haileyville. One resident of Savanna in 1884 listed among 
the town's attributes, "two drug stores, three finishing 
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stores and three grocie [sic] stores ... four bar shops, two 
black smith shops, [and] two fancy ladies houses." It is 
interesting to note that the local booster perceived '~two 
fancy ladies houses" as an asset of the community. In 1904 
the local paper in McCurtain announced that the community 
was the "best town on the Fort Smith and Western, between 
Guthrie and Fort Smith." When "a first class man" arrived, 
local leaders were "glad to see the San Bois Company's 
houses fill up with this class of family." But one miner 
noted that "the coal diggers were a rough lot, living poorly 
in company shacks . "los 
Operators paid miners in both cash and scrip, but 
advances were available only in the latter. By issuing 
scrip, operators strengthened their control over the miners. 
Advances often led to the infamous "bob-tail" check on 
payday. A "bob-tail" check resulted when advances and 
deductions totaled more than earnings, leaving the miner 
with a paycheck amounting to $0.00. One miner recalled that 
"a lot of people never saw any money at all." Scrip could 
be used in stores and banks not owned by the coal company, 
but at a discounted value. Operators sometimes replaced 
scrip with non-transferable coupons to counteract the use of 
discounted coupons, which were often used for gambling or 
drinking. lo• 
Mine owners forced patronage of the company store by 
often paying their employees in scrip. These stores charged 
lc9 
prices higher than at independent stores. sometimes as much 
as 20 percent. Operators fenced and guarded coal camps to 
fend off unwanted visitors. They ran off local farmers who 
attempted to sell their produce to miners. Not 
surprisingly, company stores were quite profitable for 
operators . 107 
Merchants who competed with the company stores for the 
miners' patronage found the use of scrip a difficult 
obstacle to overcome. One competitor lamented that "it 
would be better for miners to economize a month and then 
with the money go to Elzey and Perry, where they get $1.25 
on the dollar, instead of trading on scrip worth 95 cents on 
the dollar." Merchants who dared to compete with the 
company stores advertised that "a dollar in cash. will buy 
more staples of Elzey and Perry than a dollar and a quarter 
any company store in town. Cash is the true test. Try it 
and see . 11108 
In the early years of the industry, most coal companies 
either operated their own stores or awarded "company store 
privileges" to "independent" stores in exchange for a 
percentage of the receipts. One independent operator, Dr. 
D. M. Hailey, received "company store" privileges as part of 
his payment when he sold out to the Gould interests. These 
businesses could offer credit, because the coal company 
deducted the money owed to the store operator from miners' 
wages. As a result, these stores were little more than 
parts of the company town system controlled by the 
operators. 109 
As early as the 1890s the company town system showed 
signs of weakening. Independently owned barber shops, 
50 
clothing stores, drug stores, and warehouses began to dot 
the coal towns. One dry goods merchant in Hartshorne did 
business from a tent, displaying his wares on the sidewalk. 
In 1890 Hartshorne had only five businesses - a company 
store, two general stores, a meat market, and a drug store. 
White farmers brought in wagons of wild hogs that sold at 
five cents per pound. 110 Miners bought buttermilk and 
butter from local ranches. 111 Also, a thriving Syrian 
merchant community of around 150 did business "through the 
mining camps" of the region.ue By 1904 Hartshorne was a 
"booming little mining town" with a grocery store, the 
"Palace Meat Market," the "City Meat Market," a hardware 
store, cotton gin, and a lumberyard. Hartshorne also 
boasted of having a bank, newspaper, and a "big wooden opera 
house."'" 
After 1900 the erosion of the coal barons' total 
domination of their towns was well underway. It was not 
that the coal company's institutions disappeared - they did 
not. The change was that after 1900 the operators had to 
share the economic pie of the coal towns, whereas in the 
preceding years it had been their exclusive domain. After 
1900 a multitude of small businesses developed in the coal 
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communities. A diverse business community developed as 
livery stables, confectioners, jewelers, clothing and 
furniture stores, and many other businesses began to dot the 
coal towns. All were competition for the company store that 
had operated as a department store, offering numerous 
general merchandise items for sale."-
The establishment of schools was another important 
activity in the coal towns. In the early 1870s there were 
no schools in the territory. Parents taught their children 
to read. The earliest non-Indian school was a subscription 
school established in McAlester in 1876. In 1881 the 
Presbyterians founded a mission that doubled as a school. 
In Hartshorne in the late-1890s the Choctaw, Oklahoma and 
Gulf Railroad built a four-room schoolhouse for the children 
of its employees. Miners financed its operation, the cost 
being deducted from their wages. Married men paid one 
dollar per month and single men fifty cents per month into 
the education fund. Non-miners paid $1.50 per month to send 
their children to the school. But by 190~ schools in 
Hartshorne no longer charged for tuition as the community 
switched to taxation to finance its school system.11 ::~ 
As the coal towns grew they attracted many immigrants. 
As a result many of the communities of southeastern Oklahoma 
have wide-ranging ethnic diversity. In 1900 26 percent of 
the workforce in the coal mines were immigrants. By 1911 
more than 3,300 immigrants worked in Oklahoma's coal mines, 
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representing 55 percent of the workforce, leading one critic 
to note that the coal mines were "largely run by 
foreigners." All the major coal towns had substantial 
immigrant populations.''"' 
Italians were numerous in the coal towns, comprising 
more than one-third of the immigrant population. In the 
coal mines Italians made up ~2 percent of the workforce. By 
1910 the Italian population of Oklahoma's coal mining 
communities numbered around ten thousand. Their presence 
strongly affected the culture in many of the 
communities. 117 Among the most successful of the Italians 
was Joe Fassino, who moved to Krebs in 1891 and opened a 
store there that sold food his "countrymen wanted." Fassino 
also smuggled food into the local coal camps, where he sold 
Italian families such specialties as cheese, figs, and 
chestnuts. Later Fassino opened a macaroni factory in 1897. 
Other Italians entered the grocery store business until by 
1905 there were "seven or eight" in the Krebs area.u• The 
experiences of Fassino and other Italians indicated upward 
mobility was at least a possibility for immigrants in the 
coal towns. 
As a result of the influx of so many Italians, many of 
the coal towns developed "Little Italys." Krebs, with 
nearly 90 percent of the membership of the United Mine 
Workers local being Italian by 1909, became and remains a 
center of Italian culture in Oklahoma. By 1910 one - half of 
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the population of Krebs was Italian. As their numbers and 
wealth grew, the Italians showed signs of affluence. They 
operated several general merchandise stores in Krebs by 1905 
and by 1911 had a controlling interest in a large mercantile 
store in Coalgate. Italians also rose in the white-collar 
ranks. In 1916 Dominic Antonelli was "manager of the 
Italian Department" of a bank in McAlester." Eventually 
Italians acquired more property than any other immigrant 
group in the coal communities. 11 ' Poles, Croatians, 
Slovaks, and Slovenians also owned "considerable property" 
in the coal towns. At the other extreme, "only a very small 
percentage" of Mexicans in the coal towns owned 
property. 120 
Americans' characterization of Italians-Americans often 
had an underlying, sometimes subtle, sometimes overt, 
racism. Americans charged that the Italians were slow to 
assimilate. They pointed out that the Italians congregated 
in their own neighborhoods while retaining their own 
language and customs. An Immigration Commission report 
contended that the Italians "drink enormously and are highly 
excitable." Another claimed that Italians were "too nervous 
and excitable" for work in dangerous areas of a mine. 
Others held slightly more progressive views. The opinion 
that "he is an Italian, but a good fellow just the same" was 
corranon. '"' 
Numerous other nationalities came to work in Oklahoma's 
coal mines. One of the largest immigrant groups were the 
miners from the British Isles. English, Welsh, Scottish, 
and Irish miners came to Indian Territory to ply their 
trade. They were among the most experienced miners in the 
Choctaw Nation. Lithuanians were one of the largest 
immigrant groups in the coal towns. There were Russian and 
Ukrainian communities that numbered in the hundreds at 
Hartshorne, Lehigh, and Coalgate. Poles drifted into the 
coal fields in 1876, and by 1911 an estimated eight hundred 
of them lived in region. There were small Belgian, 
Bulgarian, Dutch, French, Slovak, and Magyar communities as 
well. After 1890 a sizeable black and Mexican population 
developed in the coal towns. 122 With immigrants drawn from 
nearly every country in Europe, McAlester, Krebs, 
Hartshorne, Lehigh, and Coalgate all developed large 
immigrant communities. In Krebs, half of the population at 
statehood was foreign-born. 123 
Lasting vestiges of the ethnic diversity in the coal 
towns remain to this day. In Krebs, St. Joseph's Catholic 
Church, as well as the numerous Italian restaurants and 
grocery stores around the area, remains as an indelible 
symbol of the impact of the Italians on the region. 12" At 
Hartshorne stands the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Russian 
Orthodox Church. Built in 1917 by Carpatho-Russians who 
worked in the mines near Hartshorne, the bright red brick 
structure, complete with white spires topped by three blue 
onion-domes, stands in vivid contrast to the less colorful 
churches of the community. The church was situated so the 
congregation faced the east in accordance with Orthodox 
tradition. The building, decorated with icons and stained 
glass, was a center of activity for those of the Orthodox 
faith in Hartshorne.u::~ 
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Religious activity was an important part of life in the 
coal towns. In the 1870s the coal communities were devoid 
of churches, as the company barons did not attend to the 
religious needs of their employees. During that decade 
circuit rider preachers provided opportunities for religious 
worship to the miners. They boarded with the local brethren 
and preached in the community's schoolhouse. Often there 
was only one hymn book. The preacher resorted to reading 
the hymns one line at a time and then the congregation would 
repeat it back- a practice known as "lining it." 
Congregations established permanent churches in the 1880s. 
By the 1890s both the Protestant and Catholic faiths were 
well-represented in the coal communities of the region.'e. 
Churches were centers of activity in the coal town, but 
other social organizations played important roles also. The 
fraternal societies of each nationality were important 
social institutions. Miners also joined the Woodman of the 
World Lodge and other fraternal orders, including the 
Masons, Knights of Columbus, Odd Fellows, and the 
Rebekahs . 1117 Carpatho-Russians at Hartshorne joined the 
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Russian Orthodox Brotherhood, an organization that provided 
aid to disaster victims. 1 e• Besides providing aid and 
solace following accidents, these institutions organized 
social activities such as picnics, dances, and barbecues. 
Holidays were major social events in the coal towns, 
providing a brief respite from the rigors of daily life. 
Every January 25 Scottish miners celebrated the birth of 
Robert Burns. Activities included recitals of the poet's 
work, and while recent arrivals from Scotland played bagpipe 
music, others performed Scottish folk-dances. On St. 
Patrick's Day all residents in the coal camps became Irish 
for a day. An important holiday for the Welsh miners was 
Saint David's Day. Fourth of July celebrations were a major 
affair. After a picnic, miners listened to a reading of the 
constitution followed by customary political speeches . 1 • 9 
Miners engaged in various pursuits during their leisure 
time. Customarily quitting work at noon on Saturday, miners 
and their families enjoyed band concerts, circuses, dances, 
bicycling, and going to the local opera house. Every coal 
town fielded a baseball team. McCurtain claimed to have 
"the best baseball team in the Choctaw Nation." Miners also 
enjoyed hunting and fishing. Often the entire family would 
gather together and fry fresh turkey in the woods . 180 
Horse-racing and the betting that accompanied it were 
other favorite pastimes of the miners. At Lehigh a "saw-
backed mare 11 was famous for being "transformed into a streak 
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of lightning" that separated many a stranger from his money. 
One individual trained his horse to fake a limp that 
miraculously disappeared on the track. One miner recalled 
years later that the contestants used "trickery of all 
sorts" to gain an advantage over their opponents. 131 
While at leisure, miners consumed their favorite 
beverage, "choc" beer. Adopted from the Choctaw Indians, 
"choc" beer was a concoction of ingredients that included 
barley, hops, tobacco, fishberries, and a small amount of 
alcohol. Local Indians also used fishberries as a 
paralyzing agent to disable fish. Considering this, one can 
only speculate on its effect in the drink. Another recipe 
called for boiling malt, oats, corn, and hops in water. 
Then the brewer added yeast and sugar. After allowing the 
mixture to ferment, it "afforded a drink that had a wallop 
comparable to the kick of a mule. " 1u 
Miners considered "choc" essential for good health. 
They claimed that local water supplies were questionable and 
that "choc" counteracted the effects of the "deadly malaria 
mosquito." Many argued that "choc" was a tonic, not a 
beverage, and local doctors agreed. Also, miners complained 
that the water tasted "gyppy" and that converting it into 
"choc" was the only wa y to make it palatable. With all the 
men working in the mines, women dominated the manufacture 
and distribution of "choc" beer. Production was 
considerable as the South McAles ter Capital reported in 1895 
that "Choctaw beer is again as plentiful ... as strip pit 
water." Irked by this illicit liquor trade, the Indian 
agent noted in 1894: that women were "troublesome" in their 
production of "choc" beer. 133 
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If a miner preferred "store-bought" whiskey to home-
made "choc" beer, it was available also. While Indian 
Territory was technically dry, in reality it was far from 
that. Due to the remoteness of the region, mail order 
grocery shopping was common. Often the order included a 
gallon of whiskey, carefully packaged to appear as groceries 
and strategically placed in the center of the crate to 
afford protection from the prying eyes of the United States 
Marshals. Bootleg whiskey peddlers appearing out of the 
night and announcing their arrival by firing two pistol 
shots in rapid succession also frequented Indian Territory. 
But bootleg whiskey was expensive, two dollars a pint. 124 
Proto-speakeasys also dotted the Choctaw Nation. The South 
McAlester Capital reported in 1894: that "the beer dives on 
the West side of the track are becoming a nuisance to the 
residents to such an extent that should be abated .... If 
the half that is told of them is true, they should be wiped 
out of existence. " 13 ::~ The 'MK&T Railroad shipped in whiskey 
marked as "freight" for its employees in the territory and 
instructed their station agents to resist inspection by the 
Indian police. 136 
Miners actively participated in politics. Even before 
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statehood the miners wielded considerable political clout. 
Hanraty, leader of U.M.W. District 21, helped form the Twin 
Territories Federation of Labor and was its first president. 
After statehood Hanraty became the state's first mine 
inspector; he also served as mayor of both McAlester and 
Coalgate. During his political career Hanraty often 
incurred the wrath of conservatives in the state. They 
labeled him a socialist and an anarchist when he came out in 
favor of women's suffrage. Hanraty denied he was "anything 
else but a Democrat .... To call me an anarchist or a 
socialist - I don't know whether it is a discredit or an 
honor .... I am a man who advocates human rights- human 
rights and human liberty." Conservatives argued that 
Hanraty led a union that was a "mob" that deprived "American 
Citizens of the Constitutional Ri~ht which the United States 
guarantees to every man. " 1:a7 
The political loyalties of Oklahoma's miners split 
between two groups. Many were traditional unionists, and 
their politics reflected their moderation; these mainstream 
unionists tended to vote Democratic. But many miners leaned 
more to the left politically than the Democratic Party. 
Support for the Socialist Party was strong in mining towns 
such as Krebs, where only a "tiny middle -class" existed. 
In 1906 Appeal to Reason, a socialist paper published in 
Girard, Kansas, proclaimed that "the coal mining region of 
the Indian Territory is aflame with socialism." Socialist 
candidate Eugene Debs garnered ~0 percent of the 
presidential vote in Krebs in 1912, and nearly as high a 
percentage in many other Oklahoma coal communities, 
indicating considerable support for socialism among the 
miners at that time. 138 
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In the period from 1906 to 191~. socialist miners 
captured the leadership of the United Mine Workers districts 
in the Southwest, including District 21, which included 
Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Texas. In congressional districts 
with mining communities, socialist candidates regularly 
garnered a large share of the popular vote. l:u 
Oscar Ameringer referred to the state's coal miners as 
"instinctive radicals, genuine American proletarians" and as 
a "fighting bunch." Miners of this persuasion contended 
that everything was "shot to hell because of capitalism." 
Many miners considered socialism a viable alternative that 
"was a respectable democratic ideology compatible with 
American and Christian values," according to one 
authority. 1 " 0 
While the Socialist Party was important in many miners' 
lives, the central institution for most was the union. 
Through the strike of 189~ the Knights of Labor represented 
the miners. After the failure of that year's strike, the 
Knights collapsed in Indian Territory. The United Mine 
Workers penetrated the region in 1898, and from 1903 until 
the mid-1920s it exer cised undisputed leadership among 
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Oklahoma's coal miners.'"' 
Miners turned to the union when they believed they had 
been treated unjustly by the operators. Union officials, 
armed with signed contracts, traveled extensively, settling 
disputes between miners and operators . The union's locals 
were the "most powerful working-class institution in the 
region." But discipline was rigid in the union's locals. 
In 1923 members of the Krebs local voted to discharge 
"Brother Alfonse Petrone" for "hiring a scab painter." 
Also, any member caught "assepting [sic] a salaried [sic] or 
comission [sic] for acting as an enforcement officer shall 
be expe 11 ed from the organization. "'"e 
Miners and their families spent much of their time 
participating in union-sponsored activities such as 
barbecues, picnics, and dances. In organizing such events 
the union helped foster cordial relations among the many 
ethnic groups in the coal towns. 1 " 3 This resulted in these 
towns being amazingly devoid of racial animosity. 
The frequent disasters and strikes pulled the various 
ethnic groups together under the umbrella of the union. The 
disaster at Krebs in 1892 and the "great strike" of 1899-
1903 are examples.'"" As the numbers of accidents grew, so 
did unionism among the miners. Many miners held that only 
by binding together could they compel the operators to 
accept practices that improved safety. That goal became a 
driving force behind the growth of unionism among Oklahoma's 
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coal miners. They also saw unionization as increasing their 
ability to lobby for strict government regulations on safety 
in the mines. But unionization meant much more than the 
miners banding together so that the operators would heed 
their collective call for improving safety. Unionized, the 
miners could demand payment for "dead work." Miners also 
saw unionism as a way to combat the common practice of 
short-changing the miner at the scales. A checkweighman, 
selected and paid by the miners, became a non-negotiable 
demand of the miners. Above ground, the union confronted 
the outrages of the company town. Abolition of scrip and 
the company store were planks in the union platform. 
Only in unions could the miners offset the tremendous 
power of the coal barons. Individually they were helpless; 
collectively, they could confront the operators. The coal 
communities were the battleground for that struggle. 
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CHAPTER III 
CHALLENGING THE COAL BARONS: THE STRIKE OF 1891.. 
The first major confrontation between the coal 
operators and miners of Oklahoma occurred in the spring of 
1891... Under the leadership of the Knights of Labor, the 
miners for the first time resisted the edicts of the 
operators. The result was a six-month stand-off in which 
the miners faced off against an alliance of the operators, 
their hired security forces, the Choctaw Nation leadership, 
the United States government, its army, and an overzealous 
Indian Agent who saw radical labor uprisings everywhere. 
Occurring in a year of labor unrest highlighted by the 
railway workers strike, Coxey's Army, and the Cripple Creek 
Massacre, this array of forces deployed against the miners 
was symptomatic of capital's and government's reaction to 
the labor unrest that swept across the nation that momentous 
year. 
The catalyst for the strike of 1891.. was a 25 percent 
wage reduction announced by the operators in early March. 
This wage cut reduced the average miner's income to less 
than two dollars a day. The operators argued that the wage 
cut was necessary, contending that they were losing markets 
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to coal from Alabama, Colorado, and New Mexico. They argued 
that the wage cut would allow them to recover their markets, 
thus providing the miners more work. An editorial published 
in the Coalgate Nonpareil and in other local papers argued 
that the wage reduction "will be made for the purpose of 
competing in prices with other coal companies and therefore 
may greatly increase the demand for coal from the mines, 
thus furnishing steadier employment for the miners.'" 
Production and income statistics strongly refute the 
operators' contention that they were being squeezed out of 
the market. Figures for both total tonnage and income 
increased in the period from 1891 to 1893. During that time 
production increased 50 percent and gross earnings grew 
substantially.e 
The announced wage cut was to take effect on April 1. 
In late March several mine superintendents met at Lehigh 
with a Knights of Labor committee representing the miners to 
discuss the wage cut. The meeting accomplished little more 
than delivery of an ultimatum. Members of the Knights local 
leadership reported the results of the conference to the 
miners in mass meetings held in all the coal camps. At 
these meetings the Knights counseled the miners to reject 
the wage cut. The miners accepted the advice and declared 
that they would not accept the wage reduction and would not 
work at the new rate when it took effect. The Muskogee 
Phoenix noted that "something is hinted of a strike about 
7/r 
the 1st . 113 
The strike that followed led to a nearly complete shut-
down of the territory's mines. The Oklahoma Times Journal 
reported on April 6: 
With the exception of the mines operated here 
[at McAlester) and at Alderson the strike which 
was to affect all mining interests throughout 
the territory on April 1, is an accomplished fact. 
The whistles at Krebs, Lehigh and Coalgate blew 
for work yesterday, but all shafts at each place 
are idle.~ 
The signs of a major confrontation were unmistakable. 
Taking the lead, the Choctaw Coal and Railway Company 
began to operate its mines at Alderson and Hartshorne under 
the new wage scale with black strikebreakers brought in from 
outside the territory.s Taking this action prior to April 
1, the move threatened to provoke violence in the coal 
camps. The Daily Oklahoman reported: 
The miners of Lehigh, Krebs, and Coalgate struck 
today. Unless a settlement is speedily reached 
much suffering will result . If an attempt is made 
to ship in new men, as the operators declare it is 
their intention, there will be bloodshed, it is 
feared."" 
Tensions continued to rise during April. While the 
Osage Coal and Mining Company offered five cents more per 
ton than the Choctaw Company, its main competitor, the 
firm's miners declared that they "can not make a living at 
those wages, and will not give in." But at the same time a 
local paper noted that the miners "are getting desperate." 
The Muskogee Phoenix reported: 
The agitators threaten to employ drastic measures 
to compel the miners to side with them. The 
citizens generally express a willingness to repel 
any attempt at invasion (of the mines}. Much 
apprehension exists amongst the business men, as 
following the recent general financial depression 
a strike now will break up many of them. This 
vicinity, however, seems to be safely outside the 
maelstrom of dissension! 
Late in the month the strikers attempted to shut down 
the Choctaw mines, and as a result the white miners at 
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Alderson joined the walk-out. Anticipating this action the 
Choctaw Coal Company brought in an additional three hundred 
black strikebreakers from Thurber, Texas. The Coalgate 
Nonpareil noted that "these Negroes are on the way from 
Texas and the 500 miners who went on strike some weeks ago 
have decided that the Negroes will not go to work and 
trouble is expected when they arrive."• 
When Edwin Ludlow, superintendent of the Choctaw mines, 
prepared to operate that company's mines "without a white 
miner," the Oklahoma Times Journal noted that the miners 
promised, "the Darkies shall never enter the mines alive." 
Still, the paper expected Ludlow's importation of black 
scabs to "settle the strike with them, as the Negroes will 
not strike, and the white men say they cannot live at the 
wages. Trouble is expected when they arrive .... Every 
white miner swears vengeance upon the blacks . 119 
At that point the atmosphere in the coal towns reached 
a nearly incendiary condition. Both sides in the dispute 
steeled themselves for a major confrontation. The slightest 
provocation on either side was likely to lead to 
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disturbances. This occurred when the Williamson Brothers 
Company resumed mining operations at its strip pit at 
Lehigh. The men who worked there had agreed earlier to stop 
work, but when they reneged and returned to the mines, the 
strikers mobilized and marched on the Williamson Brothers' 
pit. 
What followed combined a labor demonstration with a 
colorful parade. After a meeting in Coalgate attended by 
more than one thousand miners and their families, the crowd 
decided to march to the pit. At the procession's head were 
two flag bearers, followed by 50 women and 125 men armed 
with Winchester rifles and shotguns. The Coalgate brass 
band provided musical accompan~ent, while bringing up the 
rear of the procession were hundreds of strikers armed with 
clubs. The procession marched four abreast and stretched 
out for more than a mile and a half . 10 
Marching "to the t~e of a live, quick step," the crowd 
proceeded to the Williamson Brothers pit. When they 
arrived, the marshals and company officials quickly 
retreated to the high bank on the opposite side of the pit 
from the demonstrators, while the strikebreakers fled. But 
no violence occurred except that a few of the women 
demonstrators tossed chunks of coal at the strikebreakers as 
they left . 11 
This event precipitated a strong response by the 
operators and the governments of both the Choctaw Nation and 
77 
the United States. An unusual legal situation existed in 
Indian Territory, and it created a problem for labor unions 
that they faced nowhere else. Miners were considered guests 
of the Choctaw Nation, their situation akin to working in a 
foreign country. When a miner entered the Choctaw Nation it 
was by "permit." The exact cost of the permit is unclear. 
Frederick Ryan states in The Rehabilitation of Oklahoma Coal 
Mining Communities that the fee amounted to twenty-five 
dollars annually. He notes that the miner's employer paid 
the fee and then deducted twenty-five cents monthly to 
recoup part of that cost. Clyde Hamm contends in Labor 
History of Oklahoma that the fee was a dollar a month. 
Choctaw Nation financial records indicate operators paid a 
twenty cent per month "permit tax" per employee. Angie Debo 
was probably closest to the truth when she stated in ~ 
and Fall of the Choctaw Republic that permit "laws were not 
uniformly enforced." The Choctaw Nation complained that 
many miners were without permit even before the strike 
began. •e 
The leadership of the Choctaw Nation knew only that the 
strike was costing the tribe revenue from coal royalties and 
permit fees. There is no doubt that the strike adversely 
affected the Choctaw Nation's treasury, for by 1890 coal 
royalties amounted to more than $50,000 annually. Debo 
notes that the "Choctaws were greatly exasperated by the 
loss of tribal revenues" due to the strike. Coal royalties 
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financed Choctaw schools. But the loss of coal royalties 
does not fully explain the Nation's empty coffers. The 
Choctaw Nation's leadership spent at least $28,000 
supressing violence associated with tribal elections during 
1892-1893. Corruption within the tribe's school system only 
compounded an already serious situation.13 
The Choctaw Nation's leadership based its view of the 
strike strictly on its impact on the tribes's treasury. 
Based on this factor alone the tribe's leadership sided with 
the mining companies and lobbied the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs to have the miners evicted. On strict legalistic 
grounds, there was nothing unacceptable about this 
procedure. The Choctaw leadership was within its rights to 
demand that unpermitted "intruders" be evicted and removed 
to the "nearest adjacent state." Bound by its treaty 
obligations, the United States government was responsible 
for the removal of the miners. This threatened the success 
of any strike in Indian Territory. The tribes wanted their 
coal royalties and were not hesitant to help crush a strike 
that threatened those revenues. Thus, the Choctaw Nation 
leadership was a willing ally of the operators.'" 
Regulation of United States citizens on the territory 
of the Choctaw Nation was a joint- affair between the tribe 
and the federal government. The procedure for eviction of 
"intruders" was for Choctaw sheriffs to make sworn 
statements declaring the non-citizen's failure to obtain a 
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permit. Then they sent the names of the "intruders" to the 
Principal Chief, who reported them to the Indian Agent with 
a request for their removal. The Agent would expel the 
"intruders" with Indian police or federal troops, depending 
on what the situation warranted. The tribe paid for the 
cost of the "removal."15 
The position of Indian Agent was one of immense power 
in the affairs of the Choctaw Nation. The Indian Agent 
flexed much of his power through the Indian police. 
Established in 1878 and comprised of citizens of the tribe 
but under the Agent's control, the Indian police were a 
powerful force within the tribe's territory. They dealt 
primarily with United States citizens. Their main 
responsibilities included arresting fugitives, controlling 
the illegal liquor trade, and removing "intruders."a 
On May 11 the Principal Chief of the Choctaw Nation, 
Wilson N. Jones, wrote to the Indian Agent, Dew M. Wisdom, 
urging prompt removal of the strikers. Wilson included a 
list of two hundred of the strikers; the process of eviction 
had begun. Jones stated that the miners had been given 
permits to work and because "they have quit work they are 
not there under permit and consequently are intruders." 
Jones held that by preventing "others from working," the 
strikers were "setting a demoralizing example. 1117 
Agent Wisdom was in total sympathy with the operators 
and the Choctaw Nation's leadership. He promptly asked the 
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United States Secretary of the Interior, Hoke Smith, to send 
troops to eject the strikers. Wisdom argued that he needed 
federal troops for the evictions, remarking: 
There are 2,000 miners who have struck, and they 
are exceedingly boisterous and threatening. My 
police force, supported by a squad of marshals, 
is inadequate to meet the crisis. I regard the 
presence of the military as absolutely essential. 
Prompt action alone will prevent trouble. 11111 
Secretary Smith sent Wisdom's request on to the War 
Department. At first the War Department was disinclined to 
send troops to the Choctaw Nation to break up the strike. 
The Secretary of War's view was that the situation did not 
warrant troops. Wisdom helped persuade the War Department 
to alter its view by painting the situation as drastic. 
Wisdom's view was that "trouble is near at hand." By late 
May Wisdom's position prevailed, and soon thereafter federal 
troops were descending upon the Choctaw Nation from all 
directions. 1 " 
Judging from the size of the forces sent into the 
strike zone in 189~, one must conclude that the government 
anticipated trouble. The War Department responded to Agent 
Wisdom's shrill cries for troops by dispatching several 
companies of infantry from Ft. Leavenworth. Under the 
command of Major Joseph T. Haskell, these forces arrived at 
South McAlester on a special train on May 31st. Companies G 
of the 12th Infantry and H of the 13th Infantry Divisions 
were sent to Hartshorne. Troops from Company A of the 19th 
Infantry settled in at Alderson, while another company moved 
into Krebs. More infantry and cavalry from Fort Reno 
guarded the coal mines and strikebreaker camps around 
Lehigh. ao 
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The arrival of troops quickly divided the coal 
communities into rival factions. Supporters of the decision 
to send in the military expressed relief that the federal 
government had sent troops "to suppress the mine trouble and 
restore to the owners the property now held by the 
strikers." But they did not expect the strikers to cave in 
meekly to the presence of troops. When Troop K of the 3rd 
Cavalry arrived by rail from Fort Reno, they steeled 
themselves for action as "much trouble is expected as the 
miners say they will not be put out of the country as 
intruders . "u 
The citizens and business community of Krebs protested 
to Agent Wisdom about the soldiers, arguing that threats of 
mob violence were "entirely incorrect." With miners being 
the majority of their customers, the business community 
supported the miners during the strike. They contended that 
the miners were respectable members of the community who had 
been "laboring in these dangerous mines for several years" 
and were "fortunate as to escape with their lives." The 
miners had acquired "little houses and garden spots," and 
ejection "would be a great hardship upon them and their 
families. uaa 
The strikers resented the use of government troops to 
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guard the coal mines. They resented even more the use of an 
anomaly in the law to justify and legitimize deportation. 
One miner, Dan McLaughlin, writing from Atoka, assessed the 
situation in this manner: 
Had not intended to take a hand in this trouble 
and would not if things had not gone the way they 
had in the nation. But the U.S. Government took a 
hand in this trouble, and now have troops in the 
nation at Lehigh, Coalgate, Krebs, Alderson and 
Hartshorne, for the purpose of ejecting the men from 
the territory. 
McLaughlin's view was that a successful strike was next 
to impossible because: 
As soon as [the] miners strike ... [they] 
accordingly become intruders. Under ordinary 
circumstances this quirk in the law is not taken 
advantage of, but in ... case of a strike the 
companies take advantage of it and call in the 
power of our Uncle Sam to remove the strikers and 
their families and all their moveable property out 
of the territory. This is a very effective way of 
putting an end to a strike, is it not? But it 
savors to [sic] much of despotism .... Fully 1000 
men and their families etc, probably ~000 persons 
will be removed without mercy .... The troops are 
here with orders to eject strikers and may begin 
at any moveme11t. . . . The force of the U.S. 
Government has been procured (sic) through fraud 
to assist in making blacklegs and tramps. It must 
be stopped.n 
Federal troops found little evidence of trouble when 
they arrived in the Choctaw Nation. The scene they found 
made them wonder why they were sent there. When Captain F. 
Michler of the 5th Cavalry wrote to Major General N. A. 
Miles, he commented that when he arrived in the Choctaw 
Nation, he found "a large number of negro miners working." 
When Michler contacted Chief Jones to find out where the 
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reported trouble was, he said the Chief replied "All quiet. 
Do not need any soldiers. ••-
Michler found the source of the reports of trouble when 
he went to McAlester and interviewed officials of the 
Choctaw Railroad and Mining Company. They argued that "the 
presence of troops was necessary and urgent," according to 
Michler. The National Agent of the Choctaw Nation, Dr. 
Wright, also at the meeting, glossed over Chief Jones's 
remarks by stating that the Chief did not understand English 
and misunderstood Michler's inquires and that he was 
positive the Chief wanted the miners ejected. 85 
Michler anticipated trouble with the strikers. He 
reported that the miners at Lehigh and Coalgate "have armed 
themselves an [sic] assumed a very much more threatening 
attitude." Michler noted that many of the inunigrant miners 
had fled the coal camps into the surrounding countryside 
where they existed on the vegetables from their gardens. 
But Michler expected the evictions to break the strike 
quickly, saying: "Prompt removal of the few leaders who are 
well known will settle the difficulty." u The Muskogee 
Phoenix reported that "the striking miners in the Choctaw 
Territory have caused considerable apprehension during the 
past week .... So threatening that Agent Wisdom asked that 
troops be sent there to keep the peace. 1- 7 
While federal troops were supposed to "keep the peace," 
they were "preparing for war at Lehigh." Cavalry and 
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infantry poured into Lehigh. The Daily Oklahoman reported 
"Great confusion reigns in the coal mining camps of Lehigh 
and Coal Gate. Men, women and children are making for the 
timber and some of the men are drilling and say they will 
fight Uncle Sam's men. "211 
As both sides were "preparing for war," the miners had 
difficulty in obtaining sufficient provisions for their 
forces. Coalgate miners organized a relief association for 
needy miners and received aid "from all the [non-coal 
company] stores in the city." Most aid was in the form of 
groceries or meat. One store contributed five hundred 
pounds of flour, another gave three hundred pounds. Others 
promised "10 or 12 beefs" to assist the strikers. Some 
twenty to thirty families "have been relieved" in Coalgate, 
according to the local paper." 
While the miners struggled to meet their needs, the 
operators found that the arrival of federal troops relieved 
them of considerable financial burden. The Coalgate 
Nonpareil noted the connection when it reported: 
The Choctaw Coal and Railway Co. has secured the 
United States soldiers who will reach here 
tomorrow [sic]. This now assures them protection, 
and also throws the expense of guarding private 
property upon the Government. Heretofore the mine 
owners have paid about 200 marshals to guard the 
negroes at work, and also [to) protect their 
property, too. Trouble is expected daily at the 
Osage Coal and Mining Company's mines at Krebs and 
[at] this place [Coalgate], as the men are nearly 
starved out. 30 
Rapidly events were spiralling out of control in 
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Indian Territory. The Nonpareil noted that the situation 
was rapidly reaching an "alarming aspect." The initial 
delay in sending troops had caused the strikers to gain in 
"assurance daily.n Buttressed with "reports of the success 
of such movements elsewhere," they prepared to march to 
ncoalgate, Lehigh, and Krebs" and "move upon the Choctaw 
mines and force a cessation of work. 1131 
Many who supported the operators' position argued that 
many among the striking immigrant miners were dedicated to a 
violent, syndicalist labor conspiracy. The Nonpareil 
reported: 
The foreign element among the strikers are 
anarchistic in their utterances, and have made two 
attempts to wreck bridges of the Choctaw Coal and 
Railway Co., but were driven away the first time. 
The second time their dynamite was discovered and 
removed from under a bridge before it could be 
exploded.u 
Indeed, the Choctaw Company was fearful of the strike 
spreading to its railroad workers. When a Kansas newspaper 
ran a story to that effect, the South McAlester Capital was 
quick to refute it, claiming it was only unfounded rumor 
that "the Choctaw division trairunen would strike in sympathy 
with the miners of the territory. The whole affair 
originated at South McAlester and was sent from there to the 
press. The Choctaw men it is understood, will not 
strike. un 
Often the actions of the federal troops exacerbated an 
already dangerous situation. When the Cherokee Coal Company 
in Atoka requested troops be sent there "to restore the 
property now held by strikers to its owners," a contingent 
of sixty men armed with rifles, including two Gatlings and 
one six-pounder arrived to "suppress trouble." A Captain 
Hunter "expressed himself very freely" to the miners "that 
he was going to suppress trouble. " 3 " 
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Due to the previously lax permit policy, many non-
miners in the Choctaw Nation were fearful of ejection from 
the territory. With troops on hand to eject those without 
permits, many individuals were apprehensive because "a good 
many" were without permits. The result was that the news of 
possible ejections "caused considerable excitement." Those 
without permits were advised to get one, for without a 
permit they were "in danger of being summarily expelled. 113\5 
The striking miners complained often that the operators 
fooled the federal government into sending troops. At a 
protest meeting at Coalgate, they argued that the operators 
tricked the government into sending troops under the 
"pretense that the miners of Coalgate and Lehigh threatened 
to raid its mines at Alderson and Hartshorne, and intimidate 
the miners now at work there." They adamantly argued that 
"in no sense" could they "be construed to be intruders." 
The miners feared "5,000 to 8,000" being "summarily ejected 
from the territory regardless of the justice of our 
opposition to a most heartless and disastrous reduction in 
our wages." They demanded that the federal government 
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investigate before "destroying our liberty and compelling us 
to sacrifice our property."u 
The closest the miners got to a government 
investigation was an outdoor meeting held at Lehigh in early 
June. Originally the meeting was going to be held in the 
Labor Hall at Coalgate, but the crowd's size forced a move 
outdoors. 37 A federal officer told those in attendance 
that the army troops were in the territory to protect 
property and eject those without permits. He warned the 
crowd that 
I find you all idle. Idle men are the devil's 
messengers. This state of affairs cannot 
exist. We are here by the request of the 
Choctaw government ... to maintain law and 
order. We are here to protect you as well as 
anybody else. Everybody here is entitled to 
our protection. The mining mills here will be 
started up, and those who wish to work will be 
furnished with work, and those who refuse to go 
to work we will put out of the territory and not 
only you men, but your families and belongings .... 
Anybody molesting any worker on his way either to 
or from work, or during the night, will be guilty 
of (a] misdemeanor, and punished accordingly .... 
First man that utters any threats or intimidation, 
is a marked man. 38 
Most miners concluded that the main force behind the 
efforts to crush the strike was Edwin Ludlow of the Choctaw 
Company. Their view was that Ludlow was manipulating both 
the Choctaw and federal governments through a quirk in the 
law. By persuading Wisdom to call in federal troops, 
Ludlow and the other operators found they could "saddle the 
expence [sic] of breaking the strike onto the government by 
having the miners removed as intruders." The operators' 
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strategy was to use the threat of eviction to coerce the 
strikers into accepting the wage cut. If they did not 
accept the cut, then evictions would break the strike once 
and for all. 39 The strikers held that because of the 
"diverse overt acts committed by one Ludlow, and parties in 
his pay and employ, the lives and persons of the complaining 
employees are in jeopardy and we demand for them the 
protection to which every citizen of the United States is 
entitled ... no matter where sojourning. ""0 
Finally in June events began to develop that 
eventually led to evictions. First was a thwarted raid on 
the Elzey & Perry Company's powderhouse near Coalgate. 
Deputies caught five men in the act of breaking into the 
powderhouse. After firing forty to fifty shots, "mainly to 
intimidate them," authorities said later, two men were taken 
into custody. 41 Following this incident the process of 
eviction began in the coal towns. 
Before a miner was ejected he received a "fair 
hearing." Each coal company provided names of the men they 
wanted removed, then turned over the names to Indian Agent 
Wisdom. He held hearings that can be described only as the 
classic "kangaroo court." His power was absolute; there was 
no court of appeal. When he arrived in a coal town, the 
local papers reported that Wisdom was there "to look after 
the intruder question. Monday evening of the 25th was the 
limit fixed for the miners to go to work, as after that time 
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the Indian Agent has control. ""e 
At the hearings Wisdom would ask a series of questions 
related to the strike. Most centered around whether that 
individual supported the strike, had engaged in violence, or 
had a permit. No decision was rendered at that time. It 
was not "[un]til the day for ejectment comes and the 
soldiers and marshals are marching them into box cars," as 
one miner described it, that miners found out Wisdom's 
unappealable verdict." 
Most of the striking miners saw Wisdom as little more 
than a pawn of the operators. The Mayor of Hartshorne 
declared that Wisdom "seems to be acting in this matter 
wholly under the dictations of the mining company and 
without regard for justice."~" In a letter to the 
Secretary of the Interior asking that Wisdom be removed from 
office, two miners declared him "a tool in the hands of the 
coal companies of the Indian Territory." Wisdom's "fair 
hearings" were little more than a "farce 11 to the miners. 
They held that his removal policy was the result of a 
11 request of a corporation, 11 and that it was "unjust and 
Unarnerican," in addition to being "cruel and inhuman.'"'~ 
The process of evicting the miners was brutally 
efficient. Federal troops went out into the countryside in 
raiding parties, commanded by a sergeant and guided by 
Indian police who pointed out the "intruders." The federal 
troops seized the "intruder" and delivered him and his 
90 
family to the Choctaw Coal and Railway line. There the 
strikers and their families were put into box cars and 
shipped across the state line to Jenson, Arkansas where they 
"disembarked." .. 
By the end of June federal troops had deported more 
than eighty-five strikers from Alderson and Hartshorne. 
Agent Wisdom reported to the Secretary of Interior that "I 
have the honor to state" that the deportations were 
"accomplished with all reasonable dispatch consistent under 
the circumstances." Wisdom contended that "not a single 
accident occurred and I am happy to say nobody was hurt." 
But in a phrase that hinted of the repugnancy of the mission 
at hand, Wisdom expressed hope that "my conduct in the 
performance of this disagreeable duty may meet your 
approval. ""7 
If the ejections were "disagreeable duty" for Wisdom 
and the federal troops, they were slightly more than that 
for the miners and their families. The Daily Oklahoman 
reported that the miners' descriptions of their evictions 
were similar to tales "which sometimes come from Siberia. 
Many of the men were thrown bodily from their homes, their 
wives and children beaten and bruised, and their furniture 
and personal effects destroyed." After being dragged from 
their homes, "they were loaded into box cars like cattle and 
shipped out of the Territory." The paper concluded that 
"the stories told of brutality by the men from the 
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Hartshorne district are revolting to the extreme. '"'8 
An infamous incident in the June evictions did much to 
harden the strikers in their resistance and resentment 
toward the operators and the federal troops. The incident 
occurred when troops were evicting a family of four near 
Alderson. During the process the troops attacked a miner's 
pregnant wife. According to a Hartshorne merchant and other 
sources, she "was struck over the head with a Winchester and 
severely maltreated by the soldiers." After being "carted" 
over "rough roads, the "enceinte women" gave "premature 
birth to a dead child. She is in critical condition and may 
die." But this did not slow the miner's deportation. He 
was "not permitted to return," despite the fact his wife lay 
dying. ~ 9 
Condemnation of the evictions was widespread. The 
harshness of the policy shocked many Choctaws, despite their 
losing revenue due to the strike. One Choctaw who witnessed 
the Hartshorne ejections referred to the events as the most 
shameful exercise in injustice the country had ever 
witnessed. Other Choctaws denounced it. The postmaster of 
Hartshorne "condemned the act bitterly" and said in that 
city "indignation is so unanimous and intense there is sure 
to be just cause for it." The evictions led to "wide spread 
alarm ... among the farmers that their permits and contracts 
would be ignored. " 50 
The evictions even caused an international outcry. 
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Diplomats from Great Britain, Italy, France, and Belgium 
lodged protests over the treatment of their citizens in 
Indian Territory. The Secretary of State denied that the 
strike was the result of a wage cut. When the British 
ambassador met with Indian Bureau officals, he was told that 
the evictions were legal under the treaty between the 
Choctaws and the federal govern.rnent.5 ' 
After this first wave of ejections, Chief Jones wavered 
in his decision to have the miners deported. Jones sent a 
request to Wisdom asking that miners who pledged to abide by 
Choctaw laws be exempted from eviction. This action 
threatened to put Wisdom's eviction machine into neutral. 
In a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs he 
expressed 11 suprise, 11 noting that "this request ... will 
embarrass me very much in the discharge of my duties." 
Wisdom predicted that without deportations there would be 
"further demonstrations against law and order by the 
turbulent element of miners." He was afraid that without 
Choctaw acquiescence, "it would seem that further steps by 
this Agency" to break the strike "are forestalled. 1152 
Secretary of Interior Smith requested that Wisdom clarify 
the "wishes of the Choctaw authorities. 1153 In other words, 
get the Chief back on the ejection bandwagon. 
This led to a conference in early July. Attending were 
Chief Jones, Agent Wisdom, and Choctaw Company officials. 
The Chief expressed the sentiment that he had been "imposed 
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upon" by the operators and the federal government. As for 
the disputed letter requesting that deportations be halted, 
Jones claimed that "he did not ask for the removal of troops 
and the stoppage of evictions." He admitted that he had 
signed a letter, but only because the contents of the 
request had been misrepresented. He had meant that only 
miners who had turned to farming and who had legitimate 
permits not be evicted. But Chief Jones left no doubt as to 
his view toward the strikers. He told Wisdom: 
You continue putting out these strikers as 
intruders, paying special attention to such men 
as have by persuasion and threats prevented any 
assumption of work, as I am reliably informed that 
it is only the influence of a few hot-headed 
agitators and anarchists that keep the bulk of the 
miners from returning to their accustomed labors.~· 
There was some truth to the Chief's charge. Early in 
July two striking miners at Coalgate were accused of 
disturbing the peace. The charges stemmed from an incident 
at Breedlove's strip pit. The warrants alleged that the two 
had intimidated miners there by "threatening to do bodily 
violence to those who wanted to work. n=ss Deputy marshals 
never served the warrants as the two miners in question "lit 
out and got away before Marshall Parker could gather them 
in."~· 
Tensions rose as the operators continued to attempt to 
reopen their mines with strikebreakers imported from all 
across the country. They brought in blacks to work as 
strikebreakers from Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Texas, and 
9~ 
Louisiana. When the Osage Coal Company attempted to reopen 
its mines at Krebs, which had been idle for three months, 
the result was "almost a riot," according to the South 
McAlester Capital.~ 
References to events at Krebs on July 9, 189~ fall into 
two categories. Although some referred to the events as 
"almost a riot," others called it no more than "a mild 
demonstration." A "crowd of 600 men and 50 or 70 women" 
marched to the Osage Coal Company's No. 11 Shaft Mine, but 
found no one working there. The crowd, swelling by the 
moment, proceeded to an adjacent strip pit, where they 
persuaded the forty strikebreakers to cease working "as it 
was detrimental to their interest." They complied and "were 
hooted and jeered and called scabs and other offensive 
names" as they left the pit. One striker remarked that "the 
soldiers have had their day, and now we will have ours." 
The demonstration might have ended without violence except 
that an accountant who was "acting as pit boss assaulted an 
Italian and drew a revolver on the crowd, but [he] was 
promptly disarmed." After roughing up Bob Evans, the 
accountant-turned-pit boss, some among the crowd expressed a 
desire to "drown him." Luckily for all, the crowd quickly 
lost interest in the idea. The incident ended without 
further violence. The crowd moved on to Osage No. 12, but 
found it idle.s• 
After more strikers joined the procession, the crowd 
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then marched "to the music of fife and drum" into Alderson. 
There they compelled the strikebreakers to quit at 
Patterson's strip pit and then at Hughes' pit. The latter 
agreed to stop mining operations "until the strike was 
settled." The confrontation ended peacefully; Hughes even 
"brought out refreshments for the ladies. n'5• 
The crowd, content with a job well done, proceeded back 
to Krebs "led by a band of music." Buoyed by their success, 
they continued on into McAlester "under the Stars and 
Stripes, headed by a band." They visited several strip pits 
there and upon request, all the strikebreakers "came out at 
once." The mine superintendent agreed to halt operations 
until "everything was settled." As everyone left amicably, 
one observer stated that "a more peaceful lot of people have 
not been together in Krebs in a long time. There was no 
fighting or trouble of any kind. 1160 
While some saw the Krebs demonstrators as a "peaceful 
lot," Indian Agent Wisdom did not. The events of July 9th 
gave him the excuse he was looking for to resume 
deportations. The South McAlester Capital expressed this 
fear in an editorial about the demonstration. The paper 
declared that "the miners at Krebs had our distinctive 
sympathy of our people until Monday .... This action is 
exceedingly unfortunate and will result in the return of the 
troops and perhaps of wholesale evictions. ,,., 
Miners rebutted this editorial with a wave of letters 
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to the Capital. One miner retorted that "sympathy without 
relief tastes like mustard without beef." The miner went on 
to contend that "any sympathy we ever get, or expect to get, 
in your town, we have to pay for in dollars and cents. Your 
sympathy only extends to Ludlow and his accomplices." 62 
Following the Krebs demonstrations, Ludlow's "mine 
guards" turned to violence to intimidate the strikers. In 
one incident a guard identified as "Tony Catizone" shot into 
the house of one miner "and came (with]in either three or 
four feet of killing him while he and his family were 
quietly reposing midnight slumbers."u 
Not surprisingly, Indian Agent Wisdom joined in the 
crackdown in the wake of the Krebs demonstrations. Wisdom 
considered the events of July 9th as having "inaugurated a 
reign of terror in that particular camp." He saw that the 
tactics of the miners were effective in persuading the 
strikebreakers to join the walk-out, and argued that the 
only way to combat the striking miners was to deport them. 
Wisdom considered evictions "an imperative necessity" and 
argued that "there was no other remedy for the disease. " ... 
Wisdom responded to the Krebs demonstration with 
eviction hearings and a wave of deportations. On July 17 
he held hearings at South McAlester. Twenty-five "ring 
leaders of the Krebs miners" had to "show cause why they 
should not be called intruders." The miners refused to 
answer any of the inquisitor's charges. They based their 
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strategy upon a possible compromise with the operators, 
which had been hinted at since early July. While the 
operators might have been willing to compromise, Wisdom was 
not. The miners had thrown down the gauntlet in April, and 
he was not about to walk away from the challenge. The day 
following the hearing, Wisdom declared forty-four Krebs 
miners to be intruders and continually added new names to 
the list throughout the remainder of July.•$ 
Following Wisdom's deportation edicts, an attorney 
representing the miners attempted to have an injunction 
imposed upon the agent that would have blocked the 
deportations. District Judge Stewart refused the 
application. Evictions began in the predawn hours of the 
next morning. •• 
In those early hours of July 19th, Company D of the 
lOth Infantry spread out through Krebs. The lOth Infantry 
had been guarding the mines of the Osage Coal and Mining 
Company, but now it was turning its energies to rounding up 
and deporting the striking miners in the Krebs vicinity. 
When they tried to do so the miners "ran and scattered so 
that only fourteen were caught. These were sent to Arkansas 
by the Choctaw train." Local citizens reported that "Krebs 
was in a stir all night, and the report here this morning is 
that no one there slept last night. The cavalry went over 
to Krebs this morning before 5 o'clock. They were back by 
ten." The South McAlester Capital reported that the 
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soldiers had been "delivering injunctions from Judge Stewart 
to the miners " and that "about 300 were delivered. ""7 
Agent Wisdom was happy with the results of the predawn 
raids and subsequent deportations. He notified his 
superiors in Washington, D.C. that 
the removal was accomplished with no friction 
whatever, although the foreign element at Krebs 
had boasted of their ability and determination 
to not only defy the orders of this Agency, but 
even to fire upon the United States Troops, when 
the time for action came, they were either 
passive, or fled precipitately to the bush and 
adjacent woods . "11 
Wisdom contended that he evicted only "chronic 
agitators" and then only because "their violence closed down 
valuable mining property." He was satisfied that the 
deportations had broken the "great strike" and that "the 
lawless element has been overthrown at every point of the 
conflict."'" To prevent further demonstrations the 
operators "obtained a writ of injunction against the 
striking miners" prohibiting further demonstrations. Judge 
Stewart stated in his remarks that any evicted miner who 
returned would be "presented to the grand jury and proceeded 
against as criminals. 1170 
Broken by the evictions, the miners conceded and 
cancelled the strike on July 24th. They accepted a 20 
percent reduction in the wage scale, not the original 25 
percent cut. The operators, always the magnanimous victors, 
reciprocated with a 10 percent reduction in housing rent 
that helped ameliorate the impact of the wage cut. The 
99 
miners petitioned to allow those evicted to return under the 
new wage scale, but the operators declined.71 
By early August ''white winged peace" reigned in the 
coal fields. The mines were producing, royalties were once 
again flowing into the Choctaw Nation's coffers, and Agent 
Wisdom was happy with a job well done. The South McAlester 
Capital reported that "the soldiers have folded their tents 
and stole away as silently away as cavalry and government 
wagons can." Although the federal troops left, a strong 
contingent of marshals and Indian police remained to ensure 
tranquility. One commentator in Coalgate remarked that "the 
town is fairly supplied with deputy marshals." 78 
There is little doubt of the deleterious effects of the 
strike of 1894 upon all involved in the event. The miners 
were the obvious losers. They lost six months' income in 
addition to having the operators dictate a lower wage scale. 
Over 350 miners and their families experienced the trauma of 
eviction. In the rush to sell their goods before being 
evicted, many received little more than one-fourth their 
value. Hanraty lamented years later that the strike of 1894 
had been "a total failure. 1173 
The operators suffered as well from the strike, for the 
mines brought in little revenue during its duration. The 
operators' attempts to operate the mines with black 
strikebreakers imported from all across the nation had been 
a failure. A few strip pits produced some coal during the 
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strike, but the shaft mines remained idle. Also, much to 
the operators' chagrin, many of the strikebreakers changed 
sides in the conflict and joined the union .7 " 
There were others who suffered in the strike of 189~. 
The Choctaw Nation saw its treasury emptied during the 
strike because royalties stopped. Local merchants saw 
business virtually dry up, as the majority of their 
clientele were miners .nJ 
Perhaps the biggest losers in the strike of 189~ were 
the Knights of Labor. Their power and prestige declined 
rapidly in Indian Territory following the event. Of course, 
the failed strike contributed significantly to the Knights' 
demise locally, but the organization was disintegrating on 
the national level as well, largely the result of the 
national leadership's autocratic tendancies. 7 • 
One can only speculate about the outcome of the strike 
of 189~ if the deportations had not occurred. The only 
question was who could hold out the longest, the operators 
or the miners, but the evictions make the question moot. 
The evictions put a de facto end to the strike. The 
operators used a quirk in the law to call in federal troops 
to deport the strikers, thus breaking the strike, while 
placing the cost of guarding the mines and evicting the 
strikers onto the federal government. The language of the 
federal treaties with the Choctaws and the tribe's permit 
law made a successful strike virtually impossible. The 
101 
provisions of these agreements and laws, by declaring anyone 
who struck an "intruder" and a candidate for eviction, made 
the chances of a successful strike slim at best. These 
agreements created a unique environment totally favoring the 
operators. The result was that the federal government 
became the iron fist of the operators. Years later Governor 
William Murray remarked that the eviction policy "amounted 
practically to military power indulged in for the purpose of 
preventing [the] laboring man from getting his just 
dues. 1177 
The crux of any "legalistic" interpretation of the 
strike of 189~ centers around whether eviction and 
deportation was a legal and acceptable policy for the United 
States government to engage in. Under the existing treaty, 
there was no doubt that the federal government was obligated 
to eject non-Choctaw citizens the tribe's leadership wished 
deported. Gene Aldrich makes a strong case for the 
"legalist" interpretation of the strike. He declares that 
deportation was acceptable and those evicted "were treated 
with all the humanity circumstances would permit." Aldrich 
also contends that "the mandates of the government were 
executed by force, yet that force was tempered with 
mercy. 1178 One must look hard to find any mercy in a policy 
of deportation enforced at bayonet point. 
The strike of 189~ must be placed in the larger context 
of national events to understand better the actions and 
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policies of both the operators and the federal government 
during the Indian Nation strike. Labor strife beset the 
nation in 189~. The railways workers struck under the 
leadership of Eugene Debs, crippling the nation's rail 
network. Coxey's Army and the Cripple Creek Massacre fanned 
tensions further. 
These upheavals all colored the political environment 
surrounding the Indian Territory strike. According to the 
Daily Oklahoman, anarchism, populism, Coxeyism, Debsism, and 
striking coal miners were only different versions of the 
same monster. 79 Also, while Indian Terri tory miners struck 
under the leadership of the Knights of Labor, 125,000 coal 
miners were on strike across the nation under the banner of 
the United Mine Workers. 80 The South McAlester Capital 
corrunented that "strikes are the order of the day, and with 
war starring us in the face, we ask, is there any panacea 
for the ills of our beloved America? 1181 Reactionaries like 
Indian Agent Wisdom, who advocated a strong counter-strike, 
were convinced that a "reign of terror" had been inaugurated 
in the Choctaw Nation. From such a perspective, it easier 
to understand how the policy of deportation seemed the only 
"remedy for the disease. " 82 
Although the operators broke the strike of 189~. they 
only temporarily slowed the growth of industrial unionism 
among the miners in what was soon to become the state of 
Oklahoma. The miners' battles with the operators continued. 
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The strike of 189~ was only the first engagement in a 
continuing struggle. Although it was unsuccessful, the 
miners did serve notice that they no longer would accept 
without complaint the dictates of the operators. In late 
1898 the miners, under the guidance of the United Mine 
Workers, again challenged the power of the coal operators, 
but with much more success than in 189~. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFORT OF THEIR LIVES: THE 
SOUTHWEST STRIKE, 1899-1903 
While the operators scored a knockdown in 1894, it was 
not a knockout. By late 1898 the miners were ready again to 
challenge the operators. This time it was under new 
leadership. The failure of the Knights of Labor in the 
strike of 1894, opened the door to Indian Territory for the 
United Mine Workers of America. Under U.M.W leadership, the 
miners launched a new effort in 1899 to gain not just better 
pay and working conditions, but an entirely new worker-
management relationship based upon collective bargaining. 
Achieving this goal required the operators to recognize the 
union as the representative of the miners. This became the 
central issue of the "Southwest Strike" of 1899 - 1903. 
Little had changed in Indian Territory's mining 
industry between 1894 and 1898. The operators still 
exercised absolute control over the wage scale, frequency of 
payment, hours, working conditions, housing, food, and 
mining supplies. Clyde Hamm notes in Labor History of 
Oklahoma that the strike of 1894 did nothing to ameliorate 
"the harshness of the company- town system." In f act the 
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operators "had learned to use this advantage against the= 
miners to vitiate their bargaining power." Eviction and 
cut-off of food and other necessities were powerful weapons 
in the operators' arsenal. It made the miners' families 
hostages. If a miner struck, his family was subject to 
eviction and deprivation. 1 
Labor conditions in the territory's mines worsened from 
189~ to 1898. There were brief work stoppages, but the 
operators sustained production by hiring non-union workers. 
Rising demand for coal led to price increases. Wages 
remained steady while the cost of living rose, and excessive 
production left miners idle much of the time. It was into 
such an environment that the United Mine Workers made their 
first appearance in Indian Territory in 1898. 2 
In 1898 the United Mine Workers' national leadership 
sent James Boston into Indian Territory to organize the 
miners. He established the first local at Krebs. The drive 
to organize locals in every mining community accelerated 
after a series of wage reductions led to "unbearable" 
conditions. By late 1898 the United Mine Workers' locals in 
Indian Territory, Arkansas, and Texas had banded together to 
form District Twenty-One of the United Mine Workers of 
America.3 
In October 1898, the miners of District Twenty-One 
gathered at Fort Smith, Arkansas to hold their first 
convention. As first order of business, the miners elected 
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Albert Struble as district president. At the convention the 
miners passed a resolution urging Congress to abolish 
"script, and its consequent evil, company stores," and to 
legalize pay every two weeks. Congressman Little of 
Arkansas cheered the miners with his statement that he would 
introduce a bill that would "redress the evil which the 
miners claim is working a hardship on them. This will be of 
great importance to the Indian Territory, and will cut a 
considerable figure in the finances of many company stores 
that have had almost a monopoly of the miner's trade.'~ 
The miners also demanded higher wages and that the operators 
recognize the union as their sole bargaining 
representative .5 
Upon returning to Indian Territory after the 
convention, the miners began to press the operators for 
concessions. They demanded that the coal they mined be 
weighed in the pit car, instead of after being loaded into 
railroad cars. This would benefit the miners for up to that 
time only lump coal was loaded into railroad cars, meaning 
that the miner received no pay for all the "slack" he mined. 
The operators claimed that "slack," coal powderized in the 
mining process, was virtually worthless and, therefore, they 
did not pay for it. This "worthless" product still managed 
to earn the operators a tidy profit. Slack was perfect for 
conversion to coke, a material crucial to the production of 
steel. All the operators accepted the miners' demand except 
112 
those at Coalgate and Lehigh, the slack there being 
unsuitable for coke production. The miners considered this 
a token concession; their main goal was recognition of the 
union and they were prepared to strike to achieve it.• 
In January 1899, the miners and operators of District 
21 met at Pittsburg, Kansas to negotiate the next year's 
contract. While the operators contended they were just 
recovering from the effects of an economic downturn in 1897, 
the miners demanded a wage increase and the eight hour day. 
While their representatives talked, several union locals 
took action. On the eleventh of February the miners at 
Alderson laid down their tools and walked out; the next day 
three hundred miners struck the Choctaw mines at 
Hartshorne. 7 
The strike at Hartshorne was not called to pressure 
those negotiating at Pittsburg. The miners struck to 
protest Edwin Ludlow's firing of sixty men because of their 
membership in the U.M.W. The miners "allege that Supt. 
Ludlow discharged member of the order because they were 
members and for no other reason." The strikers presented no 
other demands but the reinstatement of the sixty, claiming 
"they were satisfied with the scale."" 
Ludlow summarily rejected the miners' grievances. He 
claimed he had good reason for discharging the men, arguing 
that they were fomenting discord among his employees. 
Ludlow agreed to take back the sixty, but "not as members of 
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this organization." Refusing to compromise, Ludlow laid out 
the grounds for negotiations. He stated his opposition to a 
pit committee - wage increases and recognition of the union. 
If these terms were not accepted, he would "shut the mines 
down." The superintendent of the Choctaw Mines reiterated 
that he "would in no ways [sic] recognize the United Mine 
Workers association." 9 The McAlester News-Capital reported 
that Ludlow expected to replace the strikers "with Negroes 
and that he has sent to Birmingham, Alabama for them." 
Marshall Grady declared his intention to protect both mine 
property and men who "work peaceably. " 10 
The Capital argued that the union's objective was to 
have a universal wage scale for all the nation's miners. 
The Capital's main complaint was that the miners wanted an 
agreement on rules governing the employment of miners. The 
Capital editorialized that if this was achieved, it would 
"to a great extent take away the management of the mines 
[from the operators] and place it in the hands of the 
miners . 1111 
James Boston contended the purpose of the U.M.W. was to 
bring the miners and operators "into closer relations and to 
prevent strikes." The management of the Choctaw. Oklahoma, 
and Gulf Railroad considered the organization nothing less 
than labor agitators and refused to meet with any 
representatives of the organization. Nevertheless, Henry 
Wood, general manager of the C.O.& G., met with Boston and 
11~ 
Albert Struble, district president, on February 13, 1899. 
At the meeting Wood declared that "we think the strike was 
absolutely without any justification whatever, and the men 
who have been discharged [at Hartshorne] will not be re-
instated." Wood refused to meet the union representatives 
again, although he stated his willingness to meet with his 
own employees. te 
The strike spread to Wilburton after the negotiations 
failed. The town remained peaceful as the miners there 
joined the walk out. The Capital noted that there was "no 
display of hostility on the part of the miners" and remarked 
that "there is no rioting or ill feeling expected nor 
anticipated. 1113 
In a last ditch effort to forestall a complete 
breakdown of the negotiations, the miners of District 21 met 
February 17th at Fort Smith and invited the operators to 
join them. Ludlow, a hard-liner among the operators, 
refused to attend, declaring that he would have nothing to 
do with the miners' union. Despite the absence of the 
operators, the miners issued their proposals at the Fort 
Smith convention. They demanded that coal be weighed before 
screening, a small wage increase, two weeks' pay, payment 
for "dead work," check-off dues, and no discrimination 
against members of the United Mine Workers. 1 " The Oklahoma 
State Capital reported that if the operators did not accept 
these terms a general strike in the district would begin 
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March 1. 15 
A letter to the editor of the South McAlester Capital 
in late February clearly delineated the position of the 
miners. The letter was titled, "a plea of the United Mine 
Workers of America," from a "miner." Its author argued that 
the U.M.W. wanted peace, not industrial strife. and it would 
be achieved only when the union and operators worked 
together. According to the author, the miners were entitled 
to the eight hour day and higher wages because their 
"extremely dangerous occupation" required "laboriously heavy 
tasks" in "dark, damp, unsanitary surroundings." The 
"miner" also cited the "isolated, unfavorable, inconvenient 
situation, miners are nearly always compelled to reside in" 
as justification for a wage increase. 16 
For his part, union organizer Boston continued to argue 
for the demands of the miners and to press for the 
reinstatement of the miners Ludlow "fired out" at 
Hartshorne. Boston contended that "the discharging went on 
every day, every morning rather, until I think there was in 
the neighborhood of sixty men discharged at Hartshorne and 
at a meeting of the miners they decided to stop until the 
men were re-instated." Boston lamented that "Mr. Ludlow 
refused to do business with us, or talk with us." He argued 
that the U.M.W. had to defend itself from the "injustice of 
Mr. Ludlow in discharging these men" and that the policy was 
"un-American. 1117 
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True to their word, the miners began a "wholesale 
walking out" on March 1. The next day four hundred men at 
Cherryvale joined the strike, followed by an equal number at 
Coalgate and Lehigh after a mass meeting held by the miners 
of those communities. Nearly a thousand miners met at Krebs 
to discuss the situation, but the meeting adjourned amid 
arguments. The strike continued to spread until over two 
thousand miners were on strike. The strikers pledged "the 
effort of their lives" because if they failed "then will be 
lost all hope of their even being able to unionize any of 
the mines" and that collective bargaining was the only way 
they could "be sure of receiving recognition of their 
grievance." The Capital reported that "the miners will not 
give up. 1118 But neither would the operators. 
Almost immediately after the strike started, the 
operators began to import black strikebreakers to keep the 
mines producing. In early March the Capital noted that 
about forty black miners arrived at Hartshorne. Estimates 
of the numbers of strikebreakers working in the mines varied 
from thirty to one hundred, but they produced little coal 
due to the small size of the work force and their 
inexperience. The Wilburton mines' output was one-third 
normal, only a trickle at Haileyville, and none at all at 
Lehigh and Coalgate. Miners at Hartshorne claimed the 
strikebreakers were poorly-trained and the result was that 
eighteen "rooms fell in, ... caused by [the] new miners not 
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knowing how to do the work." 19 
While using strikebreakers to keep production going, 
the operators turned to the federal government to rid 
themselves of James Boston. Henry Wood, general manager of 
the Choctaw, Oklahoma, and Gulf Railroad Company, wrote 
United States Inspector J. George Wright of the Interior 
Department requesting that Boston be ejected from the 
territory. He argued that most of the miners were opposed 
to the strike and that "there is no real difficulty between 
the miners and the operators." Wood claimed that "the 
trouble has been caused by James Boston," and that the 
Boston was leading the miners in a strike "to force 
recognition by the operators in their dealings with their 
men, and to enforce such scale of wages and conditions of 
mining as they thought best." According to Wood , the strike 
was costing the miners, operators, and the Choctaw Nation 
financially. He urged that "this man James Boston and his 
aiders and abettors be excluded from the Territory as 
disturbers of the peace and as men whose actions are 
inimical to the well - being of all parties interested." Wood 
requested prompt implementation "as every day of this 
continued agitation is a menace to order and security of 
property and a great injury to all interests involved. "eo 
Wright turned Wood's request over to Colonel Dew 
Wisdom, Indian Agent. Wisdom ordered Captain J. W. Ellis of 
the United States Indian Police to notify Boston either to 
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secure a permit or face expulsion. The Indian Agent told 
Ellis that Boston was "playing the role of an agitator and 
inducing men to strike," the result being "a menace to the 
repose of society. ••1 
Boston quickly launched a counteroffensive against the 
eviction order. His argument was that he was only traveling 
through Indian Territory and did not require a permit. 
Through his attorneys Boston asked for fifteen days to 
present his case. One of Boston's attorneys informed Wisdom 
that "you have had only one side presented to you" and once 
he had heard both sides of the story he would "not feel like 
issuing this order to eject him from the Territory."ee 
Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of 
Labor, also came to the defense of Boston. He wrote the 
Secretary of the Interior to argue that Boston be allowed to 
remain in the territory on the grounds that Agent Wisdom had 
"over-stepped his authority." Gompers stated there was 
nothing illegal about working against "low wages, long 
hours, and slave-like conditions of labor" and that neither 
"Mr. Wisdom nor Mr. Wright has been commissioned by society 
as its savior. 111! 3 
The Choctaw Nation's attitude toward Boston was similar 
to that of the operators. Principal Chief Green wrote to 
Wisdom to complain that Boston was "inciting dissatisfaction 
among the miners of this Nation." He pointed out that the 
strike was "interfering with the coal royalties of the 
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Choctaw Nation," and requested Wisdom to "take such steps as 
you deem necessary to the protection of the Nation in this 
matter." Green closed his letter with the comment that 
Boston "follows no occupation other than that of creating 
trouble, and I ask that he be removed from the limits of 
this nation." Special Investigator J. W. Zevely reported to 
the Secretary of the Interior that the "Choctaw authorities 
are anxious for immediate action" on Boston's removal. e~ 
The miners protested the order that Boston leave 
Indian Territory. They declared that Boston was not "the 
promoter of the present strike or any disturbances," but 
rather he was there to "defend their rights as miners." 
They deplored Wisdom's actions, claiming they violated 
Boston's "privilages [sic) granted him by the constitution 
of the United States, namely that of freedom of speech." 
Miners at Lehigh complained that Wisdom's actions "cannot be 
too strongly condemned as arbitrary in the worst sense and 
as an abuse of the authority vested" in his office. e~ The 
union local at Coalgate pleaded with Wisdom not to "rashly 
enforce your order upon the mere recommendation of the 
Choctaw Coal and Mining Company's Officials. " 2 • 
Miners also complained to Wisdom about physical 
intimidation by the mining company's security guards. The 
miners demanded that Agent Wisdom "take measures to prohibit 
Deputy Marshals and the Choctaw company armed guards from 
kicking and throwing people's furniture out of houses 
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without authority from court, and threatening to kill people 
without provocation. 1127 Boston charged that the 
authorities had saturated the coal towns with Indian Police 
and U.S. Deputy Marshals, some drunk, all attempting to 
provoke strikers into violence. He alleged that the 
authorities had struck miners, shot into their houses, and 
in general, had threatened the strikers while rousting them 
out of bed during midnight raids. 811 
Not surprisingly the miners blamed the operators for 
the unrest that beset Indian Territory. At Hartshorne, 
where the strike began, the miners declared they were 
engaging only in "legal and legitimate" activities. They 
scoffed at the operators' contention "that miners cannot 
strike without destroying human life and property." The 
Hartshorne miners proclaimed that the myth had been "put to 
rest as the history of this strike as far as it has gone. 
there has not been a single offence [sic] against the laws." 
The miners concluded that abstaining from provocative 
illegal actions was "absolutely essential" if the strike 
were to succeed. Calling themselves "peaceable and [law) 
abiding citizens," they contended "the strike was caused by 
the C.O. and Gulf Coal Co. discharging 60 members of the 
organization without cause and Mr. James Boston was not the 
cause of this stopping of Mines in the Choctaw Nation." The 
miners told Agent Wisdom that "when this strike is 
investigated, you will find that the Company was the 
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aggressor and the said Mr. Boston has been notified to 
vacate the Territory without just cause, and we demand the 
just right and privilages [sic] as other corporations and 
organizations in the Territory to have a man looking after 
our interest. "u 
A series of clashes at Lehigh prompted the operators o f 
the mines there to request that the federal government put a 
halt to the disturbances. This request was the result of 
one hundred strikers at Lehigh surrounding a company house 
where five men resided who had crossed the picket lines. 
The strikers gave the five a twenty-four hour notice to 
leave town. In another incident, seventy-five strikers 
intercepted a dozen men who were on the way to work in the 
mines and ordered them to turn back.30 Wisdom suggested 
that the operators seek relief through the courts , based 
upon their lease agreements with the Choctaw Nation. He 
noted that there were "both a civil and a criminal remedy 
for interferences and disturbances" and this action would 
provide "a speedy and effective remedy. '131 
Most operators blamed the U.M.W. 's organizers as 
"outsiders" whose actions "breed dissention (sic) and 
threaten violence." Ira D. Oglesby, attorney for the Atoka 
Coal and Mining Company and the Osage Coal and Mining 
Company, asked Agent Wisdom for assistance in keeping "co-
operation in suppressing and preventing violence towards our 
employees." Oglesby held that if the government assisted in 
"keeping from our several camps these outsiders, it will du 
much towards quieting the present disturbances. 1132 
Not all the operators took such a hard line in the 
struggle. In early March a rumor swept the coal fields that 
the superintendent of the Lehigh mines "had signed the 
scale. This has been flatly contradicted and there you 
are." Still, the Perry Brothers, one of the smaller 
operators, reached an agreement on a wage scale with U.M.W. 
Local No. 557 at Coalgate, an action heartily praised by the 
local. 33 
The miners planned a mass meeting at Krebs to discuss 
their options. Hearing of the proposed meeting, Agent 
Wisdom instructed Captain J. W. Ellis of the Indian Police 
to attend, stipulating that "if Boston makes an incendiary 
speech, report to me for final action. 1134 After attending 
the meeting Ellis reported back that Boston did not ask the 
miners "to strike but to stick to the Union until they got 
what they wanted." Ellis noted that Boston told those at 
the meeting that if "all the men at Krebs had gone to work 
they would have been scabs, as the majority in the district 
were out on a strike." Ellis also denied the charge that 
"the police were drunk and abusing everybody that belonged 
to the miner's union 11 and steadfastly maintained that 11 all 
of this is a lie." Finally Ellis noted that Chief McCurtain 
had informed him that Boston would not be issued a permit 
under any circumstances and "he should be put out of the 
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terri tory . " 35 
The mass meeting at Krebs buoyed the spirits of the men 
on strike. The sheer numbers at the meeting (hundreds 
attended) was proof to the miners that the strike was far 
from settled. This led organizer Boston to declare at the 
meeting that "we will fight it to the finish." One miner 
bragged that "the only coal which is now being hoisted is 
mined by scab labor and is called scab coal." But the miner 
went on to lament that "it seems as if the people of South 
Town [McAlester) were on the monopoly side of the question, 
instead of being on the poor miner's side." He stressed 
that "we are only fighting for liberty, and liberty we must 
have. 1136 
From the outset of the strike the operators ignored the 
strike and used non-union workers to maintain production. 
The striking miners often were effective in persuading these 
workers to change sides in the dispute. In Hartshorne, the 
center of the strike, "several miners who were en route for 
Hartshorne have been stopped by miners, the situation 
explained to them and that they refused to go to work. " 3 " 
The operators almost immediately sought a restraining 
order to bring a halt to the strikers' efforts to resist the 
importation of strikebreakers. In mid-March the Atoka Coal 
and Mining Company "asked for an injunction against the 
striking coal miners at Coalgate." The company's attorneys 
requested that the strikers "be restrained from interfering 
or ln any way molesting other miners who were desirous of 
working in the Atoka Coal and Mining Company's mines.'~8 
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On the next day Judge W. H. H. Clayton of the Central 
District of Indian Territory at Atoka issued the injunction 
the operators had requested. The injunction ordered the 
strikers not to interfere with the operation of the 
company's mines and in particular forbade the striking 
miners from "interfering or molesting other miners who want 
to work with federal protection." The injunction also 
warned the strikers not to destroy mine property and banned 
them from "holding riotous public meetings." If the 
operators hoped the injunction would provoke a reactio n from 
the miners, they did not get the response they desired. 
When asked to comment on the injunction, Boston argued that 
the injunction "is a benefit to the miners and not an 
injury." He noted that the injunction asked that the miners 
obey the law and this was something the miners had already 
pledged to do. 3 q A few days later the courts issued a 
second injunction, this one against the striking employees 
of the Kali - Inla Coal Company at Alderson. This action 
resulted from a mass meeting at Alderson at which Boston 
o ffered to pay the transportation cost of any strikebreaker 
desiring to leave the territory. While reporting on the 
injunction granted against the Alderson miners, the Daily 
Oklahoman noted at the same time that "the Kali-Inla Company 
received another consignment of new miners today, which will 
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be put to work tomorrow. " "0 
The initial results of the strike were mixed. The 
larger operators, the Osage Coal and Mining Company and the 
Choctaw Coal and Mining Company, continued to work "full 
blast" with non-union labor. Other companies continued to 
operate, but at reduced output."' 
By early April both sides settled in for a long 
struggle. The operators, fortified with injunctions and 
strikebreakers, believed they could outlast the striking 
miners. The miners took a more defensive posture. Hobbled 
by the injunctions and the threat of eviction, they focused 
on the strategy of a limited strike while continuing efforts 
to organize the non-union mines in the territory. At the 
same time the union organized relief efforts in the 
communities where strikes continued. 
On April 3 Boston traveled to St. Louis to confer with 
John Mitchell, president of the United Mine Workers . They 
agreed that "more aggressive measures must be taken to make 
the strike a success." Accordingly, they decided to extend 
the strike to Kansas and Missouri and to send organizers 
into those states. Boston also persuaded Mitchell to order 
miners in Illinois and Alabama to quit shipping coal to 
Indian Territory and Arkansas. These deliveries allowed the 
territory's operators to fill their orders. Boston also 
appealed to the national leadership for financial 
assistance, arguing that this was necessary "to continue the 
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strike to a successful end." Boston commented that "we are 
in this strike to win .... The operators may fill to the top 
some of their mines with scabs. It will avail them nothing. 
This strike will not be called off by the United Mine 
Workers until it is a success. ""2 
Chief Green McCurtain had no intention of allowing the 
strike to be "a success." In April he demanded that Boston 
be removed from the Choctaw Nation. The Department of the 
Interior asked for further information before committing to 
the dismissal of Boston. In May Special Inspector J.W. 
Zevely transmitted another request from Chief McCurtain to 
remove Boston and others who "appear to be either strikers, 
or persons in sympathy therewith." This request was 
"accompanied by affidavits and complaints relative to the 
situation." Zevely also enclosed financial records 
illustrating that the tribe's coal royalties had "been 
almost entirely cut off by the actions of these miners." He 
recommended "that some action be taken by the Department 1..n 
this matter, and believe that the removal of the principal 
leaders and agitators would prove very effective. '"' 3 
The result was that the tribe declared the presence of 
sixty-four strikers to be "detrimental" to the welfare of 
the Indians. The South McAlester Capital_ reported that 
"Captain Stanley and W. L. Richards, representing the 
Choctaw Nation, have filed with Secretary Hitchcock a 
petition praying for interference of the Interior Department 
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in the Choctaw miner's strike." But the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs requested further investigation before taking 
action on the request to evict the sixty-four. Responding 
to this request, Secretary of the Interior E. A. Hitchcock 
ordered Special Inspector J. W. Zevely to investigate the 
strike and report back ..... 
The operators, lacking confidence in the government's 
will to intervene in an aggressive manner, continued with 
their own plans to break the strike. A key part of the 
operators' strategy was to evict the striking miners and 
their families from company housing. Miners countered this 
tactic by trading houses. The operators responded by 
seeking and receiving an injunction "restraining Cherryvale 
miners from swapping house to defeat writs of possession 
issued against them." Earlier the courts had given the 
miners ten days to vacate company houses owned by the Kansas 
and Texas Coal Company. This action was the result of 
thirty-five unlawful entry suits the operators filed against 
the striking miners. But before the ten days had expired, 
the miners engaged in a "general swapping around of houses" 
and then argued they had complied with the court order to 
vacate the particular company house they lived in. Judge 
Clayton's injunction ordered a stop to the house swapping 
and declared that after an additional ten days, the miners 
"would be ejected by force 11 if they did not leave the 
company houses on their own accord. 45 
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The operators' plan was to fill their company houses 
and mines with non-union workers. The South McAlester 
Capital reported in late May that William F. Kelley, agent 
for the Missouri and Kansas Coal Company, was in Leavenworth 
"trying to secure negro miners" to work as strikebreakers ~n 
Indian Territory. He promised protection and sixty cents a 
ton. Kelly declared he hoped "to fill the territory mines 
with negroes as soon as possible." The railroad official 
said that the negroes "worked as steady as whites and caused 
no trouble by organizing strikes." After discounting the 
effectiveness of the strike, Kelly claimed reports of that 
sort "were exaggerated and that they were only a few men 
out.'"'~> The President of the Kansas and Texas Coal Company 
posted notices that stated: "All miners who do not return 
to work today will be forever barred from working in the 
mines of the company and must at once vacate the company 
property.'"'' Officers of the Missouri Pacific Railroad and 
the Western Coal and Mining Company posted similar notices 
at their mines, declaring they would "bring miners from 
elsewhere if necessary." Strikers gathered at one mine, 
anticipating that "negroes would be brought in during the 
night. II loB 
In late May officials of the Kansas and Texas Coal 
Company threatened to bring in black strikebreakers to 
operate the company's mines. The miner's union sought an 
injunction to halt such activity. Ruling from Pittsburg, 
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Kansas, Judge A. H. Skidmore (or Skedmore), ruled in the 
union's favor when he granted an injunction against the 
company. It forbade the company from importing "convict 
laborers, undesirable citizens, or people with malignant or 
contagious diseases." 49 
The operators' decision to operate their mines with 
non-union labor quickly led to violence in the coal towns. 
In early June, a strikebreaker identified as J. D. New 
entered McDuff's pool room at Howe, Indian Territory. Once 
inside he found "several miners in the room." One called 
New a "scab." He drew a pistol and shot dead the miner 
making the charge. Bystanders subdued New "after striking 
him several blows" and turned him over to the 
authorities. so 
Later in the month three striking miners robbed a 
Pittsburg and Gulf Railroad train near McAlester. The "Pee-
Gee" bandits were captured soon thereafter. Deputies stated 
that all three "have all been miners and went out since the 
strike was ordered.":.' Jailers two months later 
authorities caught the three with "penknives of the Barlow 
variety," which had been fashioned into saws. Presumably 
the men planned "to saw out of jail," but "at any rate they 
are now minus their means of escape. ,,se 
In July the operators began importing strikebreakers in 
large numbers. Four railroad cars carrying black 
strikebreakers from Virginia arrived on the Missouri, 
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Kansas, and Texas Railroad. Guarded by United States 
Marshall Grady and sixteen deputies, they detrained at 
Limestone to prevent trouble at the Coalgate train station 
and then were escorted into Coalgate. The South McAlester 
Capital reported that the "sixteen deputy marshals will be 
left at Coalgate a few days until matters begin to run 
smoothly. The importation was a genuine surprise to the 
miners and people of Coalgate. " 53 
The strikebreakers found themselves less than welcome 
in the coal towns. At Lehigh the Atoka Coal and Mining 
Company built fifty four-room dwellings and a large boarding 
house to shelter their imported black strikebreakers. Armed 
guards, deputized as United States Marshals, protected the 
"bull-pen." This continued until it was considered safe for 
them to move into standard company houses. 54 By early July 
fifty-two additional colored miners were working at 
Lehigh. '~::s 
Not all the strikebreakers were happy about such work 
conditions. The Krebs Eagle reported: 
The imported Negroes are having a whole lot of 
fun with their bosses. One of them floored a 
strip-pit foreman the other day, then smote him 
with a shovel while he was down. Another chased 
a foreman up a ladder at No. 6 shaft and it is 
said no straw-boss ever flew heavenward faster 
than did that one. Another unlimbered a rapid-fire 
razor and went after a company official who objected 
to the negro leaving camp. But he might as well 
have chased a hole in the wind .5 "' 
As the operators brought in non-union workers they 
evicted the strikers from company houses. The union raised 
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tent cities to house the strikers and their families. 
Supply depots were established at Wilburton and at other 
locations to distribute food to needy strikers. But funds 
were limited, and often families received as little as one 
dollar weekly.'7 Others in the coal communities rallied to 
support the miner's cause. Dozens of stores displayed 
"Union Store" placards in their windows; the strikers 
boycotted stores that did not.~ 
Living conditions became difficult for the strikers. 
Evicted from company housing and living in tents, 
possessions sold for debt, hundreds of miners subsisted on 
little more than turnips. Edwin Ludlow, leader of the 
operators, declared that he would "make a dollar look as big 
as a wagon wheel." 5 " While the strikers lived in tents and 
ate turnips, operators like D. M. Hailey lived a pampered 
life. A McAlester paper declared that the "Hailey mansion 
has not a superior in the city. It is large and elegantly 
furnished, rooms are spacious and decorated with pansies and 
roses," a measure of civilization the strikers' tents 
lacked • oO 
While the strike continued, Special Inspector Zevely 
began his investigation into the affair. He held hearings 
at the "commercial club rooms" at McAlester for a week in 
mid-July and then traveled to Atoka to hear additional 
testimony there. The Krebs Eagle noted that at stake was 
the fate of the "sixty-four persons ... (who) by their 
agitation were prolonging the strike.''"' 
Both sides in the strike realized the importance of the 
Atoka hearings. The outcome of the strike depended upon the 
results of the hearings. Accordingly, the hearings 
"attracted large crowds.""2 Among the first witnesses were 
leading officials of several of the largest coal companie5 
in the territory. "Most of the mine operators of the 
terri tory" were present."" The Krebs Eagle noted that the 
operators were "naturally giving aid where possible to the 
prosecution." The paper went on comment: 
The operators are in the novel position of 
endeavoring to prove that the strike has 
materially affected the output of the mines, 
or in other words has been a success, while 
the miners must either show that the strike has 
not amounted to anything, or else that the 
charges against them have some foundation." 
The central question of the Atoka hearings was to 
determine if the strikers had violated Choctaw laws. Once 
again the tenuous status of miners in the territory was 
apparent. The Eagle reiterated: 
People must bear in mind that the situation 
here is entirely different from that in any 
state. Anywhere else it would be perfectly 
legal for strikers to quit work and talk all 
they pleased provided they did not bodily 
interfere with work. Not so here. This is the 
Indians' country. The law provides that parties 
whom the Indians decide objectionable to them 
may be removed. The investigation is to decide 
if the strikers are objectionable.":~ 
After the operators testified, it was the miners' turn 
to give their side of the dispute. They stated that they 
were not using force to prevent non-union men from working. 
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They also contended that the strike could be settled 
promptly if the operators would meet with the executive 
committee of the United Mine Workers, "but not individually" 
as the operators demanded. The miners also testified that a 
"committee had been appointed to get permits for the 
striking miners, but the Choctaw authorities refused to 
issue them.""" This was interesting, as many of the 
strikers held municipal positions in the towns where they 
lived. Among those who testified were Dan Shea and Peter 
Hanraty, both elected mayors of their communi ties .•7 
With testimony completed, Special Agent Zevely reviewed 
the material and forwarded it on to the Secretary of the 
Interior. Zevely did not make any judgments at the 
hearings. "The final decision" on evictions would be at the 
cabinet level, although many in the coal towns were unsure 
how Secretary Hitchcock would "pass upon it." Over 650 
pages of testimony was given at the Atoka hearings, and as a 
result, most expected that "it will be probably be 30 days 
before the result of the investigation is known. "•a 
During the hearings the Choctaw tribe continued to 
press for the United States government to intervene actively 
in the strike. Governor McCurtain reiterated his desire 11 to 
have the objectionable parties removed."69 The tribe also 
sent a memorial to Congress that called for expulsion of the 
miners and appropriated 350 dollars to fund expulsions. 70 
It was during the Atoka hearings that John Mitchell, 
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President of the United Mine Workers, began to take an 
active role in assisting the striking miners in District 21, 
of which Indian Territory mines were part. He notified the 
union's locals across the nation of conditions in Indian 
Territory and requested that they lobby Secretary Hitchcock. 
The result was a flood of letters to the Secretary, not just 
from U.M.W. members, but from many labor organizations 
across the nation. 71 Mitchell himself offered to testify 
in "opposition to the ejectment of miner from the Indian 
Territory." Mitchell told Hitchcock that what happened to 
the sixty-four men facing expulsion was 
of the greatest importance not only to the mine 
workers of the Indian Territory, but to the 
trades union movement everywhere, and I assure 
you, all we ask or expect is that the Governemnt 
shall act with entire impartiality between the 
employer and the employee. 72 
Surprisingly Hitchcock granted Mitchell's request for 
additional arguments on the expulsions. 73 After months of 
soul-searching, Hitchcock refused to sanction expulsion of 
the sixty-four. He partially based his decision on reports 
of the Indian Commissioner, J. George Wright, and 
recommended that the activities of the strikers only "be 
closely watched. 1174 
At the end of July the miners offered a proposal to the 
operators to settle the strike. The demands were wage of 
sixty cents per ton for "run of mine" coal, (that is, non-
screened coal). This was to correct the operators' policy 
of not paying miners for "slack." The miners also asked for 
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payment every two weeks, an arbitration committee, an eight-
hour day, a check weighmen, and check-off dues. The 
president of Local No. 6~1 at Krebs had the contract 
published, to prove "we are not demanding anything 
unreasonable." 7 s 
The operators ignored the union's proposal, and they 
continued as if the union did not exist. They maintained 
production with the use of imported non-union men. 
Operators brought in black strikebreakers from Iowa, Kansas, 
and West Virginia. The Coalgate Courier noted that "the 
Negroes from West Virginia are very quiet and attend 
strictly to their own business." August marked the first 
use of non-black strikebreakers as "seventy-nine white 
miners from West Virginia arrived" at Lehigh and another 
eighty at Hartshorne to work in the coal mines. The Courier 
went on to note that "just at the present the Indian 
Territory is the checker-board, the railroad presidents are 
the checker-players, and the game is interesting. 117" The 
South McAlester Capital reported that "the mines are being 
rapidly filled up and will be running just as if no strike 
had taken place, in a few weeks. 1177 By August, despite the 
strike, production was exceeding that of a year earlier. 78 
As they brought in non-union men, the operators continued to 
evict strikers from company housing. In August the 
Southwestern Coal and Improvement Company 
served notice on all the striking miners who 
occupy company houses to vacate them within five 
days. Many of the miners have moved and other 
will move in the next few days. In many cases 
the strikers are selling their household goods 
and will seek employment elsewhere.7 • 
Not all the miners gave up so easily though. 
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In late-
August the Krebs Eagle noted that "some of our boys got into 
a little difficulty Tuesday .... It is to be hoped [it] will 
have no serious results, but which may have." The Eagle 
reported that a group of strikers were "having a little fun 
tossing rocks around but taking care to hurt no one." A 
disturbance began when 
two [non-union] foreign miners came along. The 
boys say the two men became scared at seeing the 
crowd and the stones, and noticing this the crowd 
chaffed them a good deal. The two men turned to 
run away when a stone, thrown by a striker, said 
to have been thrown at one of their own crowd -
without any attention of hitting anyone - hit one 
of the [non-union] miners. The man is laid up at 
present, but we do not know how seriously he may 
be injured. It is to be hoped there was no malice 
on the part of the strikers and that the rock was 
not intended for the miners, but anyway three of 
the strikers were arrested. 80 
The close cooperation between the authorities and the 
operators was made clear in the reaction to this incident. 
When the case came to trial, the judge issued a continuance 
"to allow Attorney Oglesby, of Fort Smith, attorney for the 
Osage Coal Company, to appear to assist in the prosecution." 
While this affair continued to develop, the Eagle lamented 
that "some trouble was reported between Italian and Negro 
miners at No. 5 one day last week. We do not know the 
extent of the trouble nor the accuracy of the report.'~' 
While the operators contended that the strike was 
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inconsequential, Chief McCurtain of the Choctaws did not. 
McCurtain acknowledged that many of the strikers had left 
Indian Territory, but in a letter to Ludlow he claimed that 
"at each mine a small guard of men were left who are in the 
employ and are paid by an organization know as the United 
Mine Workers of America." McCurtain complained that these 
men "dissuade imported men from entering the mines." 
McCurtain notified Ludlow that he was ordering the sheriffs 
of Gaines and Tobucksy counties "to call upon you for the 
purpose of having the agitators pointed out to them." The 
Chief declared that the sheriffs would then demand to see a 
permit, "and if they have no permits or are not following 
any legitimate avocations, steps will be taken to cause 
their removal." McCurtain argued that the tribe and the 
operators had to stand united. He claimed only then "we can 
succeed in having the mines fully operated. "82 
The union's district leadership then responded with a 
series of mass meetings to keep support for the strike 
going. At Coalgate the "speakers were met at the depot with 
a band and a procession was formed and marched to the hall. 
The strikers carried a banner bearing the inscription that 
they were good for seven months more." In a Coalgate 
meeting the secretary of the district, John P. Reese, 
"assured the striking miners they were sure to win if they 
held out against the operators a few months longer, as the 
mines could not be operated without them." Reese pledged 
financial support for the miners and promised the strike 
would continue "until it was won. 1183 
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At Krebs there was a festive open air meeting of unlon 
miners. About two hundred strikers gathered in front of the 
post office to hear several members of the district 
leadership speak . According to the Krebs Eagle, the 
speakers "seemed to have made a good impression." 11 ~ Reese 
remarked in a letter to John Mitchell that the mass meetings 
gave "the strikers new hope." He also noted that a mass 
meeting in Krebs was "something new for that place. 118' 
At these mass meetings union organizers implored the 
strikebreakers to join the union's cause. Reese notified 
Mitchell that "at Alderson we influenced one hundred black 
scabs to quit the day after we spoke there." In a meeting 
at Hartshorne the district leadership not only "had the 
pleasure of speaking to Ludlow and all his bosses, induced a 
few of is scabs to quit .... At all the other camps the boys 
repeat that the meeting done good. " 8~. 
Reese advised Mitchell that "this strike can be made 
more effective down here if we can hold more meetings." He 
also asked that an articulate spokesman for the union be 
sent as "not one of the boys here is a public speaker." He 
expressed the hope that in a few weeks the strike could be 
expanded to several "mines that are running unmolested" with 
"hundreds of scabs at work. 1111? What was important, 
according to Reese, was for the union men to redouble their 
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efforts. Reese noted that "our men never crusaded in this 
district yet at all, hence you see much might be done. We 
can crusade in the territory .... I believe the operators 
are now making their last fight."88 A local paper noted 
that Reese "was very sanguine of the ultimate success of the 
strike."89 
As for his meeting with Ludlow, Reese came away with 
the attitude that a negotiated settlement was possible. He 
noted that Ludlow even "gave me a cigar." He went on to 
comment that "I feel he is beginning to recognize us. 1190 
While Reese may have believed that Ludlow "is beginning 
to recognize us," reality was the opposite. Soon after the 
meeting with Reese, Ludlow "without consulting the strikers, 
or any committees," increased the wage scale at the Choctaw 
mines. The wage increase was evidence that Ludlow was 
having difficulty finding enough workers to operate the 
company's mines. While the wage increase indicated the 
strike was having an effect, the Coalgate Courier reprinted 
an editorial that originated in the Hartshorne Sun, 
headquarters for Ludlow's Choctaw Company mines. The author 
of the article contended that Ludlow, "without dictation 
from the strikers," made the advance "to men who work. He 
pays no attention to idlers who gather on the streets and 
demand an advance in wages." The paper advised that "if you 
want to make an honest living in this country, go to work. 
There is no premium on idleness.'~'~' 
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Both sides in the struggle seem to pause in September 
to assess the results of the strike. The Courier noted: 
the strike situation remains about the same as 
it has for the past few months. The operators 
are filling up the mines with non-union men .... 
The union miners seem to be firm and say they 
are able to keep up the strike until next 
spring .... Neither side will yield and it looks 
as though the mines will continue to be operated 
with non-union men. The miners do not ask for an 
increase in wages and never have, and the 
operators have not recognized the union and that 
is what prolongs the strike. The United Mine 
Workers of America demand that their organization 
be recognized and this the operators refuse to 
do!11 
As the strike dragged on, the operators continued to 
press the Choctaws and the Secretary of the Interior to 
intervene aggressively. The South McAlester Capital noted 
that when the two sides were unable to reach an 
accommodation, "the operators endeavored to prevail upon the 
authorities of the Territory to cause the striking miners to 
be expelled. Steps looking to this end were taken last 
spring, but without effect." The Capital warned that the 
"mine operators have petitioned the Secretary of the 
Interior to remove the strikers from the Territory shows 
they refuse to return to work or should they continue to use 
any effort to induce the men now at work in the mines to 
quit. !193 
Concerned about the continuing agitation in the mining 
communities, Secretary Hitchcock complained in a letter to 
John Mitchell that labor organizers had come to the 
territory from Iowa and Arkansas to persuade non-union 
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miners to quit work. He contend that at the union's mass 
meetings, "gathered together by means of a brass band," 
organizers urged the non-union miners to quit and join the 
strike. Hitchcock threatened that "if the troubles are not 
soon settled an effort will be made to expel the striking 
miners from the Territory." Mitchell retorted that only 
persuasion was being used and that if the non-union miners 
quit, it was of their own accord. He also argued that "all 
citizens" had "the right to peaceful assernblege [sic]" and 
that the union was against "any overt act or violation of 
the law. 119" 
Not surprisingly, the strike divided the coal 
communities into rival camps. Those who supported the 
operators argued the strike only hurt the coal towns. The 
Coalgate Courier argued that the town had "made substantial 
improvements during the past few months, notwithstanding the 
fact she has been greatly handicapped by a strike in the 
mines." The paper suggested if the town "would unload a few 
old drones, pullbacks, and kickers who would prefer to see 
the town stand still than to improve, the conditions would 
be for the better. '"'15 
Advice like that tended to turn crowds into mobs. 
After the Courier ran an article critical of the union, a 
supporter of the strike confronted its author on a street in 
Coalgate. According to the Courier, the strike supporter, 
Jack Gay, was "looking for trouble" when he proceeded to 
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heap profanity upon the paper's reporter and the crowd that 
had gathered to witness the confrontation. The crowd turned 
on Gay and he was "treated to a good thrashing." Despite 
being challenged, the Courier reporter refused "to enter the 
pugilistic arena.'' Police made several arrests in 
connection with the incident.% 
In November Chief McCurtain criticized the federal 
government for not ejecting the strikers, contending that 
those in Washington preferred "not to antagonize the miner's 
union." The South McAlester Capital chided McCurtain by 
reminding him that the tribe's allies, the operators, had 
"shipped into the territory a foreign element of low 
character and caste, and negroes which are an abomination 
rather than a benefit. "'f7 
By the fall the solid walls of solidarity exhibited by 
both sides began to show signs of cracking. Several small 
operators declared they would abide by the strikers' demands 
and would operated their mines "with union labor." But when 
a rumor surface claiming that the Kansas and Texas Company 
had agreed to sign the union scale, it was declared to be 
"like most similar rumors, utterly without foundation. " 98 
In November three hundred miners met at the Hartshorne opera 
house and voted to sever their ties to the United Mine 
Workers. They denounced the organization and agreed "to 
continue work and not allow the so-called-agitators to 
interfere . " 99 
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As the strike dragged on, union representatives focused 
their attention on the territory's unorganized mines. Peter 
Hanraty played a key part in organizing the m~ners in those 
locations. He launched a drive to organize locals in the 
district as rapidly as possible after his election as 
president of district twenty-one in 1899. The strike spread 
in this manner from one coal community to the next. 100 
Hanraty devised a multi-faceted strike strategy. The 
first objective was to organize locals. The Oklahoma 
Federationist declared that he "started out almost single 
handed and tramped from coal camp to coal camp, preaching 
the gospel of organization, dinning into the miners' ears 
that they could never right their wrongs unless they banded 
together in the United Mine Workers of America. '1101 Once 
locals were established, organizers began appealing to the 
strikebreakers to change sides and join the union. Many 
did, and Hanraty sent the former strikebreakers home to 
organize new locals. toe He also implemented "guarrila 
[sic) warfare against the larg [sic] operators that refused 
to sign" union contracts by entering into union contracts 
with the smaller operators, thus pitting one operator 
against another. 
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It was classic divide-and-conquer 
As the strike wore on, isolated incidents of violence 
occurred. In January 1900, a union miner and a 
strikebreaker shot it out on the main street in Hartshorne. 
The incident began when the union miner was tipped that a 
group of black strikebreakers were planning an attack on 
him. The striker then secured a Winchester for his own 
defense. He found one of his pursuers in the center of 
town; the strikebreaker opened fire first, but missed. At 
that point "both men advanced on each other, shooting as 
rapidly as possible and continued to advance until they were 
within a few feet of each other when the Negro 
[strikebreaker] fell dead. 1110" 
In another strike-related incident, a mine operator's 
milk cow was attacked and mutilated. The Coalgate Courier 
reported that "some fiend in the shape of a man had caught 
the cow and cut her tongue out." The operator offered a 
hundred dollar reward for information leading to the capture 
of the perpetrator of "the fiendish act. tttos 
As the year 1900 began, another "fiend" appeared in the 
coal towns, a smallpox epidemic. Beginning six months 
earlier at Hartshorne, the epidemic quickly spread to Atoka 
and other mining towns in the Choctaw Nation. Most of the 
cases affected the imported black strikebreakers. The 
Indian Commissioner, J. George Wright, acknowledged this in 
a letter to Secretary of the Interior E. A. Hitchcock. 
Wright notified the Secretary that the "epidemic was 
introduced into the Choctaw Nation to a large extent by the 
miners. "106 But only after the epidemic had swept through 
the coal towns were government officials so honest. 
lt.-5 
Despite several deaths, authorities quickly denied July 
reports of smallpox in Hartshorne. Marshall Grady claimed 
that "every facility for investigation had been offered by 
Superintendent Ludlow," and together they found "no case of 
smallpox exists." Trying to quiet fears, Marshall Grady 
declared that one black family did have chicken pox, but 
even then they were "not among the imported miners as has 
been reported." Despite this weak attempt at a cover-up, 
the authorities quarantined the strikebreakers "in response 
to a request of a meeting of citizens held yesterday 
morning." Edwin Ludlow pledged to furnish provisions and 
doctors for those afflicted with the "chicken pox." The 
Coalgate Courier declared the rumor of smallpox among the 
blacks strikebreakers at Hartshorne to be false, noting that 
"the physicians now pronounce it chicken pox. " 107 
The South McAlester Capital tried to quash rumors with 
the comment that the epidemic was "confined to the Negroes 
entirely." 108 But after the disease spread to Krebs, the 
Eagle advocated that "people should take some steps to 
prevent [this J disease from coming among us. 10 ~ As a 
result, "several Krebs parties" sought "a petition asking 
the Indian Agent to investigate the reported prevalence of 
smallpox at Hartshorne, Alderson, and other places. ttllo 
The citizens of Alderson declared that their city had no 
smallpox, but rather an outbreak of "a fungoid disease." 111 
Coalgate declared that there was "no smallpox here! 
lls6 
Coalgate has never had a case." But just ten miles to the 
south Atoka was under quarantine, its schools and churches 
closed. 11 e 
Only after the epidemic had run unchecked for months 
did the authorities quit denying the outbreak and start 
taking aggressive measures to combat the spread of the 
disease. In October Chief McCurtain ordered the Choctaw 
Nation's medical board to take charge of protecting the 
tribe's citizens. Indian Agent Schoenfelt took similar 
action in regards to United States citizens residing within 
the borders of the Choctaw Nation. 113 
Officials took these measures as a belated reaction to 
a serious smallpox outbreak. By October the epidemic had 
spread to most of the coal towns in the territory. One of 
the towns hit the hardest was Atoka, where infected miners 
were "corralled" at one of many detention camps established. 
Surprisingly, the mortality rate was relatively low, about 
2.5 percent of those infected. The Coalgate Courier noted 
that those who survived were "cured, washed, dressed up and 
turned loose to again mingle with the outer world. While 
they are not so handsome as they were, they have the 
consolation of knowing they will never have to be 
vaccinated. 1111" 
By late in the year the authorities were actively 
combating the smallpox epidemic. The Choctaw Board of 
Health, with the cooperation of the Indian Agent, took 
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complete charge of the quarantine camps. At one camp thirty 
guards quarantined "an entire mining settlement with a 
population of several thousand Negroes." Medical personel 
treated over eight hundred cases at the twenty-nine 
detention centers. The Choctaw tribe spent heavily for 
tents, food, physicians, nurses, and guards. In January 
1900 Secretary Hitchcock recommended an appropriation of 
fifty thousand dollars "to stamp out small pox in the Indian 
Territory," but Congress rejected the bill. Congress did 
not appropriate funds until after the epidemic was under 
control. m Still, some federal officials did take the 
initiative. The postmaster general ordered the mail be 
"fumigated" at McAlester, Krebs, Hartshorne, Atoka, and 
other coal mining communities. 11• 
The smallpox epidemic certainly disrupted life in the 
coal towns. It forced a closing of the courts, resulting in 
the jails being "filled to overflowing with prisoners." The 
authorities also banned public meetings, but they did not 
enforce the order uniformly. Blacks in McAlester who 
attended a Republican club meeting later found their names 
on a removal list given to Indian Inspector Wright. But 
with the ban on public meetings still in force the Woodmen 
of the World Society gave a ball and suppe r at the McAlester 
city hall. A local paper called the festivities "a swell 
affair. m• 7 
Despite the disruptions caused by the epidemic and the 
lt.8 
ongoing strike, the citizenry still managed to maintain a 
spirit of boosterism and a sense of humor. The Coalgate 
Courier noted that Lehigh was "bounded on the south by a 
praiare [sic] fire, on the north by a coal mine, on the east 
by smallpox and on the west by more smallpox. People should 
look sharp. 11111 At McAlester the Capital declared it took 
"more than a strike and a small pox scare to keep South 
McAlester from expanding. mu By the spring of 1900 the 
smallpox epidemic was under control, the last detention camp 
being closed in May.'~ Attention in the coal towns turned 
back to the strike. 
The year 1900 was indicative of what the next few years 
would bring in the "Southwest Strike." At times even the 
keen observer would have had difficulty knowing there was a 
strike on. The mines continued to operate. The Capital 
noted in January that "all the mines in this section report 
steadily increasing outputs of coal, numerous shafts are 
being sunk, and additional tracks and spurs laid. The 
output for 1900 promises to far eclipse that of last 
year.'u 
Conditions were not as promising for the striking 
miners. Without income for months, many were "reduced 
almost to the verge of starvation." The National Executive 
Board of the United Mine Workers requested that the union's 
locals levy an assessment of twenty-five cents per month for 
each member to raise funds for the six thousand on strike in 
1'-9 
Indian Territory and Arkansas. The national executive board 
notified the membership: 
Every honorable effort has been made [towards] 
settlement of this strike; but we regret to say 
that the operators have treated with scorn and 
derision every proposal or overture made by us. 
In addition to this they have invoked the 
assistance of the Federal authorities, and are 
now engaged in an attempt to have nearly all the 
leading members of our organization forcibly 
expelled from the Indian Territory . 122 
Later in the year the national leadership gave ten 
thousand dollars to District Twenty-One for strike 
relief. 123 But as the operators continued to bring in 
strikebreakers from all across the nation and even Mexico, 
the likelihood of a quick victory was nonexistent.'h 
Success, if it came at all, would be the result of a 
lengthy, protracted battle of attrition and willpower. 
At mid-year for a moment there seemed a possibility of 
settlement. Albert Struble, a member of the district 
twenty-one's leadership, issued a call to the membership 
"asking the men now at work to send delegates." Struble 
issued an invitation to the operators as well, but they 
declined, stating that "no representative would be sent to 
the conference and that they had all the coal diggers they 
could use." •es But a harbinger of the evolving position of 
the operat ors appeare d when all but the "Big Four," the 
Central Coal and Coke Company, the Western Coal and Mining 
Company, the Osage Mining Company, and the Rock Island, 
broke ranks and met with the miners in joint session . 
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"Agreement [was] reached on most all of the debated 
questions of the scale."m The Coalgate Courier reported 
that the "coal strike may soon end" and that Boston was 
advising the miners to return to work. The paper went on to 
report that while "the strike has not been forrnorally [sic] 
declared off, but it is understood all arrangement will be 
perfected an the formal end of the strike soon 
announced. " 127 
These hopes for a settlement soon collapsed over the 
union recognition issue. While the Courier was reporting 
that the strike "is now about to end," it was clear the only 
agreement reached was on the wage scale. The Courier noted 
that "the coal companies do not recognize the union nor 
agree to employ union men nor agree to any of the other 
demands of the union. 111 e8 
A few days later all hope for settlement vanished. In 
a newspaper interview Boston stated he had been misquoted 
earlier when it was reported he had advised the striking 
miners to return to work. Boston stated that he would 
recommend the miners return to work if the operators agreed 
to pay the union wage scale, even though they had not 
recognized the union - but only if the "Big Four" agreed to 
the same scale. If they agreed to the union scale, Boston 
stated, "the strike would soon end and be called off. me• 
Local papers blamed Boston for the failure of the 
negotiations. The Coalgate Courier declared: 
Mr. James Boston is not proving to be a crowning 
success as a pacificator. His latest effort 
at bringing about a settlement of the strike ... 
only resulted in widening the breech .... By 
their action the operators clearly indicate that 
they will make no terms or enter into entangling 
alliances with the union whatever. The new 
breech is to be regretted. 130 
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The talks only muddled the situation further. Because 
of the compromises made in the partial agreements reached 
before the schism, both the operators and miners split into 
moderate and hard-line factions. At Coalgate the operators 
of the "Dead Horse" and "Tight Wad" mines reached agreement 
with seventy of their employees. Two weeks later the 
McDougal Coal Company and its employees "settle(d] their 
differences and the men have resumed work. Both parties 
made concessions." 131 Thus by the willingness of some 
operators to pay the union scale and by some miners' 
willingness to forego union recognition, both sides 
experienced rifts in their ranks. 
After the talks collapsed, the operators renewed their 
efforts to have union organizers ejected from Indian 
Territory. Henry Wood, general manager of the Choctaw 
mines, wrote to Secretary Hitchcock "to again call your 
attention [to] the actions of one James Boston and others 
connected with the United Mine Workers of America." Wood 
argued the union organizers were "engaged in agitation in 
the Indian Territory, endeavoring to stir the miners up to 
strikes, are holding public meetings at the different mines, 
making inflammatory speeches and doing everything that i s 
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possible to strip up dissension between the operators and 
their men." 132 Another official of the same firm asked the 
federal government to put an end to these "mischievous and 
direful influences ... exerted by such leaders as Boston and 
others, who go from camp to camp stirring up contention and 
strife. 1n33 
The federal government's view was that intervention 
would only make martyrs out of the union organizers. 
Inspector J. George Wright wrote to the Secretary of the 
Interior recommending that as long as the situation remained 
peaceful, "no further action by the Department is necessary 
or advisable at this time." He argued that ejecting Boston 
"would tend to further agitate the matter and bring them 
into greater prominence among their sympathizers." As long 
as the union organizers picketed peacefully, Wright 
contended the best policy was "no action be taken at present 
looking to removal of these parties. 1113~ 
The "Big Four" continued to operate with imported 
strikebreakers, but there is evidence the operators found it 
difficult to obtain men willing to cross the picket line. 
When 320 miners were brought from Chattanooga, Tennessee to 
Hartshorne, the Coalgate Courier commented that "there is a 
great scarcity of miners in the Indian Territory. These men 
are to take the strikers places. The crowd was equally 
divided between whites and colored. There have been about 
700 miners shipped into the Territory in the last month. 
Not one half stay long enough to pay back their 
transportation. 1113:~ 
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While maneuvering behind the scenes to break the 
strike, the operators maintained the outward appearance that 
the strike had no effect. Peter Hanraty noted this in a 
circular to the district's miners in October 1900. Hanraty 
notified the membership that the strike for recognition was 
into its eighteenth month, with no end in sight. He 
informed the miners that the operators were scouring every 
coal camp across the nation in their search for labor, 
"stating that the trouble is all settled; which is false; 
and is only intended to deceive miners and get them here 
from their homes in the hope they will be compelled by the 
circumstances to help the operators out in their distress 
for workingmen. 11136 
John Mitchell noted with regret that "men are 
continually being brought into that District to take the 
places of the strikers." But in a hint of a secret deal 
being negotiated, Mitchell informed Boston that he had 
received assurances from the "powers that be," [Mitchell's 
quotes) that "a special effort will be made to bring the 
strike to a close." Mitchell ordered Boston to remain 
silent about certain "Republican officials" interceding with 
the "Big Four" railroad companies. Mitchell also promised a 
personal visit to the district "to render what assistance I 
could in bringing the strike to a close."13? 
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Mitchell's reference to "Republican officials" was tc, 
none other than Mark Hanna, Senator from Ohio, Chairman of 
the Republican National Committee, and political operative 
extraordinaire. The two often communicated through two 
intermediaries, Daniel J. Keefe, President of the 
International Longshoreman's Association, and Charles J. 
Devlin, president of the Mount Carmel Coal Company of 
Topeka, Kansas. On October 30, 1900, Mitchell asked Keefe 
if "the Captain," (Hanna) was "doing anything to end [the] 
Southwest strike? It is very important it be closed soon, 
as other side is preparing to flood mining regions with 
circulars on the eve [of theJ election. Fire answer. 11139 
Keefe replied he was to meet with Hanna soon. 13" 
In the following weeks there was a steady flow of 
correspondence among Mitchell, Hanna, and their 
intermediaries, concerning the Southwest Strike. '"0 These 
back-door negotiations might have yielded results had it 
not been for the efforts of the "Big Four" companies. High-
ranking officials of these companies wrote to Hanna to 
inform him that they had "no difficulties" with their 
employees and that Hanna's intercession was not 
necessary.'"' Faced with this obstacle, Mitchell thanked 
Hanna for his assistance "in trying to effect a 
settlement. ""'11 
At this point Mitchell was nearly ready to concede 
defeat. In a letter to W. B. Wilson, national secretary-
treasurer of the union, Mitchell lamented that "it is 
evident that nothing further can be done to bring about a 
settlement of this strike." He even prepared to transfer 
the union's organizers in the district to new 
assignments .'"3 
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On the second anniversary of the strike, the strains of 
the conflict were creating divisions within the union. With 
few prospects for a settlement, the district began to fall 
apart under the pressure. The district split into two 
factions over the issue of whether or not to hold a district 
convention. The national organizers, sent by the union's 
executive committee, advocated forgoing a convention for 
fiscal reasons, contending that the expenses of a convention 
would have to be drawn from the strike funds sent by the 
national board. Although this was "a proper view you must 
admit," according to John Mordue, national organizer, "this 
argum~nt did not satisfy a few chronic kickers." On the 
opposite side were those who favored a convention, led by 
Hanraty, the district's president. Mordue considered the 
arguments made by Hanraty and the district's leadership to 
be "the vaporings of a set of off ice seekers."'"" 
The dispute was so serious that uthe existence of 
District was tottering in the balance." The rift expand 
into a general questioning of Hanraty's leadership of the 
district. The national organizers pushed for the district's 
leadership to resign, save the treasurer, "and throw the 
district into the national officers hands." Despite the 
opposition of the national organizers, the convention was 
held. What followed had all the hallmarks of a classic 
convention-floor donnybrook. '"s 
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According to Mordue, what happened "is known by few -
will be realized by fewer yet." Hanraty took the offensive, 
charging that the national organizers were bent on 
undermining his authority and leadership. Mordue responded 
that this was true, but his response to Hanraty's leadership 
was due to "natural causes," alluding to Hanraty's poor 
leadership. Members of locals, one after another, rose to 
ask Hanraty, "why he had never had any policy." They 
quizzed him on controversial agreements made with 
independent operators. They asked Hanraty why he had 
"drummed the local L.U. 's for men to fill these mines." 
When mentioning this particular point to John Mitchell, 
Mordue noted, "few me~ care to be licensed as scabs." After 
this initial verbal skirmishing, "both factions sparred 
cautiously," then full-scale "hostilities commenced" on the 
first of August.'"'" 
Hanraty adopted a defensive posture during the 
proceedings. After the membership repeatedly asked him to 
elaborate on an official report on the agreements, he 
refused, snarling "I will not." Hanraty's comment that "I 
came without trimmings" only further exasperated the 
membership already ma~dened by the district president's 
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stonewalling. 147 
As the convention droned on, "the strain grew worse 
towards evening." Hanraty finally resorted to strong-a:rrrt 
tactics and closed-door deals to bring the membership back 
under control. The national organizers, labeled as 
troublemakers, became scapegoats in the dispute . But 
national organizer Mordue considered Hanraty the source of 
all the trouble, his tactics motivated by "plainly personal 
ambition prompting a detestable means of unjust and unmanly 
persecution. 11148 
Despite the union's inner turmoil, the strike 
continued. In the same letter that Mordue relates the 
events of the district convention battle to Mitchell, he 
noted that the strike was having an effect. He informed 
Mitchell that "indications for a settlement with some of the 
Big Four are more favorable than they have ever been since 
the inauguration of this strike. 11149 
Mordue drew this assessment from the success the union 
was having in negotiating agreements with independent 
operators. As part of Hanraty's divide-and-conquer 
strategy, agreements with independents put pressure on the 
"Big Four" to reach an accord with the union. One organizer 
who worked in the Lehigh district noted: "We hope to have 
enough men organized at Lehigh to secure a settlement with 
that coal co. We have made better progress this week than 
any previous week. mso 
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By the end of 1901 organizers were establishing locals 
where they had previously never existed. Several operators 
accepted the miners' demand for a check weighman at each 
m1ne. The check weighmen were "the first elected in 3 
years, " according to one organizer. I :II 
Early in the spring of 1902 Mitchell began to maneuver 
to reopen channels of communication with the "Big Four" 
operators. Mitchell first approached Charles J. Dev lin , 
president of the Mount Carmel Coal Company o f Topeka, 
Kansas. Devlin responded favorably, but advised Mitchell 
not to press for a wage increase, arguing "it will only make 
trouble all along, which you and I want to avoid as far as 
possible .... I don't want to be an extremist on either 
side. '":se 
There was some doubt whether Mitchell's selection o f 
Devlin as an intermediary was the most appropriate. 
Mitchell himself raised this issue with Devlin after the 
presidents of U. M. W. Districts 1~. 21 , and 25 notified him 
that the officers of the "Big four .. . a r e n o t dis posed t o 
hold a joint conference of the operators and of the miners 
of the states west of the Mississippi River , because of some 
ill feeling between you and them." Mitche l l went on t o tell 
Devlin tha t "I under stand, of cour se, that the y a re s ome what 
prejudiced against you because you paid the union s c ale and 
recognized our organization at the time of the strike." 
St ill, Mitchell believed Devlin was the right man for the 
job and asked Devlin to intercede , but only if it was 
possible "without loss of prestige or dignity."m 
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Devlin's response to Mitchell's request illuminates the 
view of the independent operators toward the "Big Four." 
Relishing his mission, he told Mitchell that "the Big Four 
interests will never forgive me for helping you beat them ln 
the strike." But Devlin did not expect his efforts to 
produce results. He commented that he had "very little 
faith that they will do anything and even if they agree to 
it, I have no faith that they would carry it out. They are 
a big crowd of big politicians." Devlin also advised 
Mitchell to raise publicly the issue of a general conferenc e 
with the "Big Four." This was necessary so that 
"responsibility for failure - if we do fail - will rest upon 
the "Big Four" operators, who are evidently trying to make 
it appear that you are standing in the way." Devlin 
declared he was "writing you thus frankly, knowing that you 
will always regard letters such as this as being entirely 
confidential . "'s~ 
Devlin's efforts in 1902 never produced results. After 
the operators met at Kansas City in June, Devlin informed 
Mitchell that they adjourned , "having submitted their last 
years scale as their ultimatum." Mitchell was already 
having serious doubts on the prospects for a successful 
conclusion to the strike. The union ' s president admitted 
earlier i n the month in a letter to Hanraty that he viewed 
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the strike as hopeless. Mitchell told Hanraty that he was 
cutting assistance to District 21, because "there is no 
possible hope of forcing the operators of Arkansas and the 
Indian Territory to accede to the demands of our Union by a 
continuation of the present strike. "'s::s 
Rather than give up the strike, Hanraty altered his 
strategy. He met with the district's executive board and 
issued a directive that authorized any miner who could no 
longer financially hold out to return "to work for the 
companies that are working under agreements with the 
organization." This was a concession to the operators who 
paid the union scale, despite their refusal to concede the 
union's central demand, recognition. Hanraty argued that 
officially ending the strike "would fill this District full 
of men and prevent any concessions that we may be able to 
s ecure through the s carcity of men." Despite this seemingly 
devastating setback, the mood at the district's convention 
in 1902 was a sense that victory was near at hand.':"' 
Only a few days later the mood of the convention was 
proven correct. The operators, minus the "Big Four," 
presented to the union a list of seven conditions they 
demanded in exchange for a meeting with the union. Hanraty 
succinctly replied that "the contract will be fulf illed to 
the letter. 111 s 7 
The result was a joint conference between the miners 
and operators of district twenty-one. Both sides accepted 
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an agreement that called for an eight-hour work day. semi-
monthly payment of wages, and a slight wage increase after a 
ten-day session held in August at St. Louis. All the 
operators, except the "Big Four," recognized the union as 
the miners ' bargaining agent.'"" 
The agreement reached at St. Louis did not bring peace 
and prosperity to Indian Territory mines. The strike 
against the "Big Four" continued. This maintained the labor 
shortage in the region as many miners were reluctant t o 
enter the territory. This forced the operators, even those 
who had signed the union scale, to run their mines at 
partial capacity. With the price of coal rising, the 
operators were missing an opportunity for profitable sales. 
As a result, the partial settlement reached at St. Louis did 
little to provide a comprehensive basis for a stable 
business environment in the territory's c oal industry. '"9 
This was the situation as the coal operators of Indian 
Territory met at McAlester in September 1902. The South 
McAlester Capital reported that their purpose was to discuss 
the ''cons olidation of the larger coal interests in Indian 
Territory. The consummation of the deal is not far off." 
The paper cryptically noted that "it may be the Rock Island 
[Railroad] who will secure the plums, present indica tions 
point that way. 11160 
With the strike continuing in some communities, 
concluding in others, the situation was thoroughly confused 
by the fall of 1902. Occasionally even the district 
leadership was unsure of the status of the strike in a 
particular community. When the miners at Ola walked out, 
the district secretary-treasurer declared that the strike 
is not a general one in the mines of that portion 
of the Indian Territory. If there had been a 
general strike I would have known of it. I have 
not been notified of any walk out at Ola, but a 
local union, where there is no contract can, and 
frequently does, suspend work pending the 
negotiations for and the acceptance of a 
contract. I suppose that is the case at Ola. u •• 
The district leadership worked on both the local and 
national level to bring pressure upon the hold-out 
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operators. Union organizers continued to hold meetings in 
the coal camps as the strike continued. In November the 
executive boards of Districts 1'*, 21, and 25 met in "secret 
conference" with John Mitchell's representatives. The South 
McAlester Capital reported that their object was "to 
formulate plans by which they can make joint demands" on the 
"Big Four" for "recognition of the Union. These are the 
only companies in the West that have not signed a union 
contract. "••e 
The unresolved situation continued to produce sporadic 
violence. In late November unknown persons dynamited a 
company house at Carbon. The three black stri kebreakers who 
resided there, a fathe r and his two sons, were unhurt but 
"terribly shaken up." The authorities at Bache arrested a 
black striker in connection with the incident. •u 
Whi le the troops on both s i des continued to skirmish 
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along the battlefront, each side's generals were groping to 
find the path to a negotiated settlement. All the miners 
walked out of the mine and refused to work at mine No. 1 at 
Hartshorne in February after a dispute with company 
officials over the selection of a checkweighman. '"~ This 
action was symbolic of the growing sense of confidence in 
the miners. Months of organizing were paying dividends for 
the union. Two weeks later the miners presented an 
ultimatum to the operators. The South McAlester Capital 
reported that more than three thousand recently organized 
union men planned to walk out of twelve companies' mines if 
the operators refused to meet their terms. The Capital 
noted that "sufficient force has been gathered to warrant 
the union to made [sic] its first demand and the step is a 
most forcible one." Both sides agreed to meet a few days 
later at South McAleste:c. '"5 
Before the big face-to-face meeting, both sides 
gathered to confer. The Capital reported that "one of the 
[labor] leaders stated that the prospect for a settlement 
was considered good." But the unidentified union official 
implied that if no agreement was reached within a few days, 
"the miners would be ordered out." The operators met at the 
directors room of the American National Bank. While many of 
the striking miners were subsisting on turnips, the 
operators enjoyed a feast that included blue point oysters 
on the half-shell, frog legs, beef tenderloin, shrimp, 
turkey, olives, ice cream, and other delectables.' ... 
The talks that ensued did not produce immediate 
results. One obstacle was that the operators were less 
organized than the miners. While the miners spoke with a 
single voice, the operators had yet to consolidate their 
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position into a single set of demands. After the February 
meeting at McAlester, another meeting of the leading "coal 
magnates of Indian Territory" convened in April. What the 
operators discussed is unknown, but a few weeks later they 
met again at South McAlester and organized the Indian 
Territory Coal Operators Association. Among the seventeen 
operators there to witness the event were D. M. Hailey and 
T. W. Clelland, two of the largest independent operators ln 
the terr·itory. The Daily Oklahoman reported that ''the 
combine is for the mutual protection of all operators" and 
that it would permit them to "regulate the price of coal and 
the method of operating," in addition to buying supplies in 
bulk. 167 
While the operators met to map out their strategy, the 
striking miners continued to demonstrate for their cause. 
The miners of Coalgate, Lehigh, Phillips, and Midway held a 
"big parade" at Lehigh in April. The South McAlester 
Capital reported that "the procession was a very long one 
and was headed by a cornet band. The must have been four or 
five hundred in the procession."'08 
The main reason why the miners were pressing so hard 
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for a settlement at that time was that they were unsure how 
much longer they could hold out. Elizabeth C. Morris, John 
Mitchell's personal secretary, commented that "after a very 
long and expensive strike in the Southwest (Arkansas, Indian 
Territory, Kansas, and Missouri), the organization is 
building up, but internal conditions are such that the local 
men there are unable to cope with them." But ~n a hint of a 
major breakthrough, Morris mentioned an upcoming convention 
that was going to be "one of vi tal importance. 11149 In June 
the Missouri and Kansas operators, less the "Big Four, 11 met 
with John Mitchell at Kansas City. They adjourned after 
agreeing to meet again in July at Pittsburg, Kansas and to 
issue an invitation to the Arkansas and Indian Territory 
o perators to join them. Mitchell expressed his belief that 
the "Big Four" would attend the upcoming convention at 
Pittsburg, Kansas. 170 
That city played host to four conventions being held at 
once in July 1903. Operators and union officials meet face-
to - face at a joint-convention. At their meeting, seventy -
one operators gathered together, including the "Big Four." 
The miners met in district and interstate conventions. More 
than a thousand delegates, who represented fifty thousand 
miners from Kansas, Mis souri, Arkansas, Texas, and the 
Indian Territory, met at the interstate convention. In 
charge of it all was John Mitchell, elected committeemen-at-
large and c hairman of the subcommittee on wages at the 
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joirLt-convention. 171 The evening before the convention 
began, Mitchell wrote that "the joint-convention starts to-
morrow; how long it will last time can tell. We have a wild 
delegation from District 21, some delegates of the same 
character from 1'* and 25. However I am hoping for the 
best. " 17"' 
The joint-convention nearly ended up being a love-fest. 
The big step for the operators was agreeing to meet. Once 
that happened, the negotiations proceeded smoothly. The 
South McAlester Capital reported that 11 the convention l.S 
harmonious and good feeling prevails. The miners are 
especially enthusiastic over the decision of the old non-
union Big Four companies to recognize the union and 
participate in the conference." 172 After a sub-committee 
"appointed jointly by the miners and operators at their 
conference" the Daily Oklahoman commented that "it is no,., 
believed than an agreement will be reached rapidly. " 174 
The operators acceded to all the union's demands. 
Within a week the union and the operators reached a 
settlement that called for a seven cent per ton increase l.n 
wages, the eight-hour day, pay every two weeks, payment f or 
deadwork, check-off dues, and, most importantly, "complete 
recognition of the union." The operators also agreed t o the 
establishment of pit-committees to resolve disputes, to 
equal opportunity for work, and not to deduct a physician's 
fee from a miner's wages without prior approval. The South 
1.6 7 
McAlester Capital declared that "the miners trouble's are 
over. 1117~ 
As the joint-convention drew to a close. John Mitchell 
was happy with the results. He wrote to John P. Reese, one 
of the original leaders of the strike, that the convention 
had been "a long hard fight; not only with the operators but 
also with our own delegates .... All the companies in the 
three States and the territory are represented, including 
the ' big four,' and I regard it as a great victory for our 
organization." Mitchell later commented in a letter to 
Charles Devlin, president of the Mount Carmel Coal Company, 
that he was "quite satisfied with the outcome of the 
Pittsburg Convention and I sincerely hope that everything 
will run along smoothly and that neither operators nor 
miners will have cause to regret the action taken 
there. " 176 
Mitchell's hope that both sides would accept the 
agreements quickly became reality. Within a few weeks the 
membership of both sides' bargaining organizations ratified 
the agreements reached at Pittsburg. The Labor Day that 
followed soon the:r:·eafter became a celebration of the 
victory. "At Krebs the largest celebration held in this 
vicinity for years was successfully carried out." Down the 
center of town marched a "parade ... composed of the various 
unions from the towns in the mining belt as far east as 
Buck. Each division was uniformed differently and all wore 
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bright badges" and "the number of marchers was 2,500." 
Nearly everyone in the parade carried a picture of the hero 
of the day, John Mitchell. 177 
The 1903 agreement was a watershed in industrial 
relations in the Southwest. The settlement reached at 
Pittsburg ushered in a nearly twenty-year period of relative 
tranquility in the coal communities of the region. For the 
following twenty years the United Mine Workers were the 
dominant force among and sole representative of the area ' s 
miners. While the settlement was everything the miners 
dreamed for, the operators did not lose in the strike. In 
reality, there was no loser in the strike. The miners 
received recognition, and the operators benefited by having 
orderly contractual relations with their work f orce for the 
next twenty years. 
The operators also found that the settlement provided 
them with a stable labor force and business - like relations 
with the union. The acceptance of a unifo~~ wage s cale 
helped the operators by limiting their cut - throat 
competition, thus creating a business environment more 
conducive to profits. With the strike over, the operators 
c ould fill their mines with men and produce at full 
capacity. With prices high and the market brisk, the 
settlement was as beneficial for the operators as it was f or 
the miners. In short, the agreement of 1903 brought order, 
equity, a nd prosperity to the coal fields of Oklahoma . The 
tragedy was that it took so long for an agreement to be 
reached. 
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What drove the operators to the bargaining table and to 
accept recognition of the union are the central questions of 
the Southwest Strike. Years of unrest, bombings, 
demonstrations, and other agitation did not bring them to 
the negotiating table; neither did Mark Hanna, nor the 
independent operator, Charles Devlin. What more likely 
brought the operators to swallow their opposition to dealing 
with the union was a basic human emotion, greed. The strike 
was costing the operators• revenue. It was more profitable 
to recognize the union and operate at full capacity than it 
was to operate at a diminished capacity with strikebreakers 
and the other high costs associated with breaking the 
strike. Simply put, it was more cost effective to negotiate 
than fight. It was the bottom line that led the operators 
to overcome their own reluctance to entering into agreements 
with the union. With the agreement ratified, both sides 
prepared to enter the Golden Age of coal mining in Oklahoma. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE UNEASY TRUCE: 1903-1918 
The accords signed by the operators and the union in 
1903 ushered in an era of unparalleled prosperity for the 
Oklahoma coal industry. Both the operators and the miners 
saw their income rise; relations between labor and 
management were cordial, but cool. Beginning in 1904, 
biennial joint-conferences became routine and 
institutionalized. While both sides remained adversaries, 
the agreement of 1903 marked the beginning of a new 
r elationship. An atmosphere of detente had replaced the 
hostility of the previous twenty years. Direct 
confrontation remained limited to a period of intense 
sparring that accompanied contract talks. While the union 
and the operators remained wary of each other, both realized 
that to-the-death battles benefited neither. 
Riding high after 1903, the United Mine Workers became 
the undisputed representa tive and leader of Oklahoma's 
miners for the following twenty years. These were 
prosperous times for both the miners and the operators. The 
McAlester Wasp noted that "a friendly feeling exists between 
employer and emp loyee." At the j o int - conferences, whic h 
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became "an established institution," according to one 
authority, the operators regularly granted wage increases. 
The operators, enjoying the profits derived from increasing 
output from mines "working on full time," conceded wage 
increases so not to disturb a situation beneficial to 
themselves. 1 
Not surprisingly, U.M.W. membership grew steadily. By 
190~ more than thirteen thousand Indian Territory miners 
belonged to the union. District #21 membership peaked in 
1912 at over sixteen thousand members. By that time members 
of Oklahoma's forty-five U.M.W. locals earned nearly three 
dollars for an eight-hour day and worked a little over nine 
and one-half months annually. Income by 1910 averaged 
around four hundred dollars annually, but inflation consumed 
much of these increases and as a result wages were 
"sufficient only for a very moderate living," as one source 
noted. e 
With their new-found power, the United Mine Workers 
were quick to turn to the strike when the operators balked 
at the union's demands. But the union did not always strike 
during contract negotiations, nor did they always press for 
wage increases. In 190~ the union accepted a 5 percent 
reduction in wages without stri king, but during most 
contract negotiations over the years preceding World War 
One, while union leaders negotiated, the membership struck 
to apply pressure for a quick settlement. Walkouts 
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accompanied contract negotiations in 1906, 1908, 1910, 1912, 
and in 1916. The miners were not reluctant to strike if 
they believed it was warranted. 3 
The first major strike to test the new relationship 
between the union and the operators occurred in 1906. On 
February 1 the operators and miners of the Southwest 
district, Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and Indian Territory, 
met at the Masonic Hall in Indianapolis, Indiana. After a 
week of negotiations, the Krebs Banner expressed fear that 
"the situation looks a little striky [sic]," noting the 
"operators and united mine workers preparing for a battle 
royal." Declaring itself to be "neither a coal operator nor 
a United Mine Worker" organ, the Banner advocated that with 
"good sense and calm," it was possible to "find a way out of 
the difficulty." But the paper warned that without an 
agreement, the union would call a national strike on April 
1 ... 
As the negotiations got nowhere, the operators revealed 
their next move. One operator, speaking on the condition of 
anonymity, told a Banner reporter attending the Indianapolis 
convention that if the miners struck, "the first move by the 
operators will be to close down for ninety days and make no 
attempt to work the mines." The operators "calculated that 
ninety days of idleness would exhaust the national treasury 
of the United Mine Workers and the strike [would] be won by 
the operators." By mid-March the Banner reported that "the 
operators say the strike is inevitable .... The miners 
themselves ... have very little to say about it."!! 
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Despite last-minute pleas for compromise, the strike 
began on April 1 as scheduled. The Banner reported that 
"since then not a mine in this vicinity has turned a wheel." 
Several days earlier the Banner had called for both sides to 
compromise, arguing that the U.M.W. should not impose its 
demands, but neither should the operators display "arrogance 
and shut down the mines" to freeze the nation into 
supporting the position taken by the operators. The 
Banner's plea for failed. The Indian Territory Coal 
Operators Association met at South McAlester on April 3 and 
adjourned after refusing to sign the 1903 scale.• 
When the strike commenced the miners began preparations 
for an extended walkout. The Banner noted that "many of the 
Krebs miners own their own homes and most of them are 
employing their time making a garden." The situation 
remained calm, as there was "no disorder or expressions of 
ill will" among the striking miners. The strikers seemed 
prepared for a lengthy confrontation, as the Banner noted 
that "most of the miners have money ... there will be little 
if any suffering." The Banner contended that the miners had 
little reason for "excitement or panicy [sic] feeling," as 
"it is generally believed that all the operators in this 
district will soon sign the scale and resume work."' 
The strikers at Krebs showed few signs of a "panicy 
feeling" when they "celebrated the eight-hour day 
anniversary." According to the Banner, "a big crowd was 
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out .... The procession formed up town and marched down Main 
Street and out to the (fair] grounds, several hundred 
marched in the procession, and United States flags were much 
in evidence in the marching column. The Krebs Italian band 
furnished music for the occasion and the boys played 
well .... The day passed off pleasantly." 8 
The failure to reach a prompt settlement in the dispute 
led to a growing sense of apprehension among the businessmen 
in the communities affected by the strike. They feared that 
an expected short walkout was degenerating into a lengthy 
strike. A protracted shut-down would result in economic 
hardship in the coal towns. Near the end of April the 
Banner noted that "the difference that began so mildly 
between the operators and the mine workers a month ago is 
growing more pronounced and is hardening into real strike 
conditions. •~'~ 
Only a few days later the situation improved 
considerably. By May iJr the Banner predicted that "it is a 
cinch that mine work will be resumed within thirty or sixty 
days." The Banner noted that "mine workers cannot live on 
wind." The paper's editor declared that with the coal 
supply as well as the U.M.W. treasury nearly exhausted, both 
sides would be forced to reach a settlement. 10 
This prediction rapidly became true. On May lOth the 
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national convention of the U.M.W. adjourned after 
authorizing district officers to sign agreements with 
operators willing to pay the 1903 scale. This amounted to a 
call for a 3 cent per ton increase in the Southwest 
district. By the end of the month the miners and operators 
concluded an agreement at Kansas City that called for "a 
slight advance" in wages. The agreement included provisions 
that established a permanent board of arbitration. It was 
hoped that this action was "a long step in the direction of 
settling mine troubles without strikes." Both sides also 
agreed to keep the mines operating with "no tie-up" for two 
years. But while the operators were forced to grant a wage 
increase, they did win on other important issues. The 1906 
agreement gave the operators an important concession - the 
right to fine miners fifty cents daily for each day's work 
stoppage whenever "wildcat," or unauthorized local strikes 
broke out. This prevented these spontaneous local strikes 
from escalating into district-wide walk outs.'' 
Both sides expressed satisfaction with the agreement. 
The Banner reported that all were "shoutin happy" and "in 
fine spirits over the strike settlement" that called for the 
miners to return to work by June 1. Within weeks the mines 
of the district were "working full time."12 According to 
the Banner, demand for coal was "growing every day. Jobs at 
Krebs were plentiful as the paper noted that "1000 miners 
can find employment and in thirty days there will be room 
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for five hundred more. " 13 
The relations between the union and the operators 
continued along a regular course over the period leading to 
World War One. As the time for contract renewals 
approached, both sides raised their rhetoric level as well 
as their demands. The approach left both sides maneuvering 
room and the option of compromise. Still, shut-downs, 
either by strike or lock-out, marred every contract renewal. 
The short duration of each strike indicated that neither 
side categorically rejected compromise. No strike lasted 
more than a few months. All of these developments reflected 
the general nature of relations between the union and the 
operators - detente and a precarious peace - but always a 
new crisis to overcome. The lock-out of 1908 was just one 
of those crises. 
In early March, 1908, Arkansas and Oklahoma operators 
closed their mines. The Haileyville New State declared that 
the shut-down was a scheme to prevent a strike the miners 
planned for April 1 if the operators did not grant a 10 
percent wage increase. The New State noted that the 
operators wanted to prevent a "strike if possible, but their 
method is an unusual one. They have decided to close the 
mines down before the mi ners make their dema nd." The 
operators believed this action "will take the edge off the 
desire of the miners to strike." Just as importantly, it 
would also leave the miners "short of money." The operators 
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calculated that their preemptive action would render the 
union incapable of sustaining a lengthy strike. As for the 
wage increase, the operators vowed they would "never consent 
to sign a new contract," contending they had "gone the limit 
already." The lock-out affected five thousand miners in the 
district.'" 
When the existing contract expired on April 1 the 
operators declared that what followed was a "suspension; no 
strike." The lock-out was to continue, "pending an 
agreement on a new contract," according to the New State. 
The paper argued that "during the temporary suspension the 
operators will have an opportunity to make improvements, and 
the miners a chance to make [a] garden, go fishing and 
r-est. nt:s 
After a month the union withdrew its demand for a wage 
increase. With this obstacle removed, both sides quickly 
came to an agreement. In early May the miners of District 
#21 met at Kansas City to ratify the contract reached with 
the Southwestern Interstate Coal Operators Association. 
While awaiting ratification, thirty-five thousand striking 
miners in Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas returned 
to work. By the end of the month the strike had dwindled to 
a one-line news story. On May 29, 1908 the New State 
reported: "The strike is now off." •• 
Within weeks all was peaceful in the coal fields of 
Oklahoma. The New State noted that "the mine whistles are 
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blowing and calling for all available men." Everyone in 
Haileyville and the other coal towns celebrated "the ending 
of the coal miners strike." But the operators celebrated as 
well. The New State remarked that both the Hailey-Ola and 
Rock Island coal companies, the two leading firms in that 
district, were "making money. 1117 
While the operators "making money," so were the miners. 
Not only were their wages higher, but they were being paid 
in cash; for many it was the first time ever. When the 
Osage Coal and Mining Company dispersed a seventy-five 
thousand dollar payroll in early January, it was in cash. 
This was the "first payment entirely of cash since the money 
flurry set in several months ago." The New State stated 
that it was "understood that cash payments will be regular 
from this time on." When one miner received his pay 
envelope he looked inside, smiled and remarked to his fellow 
miners, "its money this time, boys. 11111 Other operators 
quickly followed suit. The Hailey-Ola Coal Company not i fied 
its employees in 1909 that "no scrip will be issued after 
May 1, 1909, and all outstanding scrip must be redeemed on 
or before May 2~th, 1909. Govern yourselves 
accordingly. 1119 
While the typical miner's standard of living rose 
steadily during the 1903-1918 period, the dangers he faced 
daily in the mines remained. Oklahoma's new state 
c onstitu tion c ontai ne d many pr ov isions a imed at improvi n g 
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safety in the work-place, but their effect was limited. 
Peter Hanraty, "the most powerful labor leader in the 
territories," represented the miners as vice-president at 
the constitutional convention. Hanraty's presence at the 
convention was so overpowering that it led his opponents t o 
complain toW. J. Murray, president of the convention. One 
critic, S. W. Murphy, lambasted Murray, telling him that "we 
did not expect you to be doped by such men as Hanraty." He 
asked Murray "how much more of the Constitution are you 
going to let Hanraty make?" Quite a bit, it seemed, as the 
convention delegates created the office of state mine 
inspector, with Hanraty named as the first individual to 
hold the office.~ 
Hanraty's rise to state mine inspector did little to 
reduce accidents in Oklahoma's mines, however. Fatalities 
increased during the period between statehood and World War 
One. Politicians passed many laws, but the penalties 
associated with mining laws were inadequate to force 
compliance. Operators had little financial incentive to 
abide by state mining regulations. Fatal mining accidents 
continued to increase, despite claims of politicians that 
they would "enact laws as strong as the Holy Writ for the 
safety and protection of the boys at the mine." Hanraty 
complained in 1908 that due to the procrastination of the 
state legislature in enacting mine safety laws, it was an 
exercise in futility to tell "the operators to observe 
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regulations and rules necessary for safety. They know they 
do not have to now. nel 
Whatever the cause, accidents continued, despite the 
efforts of the union and the state government. In August 
1908, twenty-nine miners died at Hailey-Ola No. 1 after a 
fire broke out in the mine. The fire began when a miner's 
open-flame lamp ignited two kegs of "black jack oil." Only 
two of the twenty-nine killed had life insurance. For three 
of those killed, it was their first day in the mine. In 
addition to the men who died, "seventeen valuable trained 
mine mules were suffocated." ae 
No number of laws could prevent some accidents. One 
such mishap occurred in September 1908 when lightning struck 
the powderhouse of the Samples' mine, two miles west of 
McAlester. The lightning set-off a huge explosion. The 
only fatality was a man who lived three-quarters of a mile 
away from the mine. He died when a huge rock projectile, 
probably a portion of the powderhouse, smashed through his 
house, "completely severing his head from his body."u 
Accidents underground also continued unabated. In one 
accident, Ben Price, a miner at the Bolen-Darnell ' s Mine No . 
'* at Cr aig, was "blown to pieces" in an explosion in 
January, 1909. "Gas" overcame several others when they 
tried to rescue Price .e~ 
Hanraty recognized the inability of the state to 
improve safe t y i n t h e mi n es . He s u g gested in a lett er t o 
John Mitchell in 1909 that the: 
miners and their officials should take up the 
question of the protection of life and 
property in their meetings and in their joint 
conferences with the operators. While I have 
not much hope of the miners and operators 
agreeing on the question of safety, where the 
financial interest of either party is effected, 
and if they cannot agree, then the Inspectors 
should be empowered by law to make rules and 
enforce them, that will protect life and 
property regardless of the wishes or opinions 
of the miners or operators. 85 
Mitchell responded by stating that he agreed with 
Hanraty. He added that "so long as it is cheaper to kill 
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and maim workmen than to provide for their safety, employers 
will not, except in rare cases, make the investments 
necessary for the adequate protection of the working 
people."u From Mitchell's comments one can infer he did 
n ot expect the operators to change their views toward mine 
safety on their own. 
Hanraty continued to press the operators to reform 
their way of doing business. He chastised them for 
replacing skilled miners with inexperienced men, 
the vast majority of whom, never saw a coal mine. 
It is not enough that they pay a c cident insurance 
or make provisions for the bereaved families. 
Suffering and bereavement have no money 
equivalent. Prevention is better than 
compensation or charity .... More than 90% 
of (accidents) could be avoided if the (mining) 
laws were not violated. e? 
The primary reason why the operators were reluctant t o 
make the investments required by the mining l a ws was, of 
course, the costs involved. The large railroad associated 
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operators faced not only competition from other states, but 
from smaller operators in Oklahoma. The smaller independent 
operators complained that the larger companies dominated the 
regional market through sales associations that were little 
more than thinly-disguised pools. The smaller companies 
went on to complain that despite their numerical superiority 
within the Southwestern Coal Operators Association, their 
views did not receive the consideration due them. This 
internecine conflict disrupted the association's efforts to 
present a solid front to the union. To remedy this problem 
the association launched a drive in 1910 to bring all the 
operators into the organization. As this effort proceeded 
the miners announced they would seek a wage increase of ten 
cents per ton in the upcoming contract negotiations. 28 
As the miners sought a wage increase, a new factor was 
being introduced into relations between the operators and 
the union. The oil industry was beginning to have an impact 
on the coal business. A member of the operators' 
association made this point in a letter to John Mitchell in 
March, 1910. W.D. Ryan notified Mitchell that there was 
going to be "a disagreement out here in short order." He 
informed Mitchell that the operators were willing to renew 
the present wage scale, but the union's demand of a ten cent 
per ton increase was unacceptable. He stated that a wage 
increase was impossible as "without any doubt the oil and 
gas [industry) has put the coal business on queer street 
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down here, and that competition will be rather severe for a 
few years to come." It was clear that the oil industry had 
become a major threat to Oklahoma's coal industry.29 
With this in mind the operators entered the 
negotiations in 1910 adamantly opposed to any increase in 
the wage scale. Their demands refused, the miners struck on 
April 1. After several months of watching their mines sit 
idle, the op8ratcrs attempted to resume operations with the 
old scale. In late June the Krebs Advertiser noted that a 
"feeling of unrest and tenseness in the atmosphere" when the 
Rock Island Coal Company offered "work to the miners at the 
old scale. It is not believed that any miners will report 
for work and many of the men are looking for other 
employment. 1130 
As the strike entered its f ourth month , prospects for a 
settlement seemed non-existent. The McAlester Wasp lamented 
that "there seems to be no prospect of work being resumed in 
the coal mines. 1131 At Kansas City negotiations between the 
union and the operators dragged along. 3~ The deadlock 
broke after Thomas L. Lewis, the U.M.W. 's new international 
president , left the negotiations to attend a meeting o f the 
union's l e ader ship at Indianapolis . 33 Whether the two 
events were linked together is difficult to prove, but the 
prompt settlement so soon after Lewis' departure raises the 
possibility. By the end of the month an agreement was 
reach ed t hat cal led for t he t hree cent r aise that the miners 
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demanded. It seemed as though the strike was over. but a 
week later the miners of District #21 rejected the 
agreement, wanting better terms. The membership was divided 
over their next step. Some favored breaking off 
negotiations. others stressed the need for arbitration. The 
McAlester News-Capital reported that it was to be expected 
that the operators would 11 seek to open the mines on the open 
shop policy. 1134 
This was high-stakes poker for both sides. On August 1 
the McAlester News-Capital announced that the 11ultimata 
scrap" might "conclude tonight." It was expected that the 
operators were going to make a final offer as an ultimatum. 
The following day the News-Capital noted that the miners had 
rejected the operators' last offer and that all efforts at 
compromise had failed. The miners declared that they would 
"picket the mines at once." The News-Capital reported that 
"trouble of the gravest nature is feared by both sides." 3:~ 
After the negotiations collapsed, the time came to 
place blame for the failed talks. The inability to reach a 
settlement exposed a serious rift in the union. The 
traditional unionists were facing a serious challenge from 
the social i st faction, headed by Alex Howat, president of 
the Kansas district. Always a renegade. Howat carried as 
many battle-scars from encounters with other union leaders 
as he did from engagements with the operators. The 
Howatites sabotaged the agreement. They favored a joint-
convention rather than having two men reach an agreement 
behind closed doors. 3 • 
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The split also affected District #21. The district had 
a high percentage of socialist-oriented miners. Fred W. 
Holt, district secretary and socialist, argued that this was 
"a fight to keep our people from being forced back into 
slavery." He contended that the open shop was 11 the sole 
object and aim of the Southwestern Coal Operators' 
Association." Opposing Holt was the district's president, 
P. R. Stewart, who was firmly in the camp of the union's 
president, T. L. Lewis." 
During this upheaval, delegates of the U.M.W. met for a 
national convention at Indianapolis in mid-August. The 
convention amounted to a showdown between the two rival 
factions of the union. Miners of the Southwest district who 
wanted to continue the strike "were not largely represented 
at the national convention." In fact, they were virtually 
shut out of the convention by the national leadership. Alex 
Howat, their leader, declared that "our strike is still on." 
The McAlester News-Capital reported that the Illinois 
delegation, which was at the convention but also opposed the 
agreement reached at Kansas City, "held [a] meeting of their 
own and reiterated their declaration of war, to continue 
until they win their fight and their big strike." The 
Illinois delegation argued that if it was victorious in its 
district, "the Southwestern district also would win their 
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strike." The News-Capital also noted that the "Illinois men 
declare that the operators of the Southwest could not stand 
a continuance of their strike if Illinois were working." 38 
While the U.M.W. convention continued to degenerate 
into something similar to a streetfight, the operators 
responded to Fred Holt's claim that the operators were bent 
on trying "to force the men back into slavery." James A. 
Elliot, president of the operators' association, 
categorically denied Holt's charge that the operators' 
primary goal was to break the union. "This we absolutely 
deny," Elliot forcefully responded when queried on the topic 
by a newspaper reporter. 39 But few were interested in 
Elliot's comments at that moment. The attention of all was 
focused on the "chaos" at the U.M.W. convention at 
Indianapolis.~«> 
The Indianapolis convention pitted the union's 
president, Lewis, against Kansas and Illinois district 
presidents, Howat and Walker."• After multiple verbal 
broadsides were exchanged, the renegades had won the day. 
Lewis was humiliated when the convention delegates voted to 
declare that "all strikes are endorsed." Before the meeting 
adjourned, a special committee recommended that a one dollar 
assessment per member be levied on "all members now working" 
to support the continuation of the strike. Not 
surprisingly, Howat endorsed and Walker seconded the 
committee ' s recommendation. "e 
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While the convention endorsed a continuation of "all 
strikes," within days there were rumors of a settlement in 
the Southwest district. The operators notified the 
presidents of the three districts composing the southwest 
district that they would accept the miners' demand for a 
three cent per ton wage increase. The operators made the 
offer with one stipulation, that the miners return to work 
immediately and ratify the agreement before negotiations 
were suspended. The News-Capital declared the offer a 
"concession on part of the operators." The operators also 
concurred that the agreement be referred to the Southwest 
district convention preparing to convene at Pittsburg, 
Kansas. "3 
As the time for the district convention neared, the 
News-Capital predicted a "stormy time at Pittsburg." The 
paper noted that at the same time a delegation of eighteen 
prepared to travel to Kansas City to continue talks with the 
operators. The delegation was clearly anti-Howat as 
thirteen of the group repudiated him and his faction, but 
their primary purpose was "to end the coal strike troubles 
in the Southwestern district." The delegation announced 
that it was prepared to accept the operators' latest terms. 
At first, President Lewis was expected to attend the talks 
with the operators at Kansas City, but he declined at the 
last moment, claiming to be "busy all day" and wanting to 
finish up several matters before Labor Day."" 
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As the "stormy session" at Kansas City continued, 
national president T. L. Lewis flashed his hatred of Howat. 
Lewis continued to refuse to assist in the negotiations, his 
decision based on "hostility toward Alexander Howat, 
President of the Kansas district." The News-Capital 
reported that Lewis was still smarting from the humiliation 
resulting from Howat's victory at the convention. 4~ 
Without Lewis as a counterweight to Howat, the 
negotiations in Kansas City were "still hung up" after a 
week of talks. The main sticking points were the 
penalization and arbitration clauses. Still, the News-
Capital noted that the union and the operators were "both 
confident" the talks would be successful. 4 " 
This promise of a possible settlement proved true 
within days. Both sides accepted the appointment of W. L. 
A. Johnson, state labor commissioner of Kansas, as "official 
arbitrator in case of future disputes." The ratification 
vote was set for September 10. Last-minute delays led the 
News-Capital to declare that "the seventh son of a seventh 
daughter who has been sending out predictions as of the hour 
of settlement of difficulties between the mines and 
operators of the Southwest has fooled us again." Still, the 
paper expressed hope that the two sides might "sign this 
afternoon." Both sides finally reached a formal agreement 
on September 10. The ratification vote was delayed a few 
days, but a una nimous vote was expec t ed as "the mi ners s eem 
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to have all that they wanted. n•'7 
The final ratification was tantalizingly slow. On 
September 17 the New-Capital reported that the vote was 
"progressing slowly," according to "the seventh son who has 
been casting the horoscope for the mine troubles in the 
Southwest." u Finally, on September 19 the News-Capital 
received a telegram from James Elliott and P. R. Stewart 
stating that the union's membership had ratified the 
contract and that the mines would resume work the following 
day. The paper reported that "the long suspense is ended 
and everybody is happy. " ... 
The Hartshorne Sun captured the prevailing sentiment 
concerning the outcome of the contract talks when it 
reported, "Strike ends, Victory for the Miners." This 
assessment can be attributed to the fact the miners demanded 
and received a wage increase. But the Haskell County News 
provided a more balanced assessment. The paper noted that 
the operators had won a significant concession when the 
union accepted the penalty clause that protected the 
operators from arbitrary strikes. :~o 
The strike of 1910 was illustrative of the union-
operator relations during the 1903-1918 period. While the 
rhetoric at the negotiations was often acidic, neither side 
questioned the other's good faith during the talks. The 
Haskell County News went so far as to claim that the 
negotiations were "mar ked by utmost good will." The 
199 
Pittsburg Enterprise expressed the same sentiment when it 
declared that "an era of good feelings and good business" 
had begun. Within weeks thirty thousand miners return to 
work in the Southwest District. :u 
The clause in the 1910 agreement that prohibited 
wildcat strikes was not very effective. One wildcat strike 
broke out even before the miners returned to work after the 
1910 strike. As their leaders signed the new contract, the 
miners at Dow announced they would not return to work. They 
had earlier demanded that operators at Dow "get rid" of 
those who had worked in the mines doing extension work 
during the strike. The operators refused this demand, and 
"as a result none of the men went back to there this 
morning. ":sa While this was an inconsequential walk-out, 
others were of a more serious and protracted nature. 
One of the largest wildcat strikes occurred in the San 
Bois Company No. 1 and No. 2 mines at McCurtain in June 
1911. More than three hundred coal miners struck over a 
dispute with the operators on the issue of payment for 
"deadwork." The Haskell County News reported: 
We are unable to learn the particulars, but the 
miners claim the company will not pay them for 
the rock they must remove in digging coal. The 
trouble caused a strike here last fall but work 
was resumed upon promise of the company to pay 
for this rock, and it seems they have not stuck 
to their agreement. The strike is not 
likely to last long enough to be serious.:s3 
After two weeks it appeared the stri ke was over. The 
Haskell County News proclaimed on June 23 that there was 
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"great rejoicing" as "the strike is ended." While the 
settlement details were unknown to the public, the Haskell 
County News noted that "it is satisfactory to the miners and 
that is all we care.":s .. But only a week later Fred Holt, 
secretary of District #21, announced that "the strike at the 
San Bois mines was on again." Holt charged that "the 
superintendent backed down" on the agreement to pay for 
deadwork. He noted that the "mine operators conunissioner 
and President Stewart decided the dispute against the 
company two months ago, but the superintendent refuses to 
abide by it." Holt claimed the union was "forced to call 
the men out. u:s:s 
With the issue of non-payment for deadwork rekindled, 
it appeared the strike had the possibility of being a 
lengthy one. Although the 1903 agreement covered this 
issue, the operators continued to balk at payment for this 
type of work, arguing that the tonnage rate took into 
consideration the time needed for deadwork. The Haskell 
County News pointed out that "the trouble is the old one; 
the company refuses to pay for dead work, and the miners 
feel that they should. It is sincerely hoped that the 
miners and the operators will speedily reach an agreement." 
After a strike lasting six weeks, the two sides came to an 
agreement that permitted a resumption of work. The 
operators agreed to pay for removal of slate when it was two 
or more inches in thickness. Later an arbitrator ruled that 
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the walk-out did not violate the penalty clause of the 1910 
agreement and overturned an earlier ruling that fined the 
miners for the strike. The Haskell County News declared 
that "this is a signal victory of Labor over Capital.,.,. 
Only two months later State Mine Inspector Ed Boyle 
condemned and ordered closed the San Bois's No. 2 mine. one 
of the mines struck in the dispute. The Haskell County News 
noted that "this is the mine in which so many men have lost 
their lives. 11 ::~7 After a few weeks of repairs the mine 
reopened. The accident that occurred on March 12. 1912 made 
all the previous disasters there pale in comparison. 
The explosion at San Bois No. 2 killed seventy-three 
men and left McCurtain shocked and bereaved. According to 
the Haskell County News. "nearly all the dead were married. 
had families." Fifty-five of those killed were buried 
together at the local cemetery; one hundred and fifty men 
dug the graves. The paper went on to lament that "the whole 
city is in mourning." Wandering the streets of the city 
were "mothers with babies in their arms." their "wild eyed 
and tear washed faces look helplessly at you." The paper 
noted that it was a scene that "make's one's heart bleed 
with pity." Rumors spread that one widow died in her 
bereavement and that another had "gone insane." The Haskell 
County News declared that these "reports are groundless." 
But no one could deny the blast created two hundred and 
fifty widows and orphans. One family lost five members in 
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the tragedy. 58 
The disaster at San Bois No. 2 in 1912 was the seventh 
explosion causing fatalities there in the nine years the 
mine had been open. 59 Many of those who died in the blast 
had participated in the strike there only a few months 
earlier. The accident was more proof than anyone needed 
that state safety regulations had accomplished little. It 
was in this somber environment that the strike of 1912 
occurred. 
The strike of 1912 began with the miners demanding a 
ten cent per ton wage increase. Many believed that if there 
was to be a strike, it was going to be limited to the 
district. The Haskell County News noted that there was "no 
likelihood of the strike being nation-wide" and that it was 
not expected to "be of long duration."•o The union's 
district leadership was not so certain; it amassed $120,000 
in a "defense fund," anticipating a strike on April 1. •a 
As that date neared, the operators declared that they were 
"not disposed to grant the advance" that the union demanded. 
It was feared that if the operators did not grant the 
increase, the "miners may not take their picks and lanterns 
and descend into the dark holes where they pound out a 
living."68 After a strike lasting two months, the 
Southwestern Coal Operators Association granted the demands 
of thirty-five thousand miners in Oklahoma, Arkansas, 
Kansas, and Missouri. The miners even decided to return to 
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work before ratifying the agreement ."'3 The Coal County 
Democrat noted that "work will not be suspended .... The men 
have decidedly the best of it, will have an advance in 
wages, and most of their demands were conceded. We 
congtulate [sic] the men on the peaceful and advantageous 
settlement. ""'" 
For several years the coal fields of Oklahoma remained 
calm. This lull was broken in 1915 when two hundred miners 
struck at the San Bois mines at McCurtain, scene of the 1912 
wildcat strike. Instead of a dispute over payment of 
deadwork, this time the "cause of the walkout" was blamed on 
"the rejection of the coal operators of the proposed 
contract of the United Mine Workers for a basis of working 
conditions and scale of wages in the San Bois mines," 
according to the Keota Record. The paper also reported that 
President Jordan of the Blue Ridge Coal Company, which 
controlled the San Bois mines, intended to operate the mines 
on an "open shop basis." In reality the mines had never 
reopened after the March 1912 disaster. The effort to 
operate the mines on "open shop bas is" never took effect ... s 
The only other work stoppage during the 1903-1918 
period was in 1916. A strike lasting more than three months 
occurred while the contract talks dragged on. The onset of 
World War One created unprecedented demand for Oklahoma 
coal, and all the mines of the district worked full time. 
Wages rose with the price of coal, but so did the cost of 
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living. Federal wage and price controls during the war 
insured the operators high profits and the miners good 
wages. By the end of the war the wage scale had reached 
more than five dollars a day. Operators enjoyed high 
production and prices, and Oklahoma coal pruduction peaked 
at over four million tons in 1920. But not all was well in 
the Oklahoma coal indus try. •• 
Throughout the period from 1903 to 1918 the socialists 
and the "pure unionists" struggled to control District 421. 
Alex Howat and Fred Holt led the socialist faction, while 
"pure unionists" such as John Wilkinson, Andrew McGarry, and 
William Dalrymple tended to take their lead from the union's 
national leadership. The socialist faction was a minority, 
but a vocal one. They enjoyed visits from such nationally-
known socialists as Eugene V. Debs and Mary "Mother" Jones. 
Socialist-oriented miners remained a powerful movement 
within the district until as late as the mid-1920s.•7 
The operators, often a target of the Howat and Holt 
faction, ridded themselves of the two in 191/e. when an 
independent operator, Franklin Bache, accused President R. 
H. Keith of the Central Coal and Coke Company and president 
of the operators' association, of funnelling bribe money to 
Howat and Holt. Although the accusation never was proved 
conclusively, Howat and Holt were forced to resign their 
positions in the union. Howat still was able to remain a 
thorn in the side of the union's leadership as well as the 
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operators. After World War One, Howat became involved in 
disputes with John L. Lewis, the national president, and 
John Wilkinson, president of District #21. Jailed 
frequently for his strike-associated activities, Howat was 
an outcast within the union, but loved by his district's 
membership . .a 
The 11 pure unionists 11 also had their share of scandal. 
John Wilkinson, president of the district in the 1910s and 
early 1920s, likewise was accused of accepting bribes. 
Checks surfaced showing that Wilkinson had accepted checks 
from Colonel Samuel M. Rutherford, a political opponent of 
Oklahoma's Governor Robert L. Williams. Photocopies of the 
damning checks found their way into Williams' hands in 1918 
as he was involved in the process of being appointed to a 
federal judgeship, an appointment Wilkinson publically 
opposed. Williams questioned Wilkinson's ability "to make 
the fight solely in the interests of labor," under such 
circumstances.n 
The district leadership had other problems as well. In 
191~ several of the smaller independent operators decided to 
break ranks and attempted to run their mines on an open shop 
basis. The result was months of violence at Prairie Creek, 
Arkansas, only four miles from the Oklahoma border. During 
these clashes union miners shot dead two mine guards, 
several mines were dynamited, and others intentionally 
allowed to flood. Franklin Bache, an independent operator 
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with mines in Arkansas and Oklahoma whose mines and guards 
were attacked, accused district president P. R. Stewart of 
ordering the purchasing of firearms with union funds. Later 
Stewart was arrested and jailed briefly for contempt. 70 
Across the border in Oklahoma the business community at 
Adamson offered to provide arms to the miners in Arkansas, 
while union miners in Oklahoma professed their readiness "to 
join with the Arkansas Unions in their fight. " 71 
While no further large-scale violence occurred during 
Bache's attempt to operate his mines in Arkansas under open 
shop conditions, his aborted effort to break the union was 
proof of a rising discontent among the independent 
operators. The large railroad-connected mining companies 
were generally satisfied with business conditions, because 
their mines turned a profit while providing a dependable 
fuel source for their railroad locomotives. As a result 
those who complained the loudest about the union were the 
independent operators. Without the benefits the larger 
companies derived from economies of scale, the independent 
operators claimed their cost of production "equals or 
exceeds the gross revenue." Franklin Bache claimed this was 
due to "forced payment for ... deadwork which was considered 
as being paid for in the mining rate per ton of coal. 1172 
He argued that "another year of union operation would put us 
entirely out." 73 Other operators declared that they had 
"about reached the limit 11 and that they were ready to do 
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battle with the union in order to secure the open shop. 7~ 
Briefly in 1914 it appeared as if the open-shop drive 
would spread to Oklahoma. Franklin Bache noted that the 
cost of production was also up in Oklahoma and it would be 
beneficial for state operators to see the open shop in the 
state's mines.~ An attorney for Bache suggested reopening 
the closed-down mines at McCurtain on a non-union basis. He 
also recommended filing suit against the union, arguing that 
the union "is a combine in restraint of trade under the 
Sherman Law. '17• Bache agreed, stating that the operators 
could make a profit only under non-union conditions. He 
contended that if "business continues on a un1.on basis, 
there is in my judgement no prospect whatever of getting the 
cost [of production) reduced, and every prospect of having 
it continuously increased. 1177 
Bache enjoyed partial success in his efforts to break 
the union. He sought and won a treasury-breaking $750,000 
judgment related to the Prairie Creek violence in the 
landmark case of Coronado Coal Company v. United Mines 
Workers. In its ruling in 1922, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the district was liable for the actions of individual 
members of the union. The case dragged on in the courts for 
a decade, but the judgment was financially devastating for 
the district. 78 On the other hand, the open shop movement 
fizzled in Oklahoma in 1914. The other operators refused to 
join the open shop crusade, arguing that "the difficulties 
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of establishing open shop mining property in Oklahoma and 
Texas" were "greater than we care to undertake at the 
present time. " 79 Bache complained that the union's 
inordinate influence in Washington was to blame and that the 
union had convinced the federal government that "there is 
only one person, namely myself, in this part of the world 
that isn't in love with the union. "ao 
Bache was one of many independent operators who become 
involved in the Oklahoma coal industry during the 1903-1918 
period. By 1910 the region sported dozens of small 
independent operators, their increased numbers attributable 
to a number of reasons. A surplus of miners, low labor 
costs ($2.~0 a day), easily accessible coal outcrops spread 
over a large area, and a local market untouched by the large 
operators all contributed to the scores of independent 
operators. 81 
The independent operators often were locals with spare 
cash to invest. Storekeepers, lawyers, mining company 
officials, even frugal miners, all could save and raise 
enough money to lease and develop small undeveloped tracts 
of land sandwiched in-between the large railroad mines. At 
these sites they had access to railroads, highways, 
electricity, and water. ae 
The large operators initially ignored the small 
independents. Only after the independents were well-
entrenched did the large operators recognized the threat the 
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independents represented. If the independents went non-
union they could eventually become real competition to the 
larger operators. Outside of the market their own railroads 
represented, the larger operators were vulnerable to the 
independents. By the mid-1910s the large operators had 
grown suspicious of the independents, believing they had 
reached deals with the union to allow them to reduce their 
wages below the contract rate, thus putting the large 
operators at a competitive disadvantage. 83 
Another threat to the operators during the 1903-1918 
era was the development of "co-operative mines." Co-
operative mines were ones in which a small group of miners 
agreed to operate the mine together. They combined their 
money and labor while sharing the profits. These mines 
became especially prevalent after 1910. A five-mile long 
outcropping between Krebs and Adamson had seventy small 
mines upon unleased lands. 8~ While miners at all the co-
operative miners shared responsibilities and profits, some 
took the collective philosophy a step further . 
One location where this occurred was the mining colony 
at Milton, Oklahoma. At Milton the entire community 
functioned according to socialist guidelines. Located in 
Leflore County, "a band of industrial workers" gathered in 
1913 to "establish a communism in which all working members 
of the colony may find employment at a living wage." The 
colony, a bout one hundr ed total , consisted of houses, 
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stores, a church, school, sawmill, and its mining lands, all 
operated on a collective basis. Most of the members of the 
colony worked in its mines, which produced a peak of nearly 
eight hundred tons monthly. Many of the estimated forty 
thousand active socialist voters in Oklahoma at that time 
visited Milton to tour the colony.n 
The large operators' animosity toward the co-operative 
mines was at least as great as their distaste for the 
independent operators. They contended that the union, on 
principle at least, favored the co-operative mines. The 
large operators suggested that the union worked with the co-
operative miners in order to keep them in the 
organization. 86 
Having found a niche to survive in, the small mines, 
both independents and co-operatives, multi plied in the 1903-
1918 period. The cooperatives operated around the fringes 
of the market, and only locally. The independents, who 
operated on a mid-scale level, were more of a threat to the 
large operators, but still only in a limited way. In some 
ways they benefited the large operators, who found they 
could purchase coal from the independents for less than it 
cost them to pr oduce f rom their own mines. 87 
The 1918 District #21 convention centered around the 
union's position toward the independent and the co-operative 
mines. Topics raised at the convention inc luded the 
re l ative a dva ntages of t h e larger oper a tors and measures t h e 
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government could take to prevent the proliferation of the 
often illegal "wagon mines." Often individuals simply 
sneaked at night onto the holdings of the larger companies , 
pilfering wagon-loads of coal from outcroppings, then sold 
it locally. Enforcement of union contracts at the smaller 
mines also was discussed at the convention, but no major 
decisions were made on the issue of the smaller operators . 
Increasing prices allowed both the large and small operators 
to make profits on their coal mining investments.•• 
Oklahoma's coal industry came out of World War One in 
full-gear. Production and wages were at all-time levels. 
It seemed as if the golden era would never end, but it 
would. Within a year the union and the operators would be 
locked in battle during another bitter strike. The 
government-fixed high wages and prices of the war came to an 
end in 1919, leading to a major confrontation that fall. 
The upheavals related to the post-war economy were difficult 
on the state's coal industry, but even more threatening was 
the impact of oil and gas production on the coal industry of 
Oklahoma. Many railroads began to switch to less expensive 
oil. Other industries also turned from coal to oil, as did 
millions of home-owners just wanting to heat their homes for 
less. Oil and gas production ended up being a far greater 
threat to the large operators than the independents and the 
co - operative mines, but from 1903 to 1918, it was only good 
times i n Okla h oma's coal towns. 
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A CHANGE IN THE WIND: THE STRIKES OF 1919 AND 1922 
The first brisk winds that signaled the onset of winter 
in 1919 ushered in more than a changing of a season. The 
mood of the nation was changing also. A contagion was 
sweeping the country, one that caused a collective paranoia 
known today as the Red Scare. Lenin was in the Kremlin, and 
a fear was sweeping the United States that his disciples 
were about to rise up and seize the nation violently in the 
name of the proletariat. This led to a spasm of reaction by 
the authorities. From the White House to the local sheriff, 
government launched a massive assault on all perceived 
radicals. Caught in this broad-brush approach were the coal 
miners. Their demands for higher wages to offset the 
greatly increased cost of living were lumped together with 
the more shrill cries of the Industrial Workers of the 
World, a chief target of the government crack-down. It was 
in this atmosphere that the coal miners of Oklahoma j o ined 
in a nation-wide strike in the fall of 1919. 
There were several differences between the strike of 
1919 and those prior to the war. First, by the war's end 
the coa l operators of Okla homa h a d withdra wn from the 
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Southwest Coal Operators Association. The main reasons for 
their secession were disagreements over the cost of 
production and the "five-day" clause, which guaranteed a 
miner five days pay once he was put on the work list, 
whether he worked a full five days or not. Oklahoma's 
operators argued that the higher costs of production in the 
state made the "five-day" clause an economic death blow. 
After the 1916, conference Oklahoma's coal operators 
withdrew from the Southwestern Coal Operators Association 
and formed one of their own.' This action made reaching 
agreements with the operators more difficult. Now the union 
had to reach several agreements, rather than one. Also, 
each association's goal of using its separate contract to 
gain an advantage over the other only made negotiations more 
troublesome. 
The other major difference in the strike of 1919 and 
those that preceded it was that this was the first time 
wages and prices in the coal industry were under government 
control. The contra ct signed in 1917 fixed wages "until the 
expiration of the war." With the war over, the miners in 
the fall of 1919 presented the operators with a list of 
demands. When two thousand delegates gathered at Cleveland, 
Ohio in September, they asked for a six- hour day, a five - day 
week, and a pay increase of 25 to ~0 percent.a What 
happened at Cleveland was important, as the contract signed 
the r e was for the centr a l competitive c oa l field, the basis 
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for all other contracts across the nation. While he did not 
take an active role, J. B. Wilson of the Oklahoma Coal 
Operators Association was in attendance to keep that 
organization abreast of events. 3 
From the beginning the strategy of the operators was 
clear. They argued that the strike was in violation of the 
existing contract that forbade strikes until the conclusion 
of the war. The operators contended that the miners should 
continue to work under the existing contract "until the 
peace treaty is actually signed."" 
The miners contended that the war had been over for 
nearly a year and it was time to move into the post-war era. 
When President Wilson vetoed an extension of a war-time 
prohibition bill, the miners argued that this action 
supported their contention that the "war emergency" was over 
and that they were no longer bound by contracts "for 
continuation of the war."~ John Wilkinson, president of 
District #21, remarked in early October that unless the 
operators of the district accepted the demands put forth at 
the Cleveland convention, over ten thousand miners in 
Oklahoma and nationally over four hundred thousand were 
prepared to strike. Threatened with an injunction by the 
federal government, John L. Lewis, the larger-than-life 
leader of the union, refused to blink an eye in this high-
stakes game of brinksmanship. Lewis issued a national 
strike order on October 15 that called upon all the union's 
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miners to lay down their tools on November 1. 0 
Both the federal and state governments actively sought 
to prevent the strike. United States Secretary of Labor 
William Wilson appealed for both sides to continue to 
negotiate, but refused to arbitrate. John L. Lewis, after 
conferring with Wilson, stated simply that "the strike order 
stands.'"' 
Governor J. B. A. Robertson of Oklahoma also wanted to 
prevent a strike. He scheduled a conference at McAlester 
and invited both sides to attend. District president 
Wilkinson wired Robertson to express his plans to attend, 
but noted he could "only state our position." 9 J. L. 
Britton, district vice-president, stated he did not see how 
the governor's conference could have any "immediate effect," 
considering that 90 percent of the district's membership 
favored the national officers' order to strike. William 
Dalrymple, U. M. W. board member, contended that if the 
governor's goal was to separate the district from a national 
strike, then the meeting would be "a joke.'"' 
Dalrymple was right when he predicted that the 
governor's plan was to ask the state's miners to stay on the 
job regardless of the national strike situation. Robertson 
openly admitted that he intended to put such a proposition 
to the miners at the meeting at McAlester, despite 
Dalrymple's contention that there was no chance that 
Oklahoma's miners would "stay out" of the strike. While 
Robertson hoped for "good results from the meeting," the 
opposite occurred. ' 0 
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The governor's conference at McAlester ended in 
complete failure. Dorsett Carter, president of the Oklahoma 
Coal Operators Association, while arguing that the proposed 
strike was "entirely without justification," contended that 
the operators were willing to make a new agreement "if 
possible" and that they were ''ready to go [to] any lengths 
to avert the strike."" The governor declared that "the 
people of the state would not suffer," but the governor's 
plea that the miners stay on the job failed. They argued 
that they were bound to the decisions made by the union's 
international officers. District vice-president Britton 
stated that the district would "not secede" and that 
"whatever comes we will stick by the international. '112 
The meeting adjourned with a stormy exchange between 
Governor Robertson and Britton. After Britton criticized 
Robertson for declaring his intention to keep mines open 
regardless of the consequences, the governor stated that if 
the miners wanted a confrontation, he was prepared to give 
it to them. Robertson pledged "to use every ounce of power 
I can muster to keep the mines operating." 13 
The following day Robertson launched an assault against 
the union. Brazenly declaring, "we'll see who's running 
this old U. S. A.," Robertson stated that he considered the 
imminent strike to be "nothing s hort of a lawless 
conspiracy" and that the strike amounted to a showdown 
between the "sovereign people of Oklahoma" and the United 
Mine Workers. The governor then warned the miners that if 
they struck, he would bring criminal charges against all 
strikers and that he would ask the federal government to 
deport aliens who joined the strike. Robertson followed up 
on the threat to deport all alien miners who struck. He 
wired Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, asking for their 
deportation and contending that their action "renders them 
and their presence undesirable in every way." Finally, 
Robertson also promised to keep the mines operating, "if 
labor can be found to run them," and implored the citizenry 
to save fuel.~~ 
The federal government quickly joined many state 
governments in their efforts to counter the strike. 
President Wilson declared the strike to be "not only 
unjustifiable but unlawful." Attorney General Palmer 
threatened prosecution under the Lever Act of those who 
struck, despite the fuel administration having been 
dissolved nine months earlier. The Wilson administration 
appointed Oklahoman Judge C. B. Ames, Assistant Attorney 
General, "to direct legal forces of goverrunent in pending 
strike." Ames advocated tying up the union's fifteen 
million dollar strike benefit fund, arguing that it was the 
most effective method of crippling the union. The Daily 
Oklahoman reported the government 's view of the strike when 
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it noted that the "president's cabinet has decided to permit 
no more strikes" and that any strike would be treated as an 
act "against the government and will be suppressed 
accordingly. 111 s 
Back in Oklahoma, Governor Robertson began "the largest 
intra-state military operation in the history of the state." 
From the outset Robertson realized this was going to be "a 
nasty piece of business." After meeting with the governor, 
Adjutant General Charles F. Barrett, head of the Oklahoma 
National Guard, announced the activation of several 
regiments. Barrett also revealed that the troops would move 
into the strike zone "some time tonight." Over two thousand 
guardsmen, nearly the entire Oklahoma National Guard, poured 
into McAlester, Henryetta, and Coalgate during the night. 
When dawn broke the next morning the citizens of these 
communities found themselves under virtual military 
occupation. Robertson also asked Attorney General Palmer 
for federal troops, arguing that he was willing to use the 
"State Guard but am short of funds. '11 " 
Governor Robertson's actions found praise in many parts 
of Oklahoma. Receiving special kudos was Robertson's 
announced intention to have deported all alien miners who 
struck. A citizen in Ardmore, whose sentiments represented 
the view of many, wrote the governor that "you hit the 
bullseye when you said let us deport these aliens. 1117 A 
businessman in Ardmo·re declared that if the a lien miners did 
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not like "our Uncle Sam," they could "go back to their own 
beloved country." •• A psychology professor at Central 
State College praised the governor for "doing the right 
thing. I glory in your spunk."'" A banker from Earlsboro 
contended that "real red blooded Americans" were not 
involved in the strike, it was "a lot of foreigners who have 
received their inspiration from men like Tom Watson, Eugene 
Debs, Jack [Bill?] Haywood, Tom Gear [Gore?] and others." 
The banker suggested that if it was necessary "to fight it 
out with this crowd of anarchists, the sooner the 
better. neo 
This attitude of linking the U. M. W. with radicalism 
heavily influenced Governor Robertson. He and many others 
were convinced that the state was under assault by the I. W. 
W. and other radicals. This assumption was at the core of 
Robertson's decision to send troops into the coal towns. 
Robertson and many others believed the revolution had 
arrived in Oklahoma. A consulting engineer from Tulsa 
stated that if only more public officials would follow the 
lead shown by Governor Robertson, "the Anarchistic, 
Socialistic, I. W. W. and other tendencies destroying our 
American institutions would soon be a thing of the past.'81 
The Oklahoma City Commissioner for Public Property told the 
Governor that "it is high time to see who is running this 
Country of ours, the people or a little bunch of Bolshiviki. 
You are right and I sincerely trust you will accomplish your 
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purpose. 1122 
Robertson's announced purpose in calling out the troops 
was to provide protection for those keeping the mines 
operating. He notified the operators of his intentions and 
implored them to keep their mines producing. 23 While the 
operators of underground mines declined, strip mine 
operators were more amenable to the Governor's request. C. 
W. Dawley, who operated a strip pit near McAlester, told the 
Governor that with "necessary protection," he was willing to 
"operate if possible. '•" 
The larger operators were more interested in protection 
than in maintaining production. Harry N. Taylor, vice-
president of the Central Coal and Coke Company, wrote 
Governor Robertson to warn him that the company's properties 
were in "danger from riot, incendiarism and other forms of 
violence." Taylor went on to "respectfully demand" 
protection of the company's property, but at the same time 
threatened to hold the governor responsible "for all damage 
which may result" from the strike. 25 
Despite a last minute injunction issued at 
Indianapolis, the nation-wide strike began on schedule. 
Over eight thousand miners "quietly walked out of 150 mines 
at quitting time" in Oklahoma on October 31. District 
President Wilkinson was in McAlester, but remained "mum as 
Proverbial Clam," citing the injunction issued in 
Indianapolis. Standing in front of the Busby Hotel when the 
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first battalion of national guard troops arrived, Wilkinson 
smiled and stated that they would not be needed. He went on 
to affirm that "not a miner will raise his hand in violence 
in this crisis." Wilkinson's words appeared true, as the 
McAlester News-Capital reported that "all is serene in 
Mining Districts" after the "first day of military rule. '2 "' 
But within hours of the strike beginning, however, 
armed confrontations began. John R. Cavanagh, an operator 
at Chelsea, notified the Governor that he was "having 
trouble now at our mines." Strikers had threatened and 
chased two of the company's officers. Although the 
assailants were apprehended quickly, Cavanagh expressed 
hope for "further protection of our mines and houses which 
are threatened with destruction." General Barrett warned 
the striking miners that further occurrences would not be 
tolerated. He stated that "I am not going to run rough shod 
over the miners in Oklahoma, but I am going to be in full 
control of the situation at all times." He threatened 
"military control over the entire mining district" if any 
other demonstrations or disturbances occurred.e7 
Not all arriving troops met hostility . At Henryetta 
the striking miners extended a "cordial welcome to the 
troops." The miners there stated that they expecte d to "get 
along nicely with them" and they would do everything 
possible to "promote a friendly feeling between them and 
us." The miners' f i rst step toward this goal was to 
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challenge the guards to a baseball game. The game at 
Henryetta pitted a "crack team" fielded by the Pleasant 
Valley Mine versus a "picked team of soldier boys." The 
Henryetta Daily Free-Lance reported that "everybody is in 
good humor" - that is, except for Captain Sharpe of Company 
K. He came "under stern displeasure of a Col. McPherren 
after the coal diggers beat the "soldier boys." In one of 
the few humorous moments in the strike. the Free-Lance 
reported that Sharpe had been granted permission to play on 
one condition, that the soldiers win. The Free-Lance 
humorously speculated a court-martial was in the offing for 
Sharpe, reporting that "we wait the outcome of this 
situation with interest." 28 
The reaction of the Henryetta miners was an exception. 
Not surprisingly, most miners "fiercely resented" the 
Governor's decision to send in the troops. The Daily 
Oklahoman reported "high tension in the air" at 
McAlester. The paper noted that the radical element among 
the miners was busy "stirring up sentiment against the 
action of the government and president." The paper stressed 
that it was a "matter of speculation" how long the "ignorant 
ones" in the rank and file could stand up to "the stress of 
radical statements and bolsheviki" agitation. 2 " 
Just how strong the "bolsheviki" element was among 
Oklahoma's miners is debatable. The Daily Oklahoman 
reported that at Henryetta the "guards awe reds," but at 
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Coalgate and Wilburton, "little radical sentiment" was 
observed. District president Wilkinson pledged to drum out 
what few I. W. W. and "Bolsheviks" there were out of the 
union. Wilkinson informed the press that he had a man in 
the coal fields who spoke seven languages and who was 
identifying I. W. W. men. Once identified, Wilkinson 
promised that "all will be suspended from the union." At 
the same time he declared that sending troops to the region 
was "an unnecessary expense to the state." 30 
The press generally supported the Governor's decision 
to send troops into the strike zone. Harlow's Weekly noted 
that only the Tulsa Democrat disagreed with the decision, 
arguing that because the strike had been peaceful, there was 
no need for the two thousand troops the Governor sent into 
the region. 31 The Poteau Weekly News was among the most 
strident supporters of the Governor's policy. Robert L. 
Kidd, the paper's publisher, noted that the strike was a 
"fight of the survival of the fittest." He warned that "if 
unionism imperils this government it's time for unionism to 
die." He went on to rebuke strikers for calling the guard 
troops "scab herders." Kidd suggested the strikers would 
get their comeuppance, "altho it would be criminal to waste 
ammunition on such carrion while ducks are flying. "3 " 
Soon after the strike began, the governor announced his 
plans to keep the mines operating. Robertson stated that he 
planned to use convict a nd "volunteer" labor to man the 
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mines. He hoped that as many as eight thousand would 
volunteer to work in the mines. He argued that "green men" 
could be trained quickly. 33 
At this point Governor Robertson came into a 
confrontation with State Mine Inspector Ed Boyle. The 
Inspector stated that he would prohibit the introduction of 
inexperienced men into the mines. He promised that all the 
powers of his office would be used "to keep green men out of 
the mines." Boyle included guard troops in his definition 
of "green men." He declared that any troops ordered into 
the mines would have to prove their expertise. Boyle 
maintained that safety was his primary concern in this 
decision. 34 
Boyle's action outraged Governor Robertson and General 
Barrett. Declaring that he considered Boyle a "mild degree 
of anarchist," Barrett stated that he was prepared to ignore 
the Inspector's order that inexperienced men be barred from 
the mines. Barrett argued that Boyle had no right to 
interfere in the crisis and that his statements were 
"calculated to encourage anarchy." He promised that "the 
mines are going to be operated just as soon as we can get 
men, regardless of what any man many say or do, count on 
that. " 35 
State officials and the operators were not going to let 
one individual block their effort to break the strike and 
the union. J. G. Puterbaugh, a leading operator in 
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Oklahoma, dreamed of eliminating "some outrageous mining 
laws on the books put there by the miner's union." He even 
went as far as to state that the office of state mine 
inspector was "a product of the union." He felt little 
threat from Boyle though. Puterbaugh noted in a letter to 
the vice-president of the National Coal Association that 
Boyle had "overlooked the fact that when martial law is 
declared ... every other law is set aside." The Governor, 
General Barrett, and the Pittsburg County Attorney concurred 
in this opinion . Barrett stated a "lack of statutory law" 
prevented Boyle from "interfering in the state's procedure 
of operating state mines." While Robertson had not yet 
officially declared martial law, he had effectively 
eliminated Boyle's mandate from the state constitution to 
maintain safety in the mines. 3 • 
Despite his boasting to keep the mines operating, the 
Governor did not immediately put his plans into action. 
Robertson intended to issue a call for volunteers on 
November 5, but he delayed that action after a conference 
with Dorsett Carter, president of the Oklahoma Coal 
Operators Association. Robertson did order mines on state 
penitentiary property be kept operating with convict labor. 
Just in c a se this move provoked trouble with the striker s, a 
machine gun company "was ordered in from the regimental 
headquarters at Hartshorne. " 27 
The Governor must have expected troubl e at the 
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penitentiary mines in McAlester to move troops away from 
Hartshorne, for that community was considered to be a hot-
bed of radicalism and an expected source of trouble if any 
developed. Robertson's operatives in the field reported 
there were scores of radicals there, all "bent on creating 
trouble." According to Robertson's agents, "various I. W. 
W. groups" met several nights a week in the hills south of 
Hartshorne. Hundreds attended these meetings, and 
investigators reported that they had "the names of 168 of 
this group." The Daily Oklahoman noted that most of the so-
called radicals were Slavs and Italians, along with a few 
"renegade Americans as leaders." J. C. Britton, the union's 
district vice-president, denied reports of secret meetings, 
but Britton was a traditional unionist and an opponent of 
the radicals.u The radicals boasted that the Guard would 
be powerless if the dispute escalated to violence. These 
miners held that there were too few troops in the region to 
be effective. Besides, most expected many of the Guard to 
desert to the union side if violence broke out. Some 
National Guard officers feared just such as occurrence. Lt. 
J. H. Carey, an intelligence officer, notified his superiors 
that many of his men were in sympathy with the strikers. He 
warned that the strikers believed "that fifty percent of the 
National Guard will help them if trouble starts. 1139 
While labor organizations across the state came out in 
s upport of the strike, the miners also drew support from 
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farmers, businessmen, and many others in the coal belt. 
When Guard troops bivouacked at the state school of mines at 
Wilburton, students there sent a resolution to the Governor 
requesting that he move the soldiers elsewhere or they would 
institute a student strike. The President of the school 
made a similar request, but without an accompanying threat. 
He told the Governor that friction between the students and 
soldiers made classes impossible, contending that the 11 sight 
of the Kakai [sic] clad boys with their guns and ammunition 
detracted from the student's attention." The President of 
the school stated that it was impossible for the students 
and soldiers "to live under the same roof. 11 The wife of one 
guardsman requested that the Governor discharge her husband. 
She argued that her husband had served faithfully, but "now 
as the war is over," he should be discharged. "0 
Convicts also protested against the Governor's 
policies. After Robertson announced his intention to use 
convict labor to keep the mines going, the foreman of a 
convict road-gang wrote him that "my prisoners are in 
sympathy with the cola [sic] strikers and dont [sic] want to 
work in the mines." The work-gang foremen assured the 
Governor that he had "enough pistol toters to force them 
in." •u 
Miners were under no such restrictions. They actively 
worked to support the strike. The first incident of this 
sort occurred when two Mexican miners attempted to persuade 
several other miners at Pittsburg to quit work at the 
McAlester-Edwards mine, the only non-union mine in the 
state. The two were arrested, held briefly in the state 
penitentiary, then released after they promised General 
Barrett they would "be careful in talking. '"'2 
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The belief that the strike was part of a radical 
uprising continued to create an atmosphere of near hysteria 
in the coal towns. The second week of the strike several 
newspapers reported the discovery of a "large cache" of 
dynamite on the outskirts of Dewar. The Daily Oklahoman 
reported that enough dynamite was found "to blow up every 
mine in the Henryetta district." The "large cache" turned 
out to be a single stick, used by "nutting parties" to knock 
pecans down from trees. The Henryetta Daily Free-Lance 
chided the Muskogee Phoenix for reporting that "enough 
dynamite to blow up all of Dewar" had been found. "3 
The fears of violence were not without justification, 
however. In one incident a barbed wire barricade was 
stretched across a highway between Henryetta and Okmulgee. 
National Guard officers surmised that strikers had intended 
to wreck military cars delivering supplies to the troops in 
the field, but instead a miner coming from Henryetta had hit 
it, badly injuring him in the process."" 
While the strike continued in Oklahoma, there was 
considerable legal maneuvering at the national level. A 
federal judge issued an injunction against the union's 
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national leadership. The union filed a counter-suit that 
asked to have the first order lifted. A spokesman for the 
union argued that the government had no case, because 
President Wilson already had dissolved the Fuel 
Administration and without it the government's claim that 
the strike "was a conspiracy under the Lever Act to reduce 
the output of coal" was baseless. "5 The federal government 
increased pressure on the union when Judge A. B. Anderson 
issued an order that demanded the U. M. W. leadership 
withdraw the strike order. "6 Under duress, the union 1 s 
general committee decided to obey Judge Anderson's order. 
National president John L. Lewis proclaimed that 11we will 
comply with the mandate of the court. We do it under 
protest. We are Americans. We cannot fight our government. 
That is all . 11 " 7 
Many believed at that point that the strike was 
over."• Governor Robertson surely did, for he ordered the 
recall of troops from the strike zone."• Miners in 
Oklahoma expressed resentment over the court's order to call 
off the strike. Many felt "sullen" that the union's 
national leadership had buckled under to government 
pressure. so Their mood soon changed, though. The order 
ended up being a ploy as locals, probably in a pre - planned 
maneuver, refused to abide by it, pointing out that the 
order was not on official U. M. W. stationary, that it 
lacked an international union seal, and that the names of 
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the officers signing the order were printed, not signed.s' 
Both Governor Robertson and General Barrett felt 
tricked by the fake recall order. Angered by the affair, 
Robertson stated that the ploy had been "only a cheap trick, 
a course bit of camouflage." Robertson then went on to 
declare that the miners were "in insurrection" and that 
their actions had led to anarchy prevailing in the state. 
The Governor claimed that the miners had instituted "a 
virtual blockade" of the coal fields. General Barrett 
called the recall order nothing but "trickery" and a 
"conspiracy. nse 
This upheaval brought coal production to a virtual 
standstill. All union mines were idle, and the men at the 
only strip pit in the state still working joined the strike 
on November 15. Only the two mines on the grounds of the 
state penitentiary were producing coal. s3 
With coal production virtually nil, the Governor called 
a conference of state officials and the operators to 
formulate their next step. The Governor and General Barrett 
advocated that the operators reopen their mines on an open 
shop basis. Barrett pushed for a full-scale lockout and to 
"fight the battle to victory at once."s• Governor 
Robertson warne d the miners that if they did not return to 
work, the state "will act with a determination that will get 
results. "ss 
While Governor Robertson and General Barrett were ready 
to do battle to the death with the miners, the operators 
held no such opinion. They almost immediately rejected 
Robertson's request that they operate on an open-shop 
basis. s• 
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Most of the operators, especially the larger firms, 
favored a settlement rather than a fight to the bitter end. 
High prices, high profits, and a nation crying out for coal 
offset a reluctance to grant a wage increase. In fact, most 
operators were ready to grant an increase - how much was the 
question. Throughout late November the Federal Fuel 
Administrator brought the heads of both sides together for 
negotiations. The union reduced its demand for a 60 percent 
increase to a 40 percent increase. The operators countered 
that a 20 percent increase was the "utmost that could be 
given." The operators' claim was brought under wide-spread 
criticism when William McAdoo, former Secretary of the 
Treasury, stated that the operators had made "shocking and 
indefensible profits" during the war while the miners' wages 
were frozen . While the gap between their positions narrowed 
substantially, no agreement was reached. Secretary of Labor 
Wilson proposed a 31 percent increase. John L. Lewis 
accepted this proposal on behalf of the striking miners, but 
the operators balked at the proposal. Fuel Administra t or 
Garfield then replaced Wilson's proposal with a offer of 20-
25 percent increase. The operators accepted this, but the 
miners rejected it. After a month, a settleme nt seemed 
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nowhere in sight. :~7 
Although both sides were haggling over a 25 or a 30 
percent increase, neither was willing to blink in what was 
becoming a test of wills. Almost on cue, a severe winter 
storm swept across the United State. As the coal shortage 
reached critical levels, both the federal and state 
governments began to take aggressive steps toward the goal 
of satisfying a freezing nation's pleas for fuel. 51 
Governor Robertson expressed joy when the talks 
collapsed in Washington in late-December. He claimed that 
the miners were not seeking justice, but that "the whole 
matter is a hold-up." Robertson then promised to reopen the 
mines using convict and volunteer labor. To prepare public 
opinion for the declaration of martial law, Robertson 
announced the establishment of a commission to investigate 
the strike. While the commission's purpose was only to 
collect testimony and not to render a judgment, the result 
was quite different. The commission hearings became a forum 
for the operators to declare their willingness to work with 
the government and the public to insure a resumption of the 
coal supply .:~9 
After the hearings Robertson announced his intention to 
use volunteer labor to operate the state's mines. 
Overseeing the project was J. A. Whitehurst, president of 
the state board of agriculture and the chairman of the state 
council of defense. Whitehurst proposed that each county 
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furnish workers and that a county's ration of coal was to be 
based upon its contribution of volunteer labor. Wages were 
based upon the final government offer made at the Washington 
talks, a 1~ percent increase. Under threat of being put 
into receivership, the operators agreed to work with the 
Governor, but only if troops were brought back in to protect 
the mines. Robertson, already having to authorize deficit 
spending "due to high costs associate with deploying 
National Guard troops in the strike zone," then requested 
federal troops. If troops were unavailable, Robertson 
wanted either the federal government or the operators to 
assume the cost of sending troops back into the coal 
towns. ' 0 
While Governor Robertson was asking the federal troops 
to maintain order in Oklahoma, he was the chief source of 
anarchy in the state. Early in the strike Robertson had 
suggested to the coal-starved towns of the state that they 
"take coal wherever you find it." Federal officials, 
alarmed at such rhetoric, demanded that Robertson retract 
the advice. As a result of Robertson's suggestion, citizens 
in several communities in western Oklahoma hijacked railroad 
trains as they passed through their towns. At Tipton, a 
crowd of fifty men piled railroad ties on the track, stopped 
a passing M. K. & T. train, seized seven or eight tons of 
coal, and left the train stranded. National fuel 
administrator Garfield admonished Robertson for his role in 
this vigilante activity. A regional administrator at St. 
Louis demanded that the "holding up of trains ... must be 
discontinued immediately." Two weeks passed before 
Robertson officially rescinded his "self-preservation11 
order. 61 
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With the situation desperate, volunteer m1ners turned 
out in throngs. "Volunteers by the hundreds" descended on 
several strip pits in · Pittsburg County. Several hundred 
students from Oklahoma A & M University volunteered, as did 
students at other state colleges. The pastor of the Maywood 
Christian Church of Oklahoma City declared that he was 
prepared to "lay down the Bible and take up the shovel." 
Governor Robertson even volunteered. In a brief visit to a 
strip pit near McAlester, he donned rubber boots, mined a 
little coal, met the workmen, and "had a good time 
generally. 11 The McAlester News-Capital argued that the 
volunteers were only ~oing their patriotic duty and were "in 
no manner strike breakers." Volunteer labor produced three 
thousand tons of coal while the Oklahoma's mines were "in 
the hands of the state," but this provided less than one-
half of one day's supply of the state's daily demand, which 
was estimated at seven thousand tons daily. This token 
amount of coal was prohibitively expensive to produce as 
well. One source states that the volunteer-mined coal was 
produced "at a cost that placed it in a class with precious 
minerals. 1162 
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To protect the volunteer miners, Governor Robertson 
declared martial law in several counties in early December. 
He argued it was necessary "to uproot sedition, prevent 
sabotage and criminal syndicalism and restore the mining 
section to its normal condition." At the same time he 
requested a thousand federal troops • to assist in 11 guard and 
patrol duty in the mining districts of Oklahoma." Robertson 
withdrew his request when the commanding officer at Fort Sam 
Houston offered two all-black infantry companies from 
Columbus, New Mexico. Robertson argued that black troops 
would only lead to "unnecessary conflict and confusion." A 
few days later the commander at Fort Sam Houston did send 
four companies of 11white cavalry."63 
To increase pressure on the miners, the Governor 
ordered the eviction of all strikers and their families from 
company houses at the Dawley strip pit near McAlester. He 
argued that "they cannot live there unless they will work." 
Robertson proclaimed that "this is an industrial war and 
they are the ones who declared it. 116" 
At the same time the National Guard established a 
military zone around the areas where volunteer miners were 
working. In reality this amounted only to the Dawley strip 
pit. According to the McAlester News-Capital, the guard 
planned it so "no one can leave and no one can enter in. 
Troops will be on hand to enforce this edict. 1165 Robertson 
also ordered General Barrett to close "all pool halls, soft-
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drink stands and other non-essential businesses ... during 
the military occupation." The Governor told Barrett to 
forbid "tumultuous meetings" and if such meetings occurred, 
"all such assemblages" were to be dispersed immediately and 
"those guilty arrested." Harlow's Weekly reported that "the 
iron hand of military law is being held over the mining 
districts and no activities of agitators or reds are 
permitted. "•• 
The Governor warned the public not to be too quick to 
criticize his "strong-arm" tactics in handling the strike. 
He argued that "we expect to meet some trouble and we are 
prepared to handle it summarily. We have come down here to 
mine coal and we are no going to let anything or anybody 
interfere with the accomplishment of that purpose. 1167 
Most newspapers in the state backed the Governor and 
his policy. The Daily Oklahoman argued that he was 
"thoroughly justified in declaring martial law," contending 
that the strike was "a showdown between Americanism and 
radicalism. And Americanism must win."•• The McAlester 
News-Capital reminded its readership that in 189/a. soldiers 
had "deported a whole mine strike," and that a proclamation 
of martial law had not even been necessary in that 
instance ... Harlow's Weekly contended that eminent domain 
and the coal strike were tied together. The paper's 
publisher argued that because the strikers had "no hesitancy 
of freezing the public into submission," the government had 
not only the right, but the obligation to seize the coal 
mines and keep them operational. 70 
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The district president of the union, John Wilkinson, 
branded the governor's actions "a series of blunders." He 
argued that the governor "had erected a monument of colossal 
errors which would never be torn down in the minds of union 
miners." Wilkinson promised he would "go to jail" before 
attempting to coerce the miners "back in the mines against 
their wills. 1171 After tongue-lashing the governor, 
Wilkinson left for Indianapolis for a conference with 
Attorney General Palmer, Judge Ames, and leading union 
officials. 72 
The conference in early December at Indianapolis 
brought an end to the strike of 1919. Attorney General 
Palmer brought with him a proposal from President Wilson. 
The settlement offer included an immediate 1'* percent wage 
increase. More importantly, Wilson called for the 
appointment of a committee to investigate and readjust 
wages, taking into account the increasing cost of living. 
John L. Lewis accepted the government's proposal on behalf 
of the miners. 73 Judge Ames then wired Robertson and 
suggested the governor consider "the propriety of 
withdrawing troops." Attorney General Palmer asked the 
governor "to cooperate." 7 " Not missing a broad hint, 
Robertson ordered the troops return to their barracks, but 
he did not act immediately. Robertson argued that the 
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miners had tried trickery earlier and he was not convinced 
of their honesty this time. Robertson noted that "we've 
been fooled before, and I intend to take no steps until the 
miners actually return to work.""~ 
Nor did the Governor like the terms of the settlement 
brokered by the White House. In a letter to a state 
congressman, Robertson lamented that he regretted the 
compromise reached at Indianapolis. He argued that "another 
week's work by the volunteers would have settled it good in 
this state. As I see it now, we will have to do the whole 
thing over again in the near future." Robertson told the 
publisher of The Interstate Farmer that the "federal 
government had made a very serious mistake in compromising 
this strike at the time and in the manner it did. We had 
the thing broken. " 76 
The Governor had equally harsh words for the operators. 
He complained that he received "little support from the 
Federal government or the operators." Robertson chastised 
the operators for being "unresponsive and seemed unwilling 
to help us. They didn't seem to realize that it was to 
their interest to break the back of such an octopus as this 
thing is . ".,., 
Many in Oklahoma agreed with Robertson's assessment of 
the strike settlement. Freeman E. Miller, an attorney in 
Stillwater, wrote the Governor that "I have no patience with 
the terms of that [strike] settlement." Miller attributed 
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the settlement to "another instance of Wilson's weakness." 
He went on to rebuke the president severely for his 
interference, claiming that Wilson had surrendered to the 
miners, "whose agreements are only scraps of paper." Miller 
argued that Wilson "had not at all succeeded in making the 
world safe for democracy, but he has succeeded in making the 
United States mighty unsafe for Democrats. ,,.,. 
While the Governor may have wanted to continue the 
fight to the finish, many in the state expressed relief that 
the strike was over. The Latimer County News-Democrat 
proclaimed that the "great coal strike is ended." Harlow's 
Weekly reported that "the greatest strike of Oklahoma's 
history was weathered without a single casualty" and that 
there had not been any "actual rioting. "7 " 
Only in the waning hours of the strike did any major 
violence mar the union's promise to abide by the law. In 
the last days of the strike, there were two night attacks 
upon National Guard troops. At McCurtain guardsmen 
exchanged fifty shots with "miner sympathizers" near a mine 
"manned with volunteer labor." At the Hiawatha mine on the 
grounds of the state penitentiary at McAlester, unknown 
assailants crept up to and fired upon a guardsmen barracks 
in an hour-long skirmish. There were no casualties in 
either incident. 80 
By mid-December normality returned to Oklahoma's coal 
fields. Nearly eight thousand miners resumed work, 
21.15 
receiving a temporary wage scale of $5.50 a day. The 
Governor lifted martial law, but only after intense pressure 
from not only the miners, but from the federal government 
and the operators, who all saw the presence of troops as a 
destablilizing force. In early 1920 the Bituminous Coal 
Commission granted the miners a wage increase to $7.50 a 
day. In June 1920, after a short walk-out, the operators 
agreed to a two-year contract at that scale. 81 
When contract renewal talks began in the spring of 
1922, another national strike appeared unavoidable. 
Disputes over several issues had deadlocked the 
negotiations. The operators, arguing that they were under 
intense pressure from the oil industry, demanded that the 
miners accept a wage cut of 30 percent "or more" from the 
$7.50 a day that the 1920 contract stipulated. The miners 
refused to move from their demand for a 20 percent increase. 
The operators also demanded elimination of check-off dues 
and the national wage scale, contending that economic 
conditions were different in every district. The operators 
demanded that separate contracts be reached in each 
district.•e 
Facing the possibility of a lengthly strike, the 
operators kept their mines at "full-blast" in anticipation 
of the April 1 deadline. Railroads and industrial concerns 
stockpiled coal, hoping to prevent a recurrence of 1919. 
Economists predicted that the price of fuel oil would 
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skyrocket if the strike was not averted. John L. Lewis, the 
union's national president, declared in mid-March that the 
strike was "corning about automatically" if the operators 
refused to negotiate. He accused the operators of trying to 
reach agreements with the union's locals in a strategy of 
divide and conquer.83 
The union did not need the operators' efforts to divide 
them; they were doing a fine job of it themselves. In 
February a rift between district twenty-one's president John 
Wilkinson and Alex Howat, renegade leader of the Kansas 
miners, was threatening to tear the district apart. Drawn 
into this controversy was the socialist paper, the Oklahoma 
Leader, published by Oscar Ameringer. District twenty-one 
owned $10,000 worth of Leader stock, as did the Kansas 
miners in district fourteen. When Ameringer sided with 
Howat and the Kansas miners, Wilkinson and eight other 
plaintiffs filed suit and asked that a receiver be appointed 
for the Leader. Also thrown into the dispute was Governor 
Robertson. Howat accused Wilkinson of "playing politics" 
with the governor, referring to the collapse of the Okmulgee 
Bank of Commerce "in which $15,000 of the district's funds 
were involved." Howat noted that Wilkinson's association 
with Robertson was so complete that he retained J. D. 
Lydick, "Governor Robertson's impeachment lawyer" to file 
the suit against the Oklahoma Leader. 8 " 
In many ways Wilkinson was merely carrying out the 
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orders of the union's national president, John L. Lewis. 
Howat was not only embroiled in controversy with Wilkinson, 
but he was also at odds with the traditional unionists at 
all levels of the organization. Ameringer argued in the 
papers of the Leader that Wilkinson was little more than 
"one of the errand boys of John Lewis, ... his Lord and 
Master. ue:s 
While the union prepared to strike on April 1, the 
Howat-Wilkinson controversy continued to rip the union 
apart. Scoffing at Wilkinson's suggestion that he was dead 
politically, Howat took his case to the miners of the 
district. Speaking in many of Oklahoma's coal towns, Howat 
drew crowds that numbered in the thousands. He and 
Ameringer denounced Wilkinson and Lewis in Hartshorne, 
Henryetta, Wilburton, and other Oklahoma coal towns. Howat 
argued he was in the state to fight the "traitorous betrayal 
of the Oklahoma miners by John Wilkinson and his crowd." 
Many locals in Oklahoma passed resolutions favoring the 
restoration of district fourteen's autonomy, which was under 
direct control of the national leadership, and condemning 
district twenty-one's leadership for their verbal attacks on 
Howat and for the Leader receivership lawsuit.•• 
While the Leader dispute divided the union, the 
operators had their own disputes. Meeting at Kansas City, 
the Southwestern Coal Operators Association debated a 
proposal to return to the 1917 wage scale "as an ultimatum" 
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to the miners. This amounted to an offer that included "a 
scale of less than half that now being paid," according to 
the McAlester News-Capital. The operators of the Southwest 
district also declared that they planned to abolish the 
check-off system and that they were under no obligation to 
negotiate under the terms of the central competitive field 
scale, which had been the basis of agreements nation-wide 
for years. 87 
In late-March there was a joint-meeting at Okmulgee of 
the members of the Southwestern Coal Operators Association 
(SWCOA) and the Oklahoma Coal Operators Association (OCOA). 
Their main purpose was to hammer out the details of a new 
contract with District #21. When asked about details of the 
contract, J. B. Wilson, a commissioner in the 0. C. 0. A., 
noted that "when this bunch get together, it is always for 
the purpose of decapitating someone and the people will find 
out soon enough what we intend to do. 1188 
Several last-minute attempts were made to avert the 
April 1 strike, but these efforts failed. Oklahoma's 
operators cloistered at McAlester, but kept their plans 
secret. They flashed a hint of their position when they 
argued that competition from non-union mines of Alabama, 
Colorado, and New Mexico, plus cheap Texas crude oil, 
required a lower wage scale. Just before the anticipated 
walk-out, the secretary of the Oklahoma Coal Operators 
Association announced that it was prepared to fight to the 
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finish with the miners of the Oklahoma district. 89 
On April 1, 1922 an estimated 665,000 union miners went 
on strike across the United States. Soon many non-union 
miners joined the walk-out. This was unexpected, as the 
Harding administration was betting on non-union coal to 
supply the nation's needs until a settlement was reached 
with the United Mine Workers. Governor Robertson, still 
smarting from his experience in the 1919 strike, declared a 
"hands-off" policy in regard to the strike. He reminded the 
state that he had warned three months earlier of the 
impending strike and that he assumed that "all have laid in 
a supply of fuel." 90 
By April 1 the union had modified its demands, 
retracting its proposal for a wage increase and pressing for 
a renewal of the present contract, but with one important 
change. Union officials proposed a six-hour, five day week 
and a renewal of the $7.50 scale. John Wilkinson argued 
that shorter hours would limit miners' exposure to the 
"poison air" in the mines to a point below what "his 
constitution will stand." 91 
The operators refused to renew the $7.50 scale. 
Meeting at Kansas City in early April, the Southwestern Coal 
Operators Association agreed to return to the May 1917 wage 
scale of $3.60 a day. Members of the Oklahoma Coal 
Operators Association demanded that wages be cut not just to 
1917 levels, but to a pre-war standard. 92 
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As the strike lengthened, district president 
Wilkinson's control over the union became more and more 
precarious. Wilkinson had raised the ire of many Oklahoma 
miners when he signed a contract with one mine owner to keep 
it operating in order to provide coal for the state's 
utility plants. When it was discovered that much of this 
coal was being shipped out of the state, the miners at the 
Blackstone mine protested, arguing that the agreement sapped 
morale and made them feel like traitors to their striking 
comrades. Only by threatening to take away the union cards 
and charter of the Blackstone miners if they refused to work 
did Wilkinson keep the rebellious miners under control. 93 
Worsening Wilkinson's grip on the district was his 
ongoing rivalry with Alexander Howat. The dispute nearly 
degenerated into violence between the two men a n d their 
supporters at a miner's meeting held at Coalgate on April 
15. Wilkinson had called the Coalgate meeting to discuss 
the Leader receivership suit, but as soon as the meeting 
began Howat, the deposed leader o f the Kansas miners, 
crashed the event, leading to a "near riot." 94 
At this point Howat rose and demanded a chance t o 
debate Wilkinson on the issues that divided them. The 
Leader suit may h ave brought their riva lry to a head, but 
their differences went much further. The two had been 
"sworn e nemies" since Wilkinson opposed Howat at the 
international meet ing that " t h rew him ou t of office ." The 
251 
district's leadership refused to recognized Howat. Instead, 
Wilkinson launched a verbal attack on him, noting that Howat 
had not extended his "campaign of vindication" to Arkansas, 
because he had escaped from jail there fourteen years 
earlier after a woman had brought charges against him and 
that he was fearful of arrest if he returned. 9~ 
Divisions at the meeting ran deep. Confronting William 
Dalrymple, a member of the international board and a John L. 
Lewis operative, Howat demanded to know what Dalrymple was 
doing at the Coalgate meeting. Dalrymple replied that "I'm 
a man, Alex. Something you never were." Other Howat 
supporters were refused the right to speak. While half the 
crowd cheered, Howat's supporters "booed, yelled coward, 
traitor and more profane things." Howat again challenged 
the district president to a debate, Wilkinson agreed, but 
demanded it be at a later date. Howat promised to be "on 
hand." As tempers flared, deputy sheriffs were called in to 
remove the radicals. This became unnecessary as Howat and 
his side-kick, Arneringer, called for all "friends of 
justice" to follow them to another floor in the same 
building where "the truth will be told." More than half of 
the crowd of five hundred in attendance walked out. The 
Leader claimed that eight hundred were there and that only 
one hundred remained after the Howat forces left. The Daily 
Oklahoman noted that many at the meeting were not miners, 
but townspeople who saw a storm brewing and wanted to be on 
hand for the big battle. What they saw was preliminary 
sparring; the main attraction was set for May 15 in 
Muskogee. •• 
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During the month leading up to the district convention, 
little progress was made toward settling the strike. The 
vice-president of the union's national leadership announced 
in late April that the miners would call off their strike 
and return to work, pending a new agreement, on the 
condition that Congress passed a resolution that called for 
the Bituminous Coal Commission's ruling of 1920 giving the 
miners the $7.50 a day. The operators were willing to wait 
the union out. They saw no need for a settlement with a 
sluggish market and with no shortages expected for at least 
six weeks. Although the nation's bituminous coal output had 
been cut 75 percent by the strike, production from non-union 
mines had increased to ~.150,000 tons weekly, although the 
amount of anthracite coal "remained at practically zero. '~'~7 
Six weeks into the strike, the miners of district 
twenty-one met in Muskogee. Superficially the main issue on 
the table was distribution of strike benefits. The union's 
constitution called for strike benefits to begin after a 
strike reached six weeks in duration. The problem was that 
with nearly 1~,000 miners in the district, strike benefits 
added up $260,000 monthly. Continuing the policy of 
distributing a weekly $5 strike benefit to each union member 
would virtually wipe out the district's treasury in a week, 
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as it contained at that moment $77,000 dollars, less the 
cost of the Muskogee convention. With many miners already 
in desperate straits, those who declared they were "in fine 
shape and can hold out indefinitely " voted that benefits be 
distributed only to those who required them rather than to 
the entire district membership. •a 
Despite his wishes to be "on hand" for the convention, 
Howat was unable to attend. He was at that time residing in 
a jail cell in Girard, Kansas for violating an industrial 
court act. Standing in for Howat was President Farrington 
of the Illinois district. Wilkinson had hoped to ban 
Farrington, but the Howat forces on the first day of the 
convention showed their strength when they mustered enough 
votes to pass a resolution that invited Farrington, who had 
taken up Howat's fight since his incarceration. Farrington, 
another radical and opponent of J. L. Lewis, relished his 
mission. So did Ameringer, who was equally ready to assist 
Howat's effort from his jail cell to unseat Wilkinson.•• 
Besides these big names, many in Oklahoma's locals were 
"active among the opposition forces. 11100 
When the president of the Illinois district arrived for 
the Muskogee convention, the Phoenix reported that 
Farrington was "here for scrap today." The Phoenix expected 
a major battle, as the morning session had been colored by 
"personalities of a more or less profane nature were hurled 
back and forth" between the two factions. Several times 
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during the session it appeared as if the convention "would 
break up in disorder. '" 0 ' 
Farrington lived up to his billing as a firebrand. 
Before turning his attention to Wilkinson, Farrington 
launched a bitter attack on John L. Lewis. He claimed that 
Lewis had a vendetta against him since he had exposed how 
three of Lewis's hencr~en had stole $3000 from the local at 
Panama, Illinois." Farrington then stridently defended 
Howat, contending that he "was the victim of the biggest 
political conspiracy ever perpetrated." The Illinois 
president stated that even "granting for the sake of 
argument that Howat is guilty as hell," he asked why he 
should be kicked out of the union for fighting an industrial 
court act. Farrington's language was so colorful that 
Wilkinson warned, "easier on cussing or be kicked out," 
after a women's club, meeting in another room in the 
building, objected to the rhetoric. Farrington's only 
comment was that he would "use any kind of language I see 
fit." Wilkinson retorted: "Go ahead and get us thrown out 
of the building." While Farrington and Wilkinson sparred 
verbally, their supporters had to be pulled apart 
repeatedly. When Farrington arrived to the applause of the 
r a dicals, the demonstration nearly led to blows between 
followers of the two factions. Some had to be physically 
restrained, others were ejected from the meeting. 101 
Supporters kept Howat abreast of events at the 
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convention. Commenting from his jail cell at Girard, 
Kansas, Howat noted that "Wilkinson will no doubt try and 
dictate to the delegates." He urged the miners to stand up 
to Wilkinson and his 11 dastardly and cowardly attempt to 
destroy the Oklahoma Leader. 11103 
Finally, in the fifth session Wilkinson rose to present 
his case to the convention. First, Wilkinson defended his 
own policies. He stated his reasons for allowing the 
Blackstone mine to produce coal for utilities and for 
allowing miners in Texas to sign an agreement that called 
for a reduced wage scale. Wilkinson contended that neither 
action violated the union's national strike order. Then 
Wilkinson turned his attention to the radicals. He 
lambasted Howat, Farrington, Ameringer, and several other 
socialist-oriented miners. Wilkinson lampooned Farrington's 
assertion that he had no hate for anyone by replying that 
"if what he said here, was an expression of love, then it 
must have been in the true caveman fashion. 11 Wilkinson then 
accused a deceased socialist miner of being a 11 scab herder" 
during the 1910 strike. After the deceased miner's daughter 
rose to demand proof of such an ugly accusation, Wilkinson 
retracted the charge, which had been based on hearsay 
evidence. 10"' 
Wilkinson saved his strongest rhetoric for Oscar 
Ameringer. He declared that Ameringer "says I've got a 
streak of yellow a yard wide, but he can't prove it; 
physically or otherwise." Wilkinson then launched into a 
lengthy diatribe aimed at the socialist publisher.105 
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Arguing that he was at the end of his patience, 
Wilkinson prepared to let the Howat forces present their 
case. Acknowledging the dispute had taken a nasty turn, 
Wilkinson stated he would let Ameringer take the floor and 
"go at it as dirty as he likes." Wilkinson maintained he 
was ready to do battle. Confident of victory, the district 
president claimed that "if they want to make it a moral 
issue [the Leader receivership suit] and go down in the mire 
they can go just as far as they like. We'll kick the lid 
off. n1o• 
After supporters of both sides hurled insults and 
accusations at each other, it was Ameringer's turn to speak. 
He rose and in a thick German accent proceeded to accuse 
Wilkinson of a wide variety of crimes and injustices. 
Speaking for an hour and a half, Ameringer charged Wilkinson 
with graft, fraud, and theft of treasury funds. After a 
lengthy verbal attack on John L. Lewis, Ameringer indicted 
all the officers of the district, telling the crowd that 
"these men have stolen your money boys," pointing to the 
officers on the platform. To drive his point home that the 
district leadership were little more than armed thugs, 
Ameringer declared that he was unarmed and proceeded to take 
his coat off to prove it. While he spoke and with a smirk 
on his face, Ameringe r turned his trouser pockets out and 
slapped his backside to emphasis the point. Insulted, 
Wilkinson charged at Arneringer, declaring that "no German 
can pat the seat of his trousers at me and get away with 
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it .... The Kaiser did that to the United States once." At 
that point the convention was a tinderbox, ready to 
deteriorate into a free-for-all fight. When a miner rose to 
make a motion for a twenty minute recess so the delegates 
could check their "firearms and surgical instruments" at the 
door, Wilkinson over-ruled the motion, declaring he was 
armed and did not care who knew it. so? The district 
leadership presumably expected trouble, as "different 
members of the board were armed with guns, pistols and 
knives." Although Wilkinson contended that he was armed 
because of death threats he had received, the Leader posited 
that Arneringer was the one in physical danger and that the 
publisher spoke at the convention "under circumstances as 
unfavorable as would be. All week were rumors of threats to 
beat him up and a personal conflict seemed imminent." ' 011 
As he drew his speech to a close, Arneringer warned that 
even if the district leadership won the receivership suit, 
the union would be the real loser. He pointed out that the 
district was a minority shareholder and that the majority 
shareholders, the Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing 
Company, still supported him, "for they think I'm a pretty 
good sort of a fellow up there." •o• 
Wilkinson then rose for a final rebuttal. He denied 
258 
that he had ever been influenced by Governor Robertson in 
the depositing of district funds in the failed Bank of 
Commerce at Okmulgee. Wilkinson promised to resign if "one 
scintilla of evidence" could be found that proved the 
charge. Declaring that he wanted Ameringer "to go back to 
Germany," Wilkinson noted that he had lost a brother in the 
Great War and had "more respect for the German who killed my 
brother in France than I have for Oscar Ameringer. 11110 
What followed gave credence to Ameringer's claim that 
the district leadership used strong-arm tactics to get their 
way. After the convention voted eighty to seventy-six 
against a resolution authorizing the continuance of the 
receivership suit, the acting chair, D. A. Frampton, 
international organizer from Missouri and a John L. Lewis 
man, overruled the motion in a blatantly partisan move. 111 
While Wilkinson may have prevailed in the battle, he 
and his leadership were discredited among the socialist 
membership as a result of the Muskogee convention. 
Ameringer claimed Wilkinson's supporters had resorted to 
"racial and religious prejudices" in addition to abuse of 
office to prevail. Ameringer called Wilkinson a knave and a 
fool and said that if he were Wilkinson, he would "have 
pulled that six- shooter out of my hip pocket, pressed it 
between my lying teeth and soiled the ceiling with my foul 
brains . nul! 
Delegates at the Muskogee convention almost forgot that 
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the union was involved in a national strike. Torn by the 
Wilkinson-Howat fight, the convention adjourned with no 
resolution of the strike benefit question, despite the 
district's treasury being "practically empty."t 13 The 
Muskogee Daily Phoenix declared the convention "a smashing 
success," pointing to the convention hall where there were 
twenty broken chairs, curtains tied in knots, and the floor 
covered in tobacco juice, cigarette, and cigar butts. This 
led the Phoenix to report that "the floors are evidence of 
the conventionites unfamiliarity with cuspidors." 11 " The 
Leader receivership suit controversy ended with a whimper, 
as a few days later a district judge denied Wilkinson's 
application for receivership. 11 !5 
As the strike entered its third month, both sides edged 
toward a settlement. But the situation remained far from 
peaceful. At Herrin, Illinois, thousands of union miners 
attacked strikebreakers in an orgy of violence, dozens were 
killed. The Herrin Massacre shocked all, but coupled with 
the Coronado case ruling, it led many of Oklahoma's 
operators to contemplate re-opening on an open shop basis -
especially after they heard that the Governor had ordered 
the state's military to prepare to move into the coal fields 
if the operators took such an action. Both the operators 
and state officials publicly denied making such plans. 11 • 
It was only as coal reserves dwindled and the strike 
dragged onto into the fourth month that the Harding 
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administration began to take an active role in bringing 
about a settlement. Calling both sides to Washington, 
Harding proposed a resumption of work on the basis of the 
scale that expired March 31, with arbitration to follow. 
After neither side seemed receptive, Harding turned from the 
carrot to the stick. He threatened the operators with 
seizure of their mines and warned the union that he would 
send in federal troops to get the mines operating.117 
Not desirous of seeing their mines put under government 
control, the operators signalled their readiness to 
negotiate a settlement with the United Mine Workers. Nor 
were they prepared to re-open on an open shop basis. The 
president of the Oklahoma Coal Operators Association 
declared that the state's operators were "loathe to break 
relationships that have existed for many years with the 
miners' organization and are still willing to meet in joint-
conference and discuss our differences with a view of 
reaching an agreement. 11118 
After a final round of sparring, both sides reached 
agreement. A settlement was concluded in mid-August in 
Cleveland that called for the miners to return to work under 
the contract that expired March 31 at $7.50 a day. After a 
brief period of contemplating going ahead with open shop 
plans and a lower wage scale, the operators of Oklahoma gave 
up on the idea after district president Wilkinson threatened 
to pull fireman, pumpers, and other essential personnel out 
of the mines if the operators attempted to use non-union 
labor. 119 
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By late August more than seven thousand miners returned 
to work in Oklahoma's coal mines. Because the operators had 
been unable to force a reduction in the wage scale, the 
miners believed they had won "a signal victory in the 
settlement reached." But the strike was costly for the 
miners. Over $200,000 was paid out of the district's 
treasury in strike benefits, leaving the district penniless 
and weakened for the next battle with the operators. 120 
The strikes of 1919 and 1922 indicated a change in the 
union's relationship with the operators. Threatened by oil 
and gas competition, the operators had twice seriously 
contemplated abandoning their relationship with the union in 
favor of the open shop. Although they backed off both 
times, this was something unheard of since 1903. It. 
signalled that the golden days of high profits and wages 
were drawing to a close. The prosperity that had reigned in 
Oklahoma's coal towns for nearly twenty years was under 
assault from competition from oil and gas. Both sides, 
having grown accustomed to prosperity, were unwilling to 
work together to continue the competitiveness of their 
industry. This was proven beyond a shadow of a doubt in 
192~ when the contract came up for renewal . 
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CHAPTER VII 
GOTTERDAMMERUNG: THE STRIKE OF 192~-1927 
When the miners of Oklahoma came to the bargaining 
table in the spring of 1924, they asked for a three year 
extension of the existing contract. Little did they know 
that three years later their union would be destroyed, the 
open shop instituted, and life as they had known for nearly 
a quarter century was over. With the union smashed, the 
operators slashed wages in their frenzied efforts to compete 
with one another and the growing menace of oil and gas. But 
the union was not the only loser in this death struggle. 
The medium-sized mine operators, who led the open shop 
drive, were wiped-out, unable to compete with the larger 
railroad mines. The smaller independents survived around 
the edges of the market, but the coal towns themselves were 
perhaps the biggest losers. With few jobs and lower wages, 
the glory days of Oklahoma's coal towns were over. Empty 
and boarded-over businesses replaced bustling and crowded 
streets. Population fell dramatically as people drifted 
away in search of employment. The strike of 192~-1927 was 




In January 1924 the leading operators of the Central 
Competitive Field met at Jacksonville, Florida. The 
contract reached at those talks became known as the 
Jacksonville Interstate Agreement of 192~. The agreement 
extended the existing wage scale for three years and became 
the basis for all other fields across the nation, including 
the Southwestern Interstate field. 2 
More than forty thousand miners struck in the 
Southwestern field on April 1. Within a month the 
Southwestern Coal Operators Association accepted the 
Jacksonville Agreement, but not every operator in Oklahoma 
belonged to the S.W.C.O.A. About one-third of the mines in 
Oklahoma were operated by members of the Oklahoma Coal 
Operators Association. While it was independent of the 
Southwestern Coal Operators Association, traditionally the 
O.C.O.A. based its contract with the U.M.W. upon the 
S.W.C.O.A. contract. But many operators in the Oklahoma 
field complained that they could not compete with non-union 
mines and fuel oil if they continued to pay the $7.50 scale. 
After a month-long strike, the S.W.C.O.A.-affiliated mines 
were back operating, but the strike continued at the 
O.C.O.A. - affiliated mines.3 
Two weeks later the O.C.O.A. came to an agreement with 
the United Mine Workers. The settlement was identical to 
the S.W.C.O.A. contract and the Jacksonville Agreement.~ 
Except at Hartshorne, where an electric lighting dispute 
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kept the mines closed, all the mines of the state were back 
up and operating. By June the controversy at Hartshorne had 
been resolved, and the miners there had returned to work.s 
It seemed as if tranquility had returned to the coal 
fields of Oklahoma. A contract had been signed that 
extended the existing wage for three years. But within 
weeks this veneer of tranquility was shattered, for not 
all the O.C.O.A. operators accepted the Jacksonville 
Agreement. A faction led by D. C. McAlpine, Franklin Bache, 
F. B. Drew, and James McConnell broke with the majority on 
the wage scale. These operators argued that they were 
uncompetitive paying the Jacksonville scale, and therefore 
they had no choice but to run their mines on an open shop 
basis.• 
On July 18, 192~. three to four hundred union miners 
stormed the Kali-Inla mine at Cambria. Sheriff Austin Parks 
of Latimer County, who had been expecting trouble, was on 
the scene, but so outnumbered that he was helpless. The 
crowd, comprised of union miners from Hartshorne, Henryetta, 
and several other nearby towns, but also from as far as 
Texas, quickly disarmed the mine guards and forced seven 
non-union miners who had been working under the 1917 scale 
to leave the mine. The non-union miners were lined up and 
told to raise their right hand and swear never to work again 
under open shop conditions. The Daily Oklahoman noted that 
the demonstration was "orderly throughout the trouble, 
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although there were a few guns." After searching the 
surrounding company houses for arms and ammunition, the 
union miners left without incident. Later the union miners 
declared that the visit to the Cambria mine was not an 
attack, but a "demonstration against the 1917 scale." This 
was seen by all as the first attempt of the union to prevent 
the open shop movement from taking hold in Oklahoma's 
• 7 
m~nes. 
In the days that followed the Cambria raid, paranoia 
and fear ran wild in the Hartshorne-Wilburton district. 
Rumors swirled through the region as confrontations at the 
open shop mines of the Wilburton region continued. Latimer 
County was a test for the operators. If successful there, 
they planned to expand into the McAlester and Henryetta 
districts, strongholds of the union. But Hartshorne, in far 
eastern Pittsburg County and a center of union sentiment, 
was only twelve miles away from Wilburton, where most of the 
non-union mines were located. This proximity threatened to 
mushroom into civil war between the two communities.a 
The day following the Cambria raid the miners expanded 
their anti-shop campaign. Sheriff Parks of Wilburton 
announced that the Degnan-McConnell mines at Wilburton were 
the next target for mob action from "an invading force from 
the community of Hartshorne." The Daily Oklahoman reported 
that "a runner said to have been from Hartshorne conveyed 
the threat to the Degnan and McConnell miners." The sheriff 
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placed guards at the threatened mine and proclaimed that 
state troops would be called in if needed. Meanwhile, more 
than one hundred non-union miners at the Degnan-McConnell 
mine worked under armed guards, as did those at the Cambria 
mine. 9 
While Cambria remained "peaceful" on the surface, there 
was great excitement and fear in the area. Some of the 
miners who had been driven off at the Kali-Inla mine stated 
that they had been threatened with death if they continued 
to work "under existing conditions." Another raiding party 
sent word to Wilburton that they were preparing to march on 
the Hailey-Ola Company's mines at nearby Lutie. After the 
citizenry of Lutie declared they would offer armed 
resistance if attacked, the raid was aborted. But Wilburton 
continued to believe it was a community under attack. 10 
After the union miners of Pittsburg County threatened 
to eject all non-union miners from the district and to "make 
it hot" for the Wilburton merchants, the citizens of that 
community prepared for an attack. Hundreds of armed 
citizens patrolled the streets. As the citizens of 
Wilburton steeled themselves for the impending attack, 
reports of "scores" of miners massing in the hills west of 
the city only worsened fears there. Motorists reported that 
miners in twenty-five autos had blocked the road to 
Wilburton. Pickets at the barricade declared they were 
going to "get Wilburton. " Throughout the night the tense 
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stand-off continued. It seemed as if hostilities were 
imminent. The Daily Oklahoman reported that there was "grim 
foreboding of what may or may not happen to the coal 
industry of the McAlester valley." At Hartshorne, the 
whistle blew at the Rock Island Mine Number Twelve, calling 
the miners to work, but they "preferred to join the 
demonstration against the Kali Inla Coal Company." While 
this was happening the county authorities met with 
representatives of the governor in a midnight meeting. The 
sheriff, the county attorney, and twenty-five concerned 
citizens demanded the governor send in state troops to 
protect Wilburton. " 
The midnight meeting at Wilburton had great 
significance in the outcome of the strike. In attendance at 
the meeting was the Governor's representative, General B. H. 
Markham of the National Guard. At the meeting General 
Markham heard the testimony of James Patterson, 
superintendent at the Cambria mine. Patterson predicted 
another Herrin Massacre if the mine was reopened without 
adequate protection. After the meeting H. C. Finley, 
treasurer of the Kali-Inla mine at Cambria, officially 
requested that the governor provide troops to protect the 
company's property at Wilburton. General Markham quickly 
agreed, but held back on asking the Governor to declare 
martial law . 12 
The opei·ators proceeded to e xpa nd the open shop 
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movement as the authorities began to round up and arrest 
those who participated in the Cambria raid. The operators 
announced they planned to open more than a half-dozen more 
mines on an open shop basis, paying the 1917 scale of $5 a 
day. The operators contended that they could not remain 
competitive paying the 1924 scale of $7.50 a day, while the 
union miners argued that they could not survive on the 1917 
scale. The Daily Oklahoman acknowledged the differences of 
opinion, but declared that "a riot is not the answer. 1113 
The authorities rounded up the leaders of the Cambria 
raid within a week. They were charge with rioting, robbery, 
and unlawful trespassing. One of those arrested in 
connection with the raid openly admitted that he had been 
there and that he had carried an American flag during the 
proceedings, "considering it an honor." The miner, when 
asked what he would have done if someone had insulted the 
flag while in his presence, quickly replied that he would 
have been obligated to "stomp his face." Eventually the 
authorities arrested thirty-eight miners in connection with 
the Cambria raid. 14 
The union miner s continued to fight against the open 
shop movement in the Wilburton district, despite the arrests 
that followed the Cambria raid. Three masked men appeared 
at the entrance to the Great Western Mine Number Seven and 
warned the operator to close down by that eveni ng. The raid 
was a daring one , as t he mine was only one - h a l f mile f r om 
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the Latimer County Court House. 1 !5 At the same time another 
group of miners attempted to raid a National Guard armory on 
the Pittsburg County fairgrounds near McAlester. There 
guardsmen drove off the raiders "under a fusillade of 
shots." While these raids were occurring, a rumor spread 
that the miners had cut the telephone lines to Wilburton ... 
Once again Wilburton was plunged into fear and 
apprehension. The Daily Oklahoman reported that the 
citizens of Wilburton were "apprehensive and nervous" and 
that they were "armed against an expected invasion from 
across the county line." In Hartshorne the citizenry 
remained "firmly behind the miners in their support of the 
closed shop." 17 The Hartshorne Sun contended that the mine 
trouble was "greatly exaggerated." The Sheriff of Pi ttsburg 
County denied that he had warned his counterpart in Latimer 
County that an invasion was imminent and stated that he had 
only heard rumors of an attack and had counseled against it. 
Hardware store owners in Hartshorne denied a run on their 
gun stocks. 18 
Wilburton began to calm down only after a contingent o f 
National Guard troops arrived from Muskogee. To supplement 
these troops a citizen gu ard was formed. Wilburton dec lared 
itself "fully prepared to cope with any crisis," as rumors 
of "impending invasions" continued . The Latimer County 
News-Democrat argued that Wilbur ton became partisan on the 
wage issu e only b e cause i t was thre atened. As a resu lt , 
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"three hundred or more men have been sleeping on their arms 
[fire arms l . 1119 
The union's district leadership declared that the 
miners were not to blame for the trouble in the Wilburton 
area. District President Andrew McGarry stated that "the 
whole troubluous [sic] situation was brought on by the 
premeditated plans of the operators to incite an uprising 
and bring on state military investigation and protection," 
so that non-union labor could be introduced into the area 
under military protection. eo 
While he poured troops into Wilburton, Acting Governor 
Tom Anglin called the miners and the operators to a 
conference at Oklahoma City. The conference resulted in 
little more than an opportunity for the operators to send in 
more troops as a "reign of terror" prevailed in Latimer 
County. District President McGarry reiterated his position 
that the operators' efforts to run their mines on an open 
shop basis was to blame for the trouble. The Acting 
Governor did little more than condemn the disorder in 
Latimer County. et 
Anglin's conference did nothing to stop the violence in 
the county. While thirty-seven miners were being arraigned 
in a crowded courtroom in Wilburton for their participation 
in the Cambria raid, there was a more serious attack upon 
non-union miners. Five of them were fired upon from ambush 
at the Bull Hill mine near Red Oak, eighteen miles east of 
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Wilburton. The miners had just completed the day shift and 
were crossing a creek near the open shop mine when "they 
were met with a fussillade of bullets which mowed them 
down." After more than twenty shots rang out, all five lay 
injured, one seriously, after he was hit in the face, chest, 
and abdomen by "two charges of buckshot." The Bull Hill 
mine employed fifty men and had been operating on a non-
union basis for several weeks. Only a week earlier a non-
union miner was fishing near the spot of the ambush, when an 
unknown assailant fired upon him, wounding him in the 
neck. 22 
Throughout August and September sporadic incidents 
continued. Mine guards at the Great Western Coal and Mining 
Company's properties drove off union pickets who had come to 
put forth a "strenuous effort" to persuade the non-union 
miners there to quit working. In one incident mine guards 
at Lutie ordered union miners off mine property, but only 
after one miner invited a guardsmen out to the highway "for 
a licking." The McAlester News-Capital predicted a clash 
between the two sides 11 at any date." National guardsmen 
also protected the open shop mines, "their automatic rifles 
trained on the approaches." Operations resumed at the Kali-
Inla mine at Cambria "under a heavy guard of state troops 
and state police. 11 At least three machine-gun nests 
protected the mine, including one at its entrance. Several 
times guard troops exchanged fire with union miners, but no 
28 0 
injuries resulted.~ 
For the first six months of the strike, the operators 
of Latimer County attempted to run their mines on an open 
shop basis. In early October the operators of Pittsburg 
County invited miners there to return to work on an open 
shop basis and the 1917 scale. The operators contended that 
the 1917 scale beat idleness. It did not take long for the 
miners to offer their response. 2~ 
The miners of Pittsburg Country replied with dynamite, 
which demolished the padlocked gate to Rock Island 1 s Number. 
An hour later a Rock Island railroad bridge and a wagon 
bridge leading to the mine were put to the torch. Rock 
Island management had announced earlier that they were 
planning to switch to the 1917 scale. Sheriff Anderson, 
aided by four deputies and bloodhounds, searched for the 
bombers, but to no avail as they fled by auto. In nearby 
Hartshorne, nerves were en edge after hearing the ntwo thuds 
of the explosions. nes A smaller independent mine also was 
ndynamited and badly damaged.nu 
The dynamiting spree was largely a last, futile gesture 
by the union miners. Only days later Rock Island management 
r eopened its Number Twelve mine, paying the 1917 scale. 
Thirty-five private guards provided security at the mine . 
More than a hundred union miners who worked at Number Twelve 
held a meeting to discuss their next move . The sentiment o f 
the mee t ing was against returning to wor k unde r t he 19 17 
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scale and conditions "virtually the same as open shop." But 
with an empty treasury and the mines under military 
protection, the miners conceded and signed an agreement that 
slashed their wages by one-third. Thus, the last union 
stronghold in the state had been broken. Many miners had 
feared that if the 1917 scale prevailed at their stronghold, 
Number Twelve, then soon the whole district would follow. 
This held true, for within a few months many of the mines in 
the state reopened on an open shop basis, paying the 1917 
scale. 117 
Not all the union miners in Pittsburg County conceded 
so easily, though. In November, two miners were arrested 
and charged with criminal syndicalism after they accosted a 
miner working under the 1917 scale at the Rock Island mines. 
The men had threatened to dynamite the non-union miner's 
house if he continued to work at the lower pay scale. One 
of the two had been arrested previously in connection with 
the Cambri a raid. Judge Harve L. Melton set bond for the 
two at $5000 each. The authorities dropped the charges 
before the case came to trial, but the incident led to 
"government operatives" keeping "a close tab" on "suspected 
radicals in the McAlester and Hartshorne dis tricts. neB 
Also in late November, five of the thirty-eight arrested in 
connection with the Cambria raid pled guilty to riot charges 
and served forty-five days of a sixty-day sentence. The 
authorities dropped t he charges agains t t h e other t h irty-
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three two months later.n 
As the open shop took hold across the coal fields of 
Oklahoma, the union's district officers turned against each 
other in a struggle for power. The main source of much of 
this turmoil was an election dispute between the incumbent 
president, Andrew McGarry, and William Dalrymple, who was 
challenging for the office. Dalrymple had garnered the most 
votes during the district election, but McGarry stole the 
election by disfranchising thirty-five locals that supported 
Dalrymple on the grounds that they had held an unauthorized 
rump convention at McAlester in January. 30 
After it became clear that the president had attempted 
to manipulate his re-election, the district membership 
protested and rose up to drive McGarry and "his band of 
political saltadors" from the organization they "disgraced." 
But the damage the internecine conflict had wrought on the 
district was indisputable. Conditions were becoming very 
difficult for union stalwarts. Seven months into the 
strike, many were depenJent on strike relief funds that had 
dwindled to virtually nothing. At the same time the 
district had to abandon its attempt to provide "cooperative 
insurance" for its members, due to the lack of financial 
resources. District #21 had been the only U. M. W. district 
in the nation to provide such a pension system. Worst of 
all, while all thi s was going on, the open shop movement, 
which began in Latimer County, had spread to Pittsburg 
County and was beginning to take hold in the Henryetta 
district in Okmulgee County. 31 
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The union miners made a last desperate attempt to hold 
off the open shop in the Henryetta district. Miners feared 
that if they accepted the 1917 scale, the non-union mines 
would "go them one better" and pay the 1914 scale, and so on 
until wages would be reduced to starvation levels. Union 
miners argued that "the old cut-throat tactics are being 
resorted to in order that some may gain a temporary 
advantage." Union men contended that the operators had 
repudiated the Jacksonville Agreement, comparing their 
action to 1914 when the Germans called their neutrality 
treaty with Belgium a "scrap of paper. 1132 
When the operators of the B & A Mine at Schulter 
declared they would resume operations in April, nearly 
everyone in Henryetta expected trouble. This was the first 
attempt to operate a mine in the Henryetta field on an open 
shop basis. The result was a series of clashes between 
union miners and mine guards. After the violence escalated, 
Governor Martin Trapp sent in guard troops into the 
Henryetta district in early June. 33 
While both miners and non-miners protested the presence 
of troops, there were no serious outbreaks of violence 
related to their arrival. More than 1500 Henryetta citizens 
signed a petition asking Governor Trapp to remove the 
troops. After Henryetta had been calm for n e arly a month, 
Adjutant General Charles F. Barrett traveled there to see 
for himself if the troops could be withdrawn. 34 
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Instead of a calm Henryetta, Barrett saw a series of 
protest demonstrations that grew in size and intensity at 
every turn. The miners claimed their gatherings were 
"prayer meetings," and not demonstrations or picketing. 
After one such "prayer meeting" at one open shop mine, the 
protesters' caravan drove on to Henryetta. The long line o f 
cars passed along Main Street, each car "decked with flags 
and bunting, and the thing looked more like a Fourth of July 
celebration than a labor demonstration," according to the 
Henryetta Daily Free-Lance. 3 :s 
Further demonstrations continued into August. Then 
came a turning point in the showdown. Sheriff John Russell 
of Okmulgee County issued a proclamation that banned 
parades, demonstrations, and "so-called religious meetings." 
The Free-Lance noted that the result was "a situation little 
short of martial law." At the same time, Governor Trapp 
sent a "full battal i on" of troops from Ft. Sill to augme nt 
the troops already in Henryetta. 3 • 
Sheriff Russell's proclamation quickly led t o a test of 
wills. Af t e r a protest at the White head Mi ne, Sheriff's 
deputies arrested two miners for violating the proclamation. 
Several days later a judge at Okmulgee denied the two a 
habeas c orpus writ, but did release them on b ond. The 
issuance of the proclamation became a political scandal when 
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the two miners' attorney, C. E. B. Cutler, charged that the 
proclamation was part of a larger conspiracy, involving 
Governor Trapp. Cutler contended that the Sheriff's 
proclamation was the result of a secret meeting with the 
Governor. The American Civil Liberties Union also joined ~n 
the fight against the proclamation, as did Clarence Darrow, 
who sent a telegram in which he expressed support for the 
miners' actions. But every new report of a prayer meeting 
"sent bands of national guardsmen roving over the district" 
on many a "wild goose chase. '137 
Arrests continued under the sheriff's proclamation, 
despite the continuing efforts to have the edict overturned. 
After several "open air prayer meetings," miners were 
arrested and charged with such infractions as "disturbing 
religious worship" and "violating an order prohibiting 
public prayer meetings. " 38 
Those involved in the prayer meetings contended these 
gatherings were of a strictly religious nature. Mrs. 
Frances Coulter, "one of the leaders" of the Henryetta 
prayer meetings, declared that "Presbyterians , Baptists, 
Catholics, and Methodists are partic ipants in the prayer 
meetings." Mrs. Coulter went on to point out that the 
guardsmen were "hard-boiled" types, citing "one instance 
where guardsmen slapped one miner when he stopped his car to 
let his wi fe in. 1139 
Finally, the union ' s l aws u i t against t h e proclamation 
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was heard in the state court of criminal appeals. Miners 
charged with violations of the proclamation contended that 
the meeting at the Whitehead Mine, after which they had been 
arrested, had been "a religious service consisting of the 
singing of songs, offering prayer to the almighty for his 
divine protection and guidance in the wage struggle.'' In 
their petition the miners also argued that there had been an 
"unholy conspiracy" among the operators, Governor Trapp, 
Sheriff Russell, and A. N. Boatman, County Attorney for 
Okmulgee County. The union's lawsuit alleged that these 
individuals had gathered together at the Governor's office 
on August 6 to formulate the proclamation issued by Sheriff 
Ru.ssell. 40 
The state court of criminal appeals agreed with the 
miners. Judge Thomas Doyle ordered the immediate release o f 
the four defendants in the case before the court. The judge 
declared that "there is not ar. element of the crime of 
unlawful assembly charged in the information under which 
these men are held." Judge Doyle ruled that the 
proclamation and the subsequent arrests by the national 
guard were "a misuse of military authority to arrest men for 
holding religious meetings or peaceful picketing." The 
judge went on to "direct several caustic thrusts" at the 
Governor and his advisors for sending troops to Henryetta. 
Judge Doyle referred to Sheriff Russell as a "self-appointed 
law-maker" who had a nnoited himself with a "tinsel crown a s 
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the lord of Okmulgee County.'"'' 
Governor Trapp denied having any role in the 
formulation of the proclamation prohibiting prayer meetings. 
He pointed a finger at General Barrett. The Governor's 
spokesman, C. E. McPherren, a general in the national guard, 
stated that no one at the August 6 meeting could recall who 
suggested the proclamation and that it was drawn up in 
General Barrett's office after the meeting, suggesting that 
the Governor had no role in its preparation. 42 
The miners praised the criminal court of appeals and 
Judge Doyle for the ruling upholding "valid prayer meetings 
of union miners." Celebrating their victory, the union 
miners held parades at several open shop mines. When the 
miners marched to the B & A Mine, where the protests first 
started, they marched there under an American flag. The 
meeting began with a robust rendition of the national 
anthem, following by a prayer to the almighty that "there be 
no violence nor will there be any violence on the part of 
the union miners . " "3 
Neither side seemed interested in compromise. The 
operators were determined to implement the open shop. The 
miners refused to move away from the 192LJ, scale, despite 
admitting that they realized it was nearly impossible for 
the operators to compete with oil and gas if they continued 
to pay the higher scale. The Henryetta Daily Free - Lance 
noted tha t both sides were "dug in" and tha t "neither side 
will concede." As their industry collapsed around them, 
both sides were too preoccupied with the fight to 
contemplate compromise ..... 
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With the operators and the union locked in battle, 
Governor Trapp called both sides to Oklahoma City for a 
conference. He offered to recall all the guardsmen from the 
Henryetta district on the condition that the union promised 
there would be no violence while they picketed. 
International representative David Fowler promised that the 
union did not want any "pistol pete" actions by its 
membership and that they planned peaceful picketing only."5 
Despite this promising beginning, the conference 
resulted in no agreement or settlement. In reality it 
worsened the situation. The union representatives walked 
out of the conference after Governor Trapp refused to offer 
any concrete propositions to settle the dispute. Contending 
he did not want a "repetition of Herrin in Oklahoma," the 
Governor stated that he believed the true purpose of the 
miners' prayer meetings was to intimidate non - union miners. 
He argued that "if this can be done, you can take a Bible 
under your arm and a flag in your hand and rob a bank."u 
The operators quickly transformed the Governor's 
conference into a plea that the troops remain to guard their 
mines. J. J. Puterbaugh, president of the McAlester Fuel 
Company, argued that if the troops were withdrawn there 
would be "loss of life and property." Several non-union 
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miners testified that they faced daily intimidation. One 
miner claimed that without the presence of troops, he "might 
get bumped off." Colonel Ewell Head of the National Guard 
testified that several strikers had bragged that if the 
troops left, they would tie the non-union miners to their 
cars and "drag the strikebreakers behind their cars to 
Okmulgee. ""7 
As mass meetings continued, Governor Trapp stated he 
had not decided his next course of action. While the 
Governor planned his next step, Captain B. G. Patton, in 
charge of the guard troops at Henryetta, notified Trapp that 
the mood of the union miners was "worst it has ever been" 
after the collapse of the Governor's conference. At the 
same time four hundred non-union miners at Henryetta sent a 
petition to the Governor. In the petition the non-union 
miners declared that "the union men will get us as soon as 
the troops are withdrawn." The next day Governor Trapp 
announced the troops would stay in Henryetta 
indefinitely. "8 
The union responded to the failed conference by 
declaring a strike for September 1, 1925 against all non-
union mines in the state. This was "little more than a 
gesture," as the operators already were manning their mines 
with non-union labor only. More than ten thousand miners 
and their families attended a barbecue at Hartshorne the day 
before the announced strike began. The event was described 
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as peaceful, the crowd "good humored." Even the miners 
working under the 1917 scale joined in the festivities, 
fraternizing "with those who refused work under it." A 
government operative at the event reported back to Governor 
Trapp that the meeting was "more of a holiday, enjoying the 
picnic, the crowd was peaceful. ""9 
The strike declared on September 1, 1925 was 
ineffective. The district was without funds, and the 
operators were recruiting large numbers of strikebreakers to 
man their mines. Sporadic violence continued, and several 
mines were dynamited near Hartshorne, but with troops 
guarding them, the open shop mines continued to operate with 
non-union labor. :5o After one confrontation resulted in 
injuries in October, Federal Judge R. L. Williams issued an 
injunction that prohibited the striking miners from 
picketing against the use of non-union labor at the open 
shop mines. :5l 
The operators recruited non-union miners from the 
surrounding countryside. Initially they had brought in six 
hundred Mexicans, but many of them later joined the union. 
The operators then turned to local farmers as a labor 
source. The decision of the operators to employ men 
unfamiliar with mining quickly had devastating results.:52 
On January 12, 1926 a gas and dust explosion at the 
Degnan-McConnell's Mine Number Twenty-One at Wilburton 
killed ninety-one men. Would-be rescuers attempted to enter 
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the mine, but they were forced to retreat by noxious gases. 
Hysterical relatives gathered at the mine entrance "in a 
frenzy of anguish." The two thousand who had gathered at 
the mine entrance "surged against the ropes, but were held 
back by national guardsmen." An empty building across the 
street from the mine was converted into a temporary morgue. 
Wilburton's single undertaker was unable to cope with the 
disaster himself, and additional undertakers were brought 
in. They "worked at top speed to prepare the bodies for 
burial." Forty convicts were sent to Wilburton to dig the 
graves, and extra coffins had to be trucked in from Fort 
Smith. State Mine Inspector Ed Boyle declared in his 
official report on the disaster that inadequate ventilation 
and "green men" had caused the explosion. He stated that 
the non-union miners had detected gas, but "were afraid to 
protest." Boyle argued that union miners would have refused 
to enter the mine until state officials had declared it 
safe .53 
The Wilburton disaster did not alter the strategy of 
the operators to continue on an open shop basis. Whenever 
miners protested, they were arrested for violating Federal 
Judge Williams' injunctions issued at Okmulgee in October, 
1925. Judge Williams later rescinded the injunction and 
charged the operators with misrepresentation, but the damage 
the injunction had inflicted upon the union was irreparable. 
The federal injunction was the coup de grace for the 
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district. s .. 
For all practical purposes District Twenty-One ceased 
to exist by 1927. The Jacksonville Agreement expired in 
April of that year. Attempts to reach an agreement in the 
Central Competitive Field failed, ending a thirty-year era 
and beginning a six-year period of chaos in the labor 
relations of the bituminous coal industry. In Oklahoma the 
open shop operators had won complete victory. Skilled 
miners were reduced to working side by side with 
inexperienced "Hoosiers," the name given to the white 
farmers the operators brought in to the mines during the 
strike. As the union miners had predicted, wages continued 
to slide downward, first to $5.00, then to $3.60, eventually 
reaching a low of $2.00 a day during the nadir of the 
depression. ss 
The union was not the only casualty of the 192~-1927 
strike. The coal towns themselves showed the scars of the 
battle. As the state's coal industry faded away, so did the 
coal towns. Every indicator illustrates the decline. 
Production, payroll, and population all fell, but the banks 
illustrate the collapse best. After 1923, all but four of 
the sixty-five banks in the McAlester district failed, many 
during 1926 and 1927, when the miners were broken not only 
as a union, but financially. These towns were utterly 
dependent on the coal industry; when it collapsed, so did 
the towns. Many of the coal towns simply disappeared, 
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while others dwindled to a pitiful version of their former 
selves.:~• 
Whether this Wagnerian tragedy had to occur is 
debatable. The fact that the industry recovered and even 
prospered during World War Two is evidence to the contrary. 
The coal industry could have and has survived competition 
from oil and gas. Even as early as 1925 the "Katy" railroad 
converted its locomotives from fuel oil back to coal 
burning, citing the mounting cost of the former. Also, the 
growing demand for electricity by the state's municipalities 
could have provided new customers for the coal industry, had 
it survived in its former glory. Instead, Oklahoma imported 
coal to supply this need. 57 
Looking back on their defeat, many members of District 
#21 blamed the national leadership for their demise. Many 
in the district argued that when the national leadership 
refused to move away from a national pay scale, it was 
devastating for the Oklahoma coal industry. Many of 
Oklahoma's miners accepted that the costs of production 
varied from region from region and that the pay scale should 
reflect that. But at the same time, the district's 
leadership was in such disarray that they were unable to 
unite long enough to stand up against the national 
leadership. The Secretary-Treasurer of District #21 noted 
after the strike that the Illinois district had accepted a 
wage cut and thus survived the crisis. The district officer 
29'* 
contended that "we should have accepted a similar reduction 
in Oklahoma. If we had, we could have save our 
district. 1158 
By 1928 the United Mine Workers had virtually 
disappeared from Oklahoma. The operators had no relations 
whatsoever with the union. With no counterpart, the 
operators' associations faded away as individual members 
withdrew from these organizations whose sole purpose was to 
bring the operators together for contract talks with the 
miner' s union. 59 
For several years the spirit of unionism would lay 
dormant in Oklahoma's coal industry. But like the mythical 
phoenix, unionism and the state's miners rose from the ashes 
of defeat in 1927 to be reborn in 1931. While the torch of 
unionism had flickered in the winds of the open shop 
campaign, it had not gone out. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
FROM THE ASHES OF DEFEAT: THE STRIKES OF 1931 AND 193 2 
The years from 1927 to 1931 were dark years for 
un1on miners in Oklahoma. Every mine in the state oper ated 
on an open shop basis. Wages had dipped t o $2.00 a day. At 
the same time safety had become a secondary concern of the 
operators as they struggled to survive in the worst economic 
conditions ever seen. The Henryetta Daily Free-Lanc e 
reported in its 1931 New Years' edition that ''1930 will be 
known as year piper was paid." Accidents continued t o 
mount, t opped by the Little Bolen Disaster in 1929 in whic h 
a gas explosion killed sixty-one men. Since 1892 more than 
four hundred men had died in the state's c oal m1nes. 
Oklahoma's mines h ad become so dangerous that by 1 930 
"better informed mi ners were a fraid t o wor k in t hem," 
according to one s ource. These desperate working c onditions 
led the miners t o reorganiz e and prepare on c e a gain t o 
confront t h e operators . 1 
After four years o f open shop supremacy in Oklahoma, 
the United Mine Workers sent in David Fowler to reorganiz e 
the state's miners. He b egan his work in He nryet ta early i n 
1931. In meetings he ld across t he He nryetta distr ict , 
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Fowler implored the miners to reorganize their locals. By 
late October Fowler had enrolled fifteen hundred miners in 
the Henryetta field, many of them former-members of the 
union who had worked under open shop conditions after the 
union collapsed in 1927. The first test of strength for the 
reconstituted locals was when they declared that unless 
their demands were met, they would strike on the first of 
November.e 
The union presented a list of grievances to the 
operators. Among their demands was a return to the $5.00 
scale. The catalyst for the strike had been the operators 
slashing the pay scale that had led to $3.60. The miners 
demanded that the "task system" be abolished and favored 
payment on a tonnage basis, which rewarded hard work. 
Finally, they demanded reinstitution of the check weighman 
and that the operators meet with the union's grievance 
committee. When the operators refused to even meet with the 
union's representatives, fifteen hundred miners voted 
unanimously to strike in the Henryetta field. 3 
The operators shut down their mines rather than attempt 
to break the strike. They closed fifteen mines in the 
Henryetta district. Among these were five co-operative 
mines that "closed in sympathy" with the strike. While the 
operators gathered at Okmulgee to confer and formulate 
s t rat egy, State Labor Commissioner W. A. Murphy sent h is 
assistant, James Hughes, to observe and make recommendations 
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on the dispute. Murphy expressed concern that it would be 
difficult "to iron out the difficulties," because the miners 
were under the control of the union's national leadership at 
Indianapolis." 
Almost immediately cracks began to appear in the 
operators' wall of solidarity. On just the second day of 
the strike, one of the smaller operators announced his 
willingness to sign a contract with the union that paid 
miners the 1917 scale of $5.00 a day. Rumors of ongoing 
"conversations" between the operators and the union 
continued to ripple across Henryetta.~ 
The union showed its strength by calling a meeting in 
downtown Henryetta. After the police roped off the center 
of town, the meeting of more than one thousand miners took 
place in the middle of the street. The "scores" who 
attended the meeting heard speeches from the president of 
the Henryetta local, former district president Andrew 
McGarry, and national organizer David Fowler, a former 
member of the Pennsylvania state legislature. Fowler urged 
the miners to "stick to their guns" until the operators 
agreed to meet with the miners' committee. Fowler stated 
that if the operators refused, the miners would have to 
"force their hand," although he did not mention specifics. 
A few days later a second operator signed a contract with 
the union.• 
From the union's standpoint the strike was proceeding 
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nicely. Several operators had already signed with the 
union, and others were contemplating it. At this crucial 
point Governor "Alfalfa" Bill Murray decided to take an 
active hand in the dispute. Murray announced that he 
thought the miners should immediately return to work "at the 
best wage scale they can get," insinuating that the miners 
should accept the $3.60 pay scale. After Murray announced 
that he was going to "url8.ertake to get the miners and 
operators together," Fowler responded that "we believe the 
miners have the operators whipped" and that "if Governor 
Murray will only quit encouraging the operators to reduce 
the wage, they will abandon their efforts. '(1 
Governor Murray had a two-track approach to the strike. 
While Murray proposed that the Board of Arbitration mediate 
the dispute, he denied Fowler's claim that his primary 
purpose in sending armed agents from the Oklahoma State 
Bureau of Criminal Investigation into the strike zone was to 
force the miners to return to work at the reduced scale. 
Fowler had earlier contended that Murray's statements and 
actions indicated he planned to force the miners back to 
work "at starvation wages." 0. P. Ray, assistant 
superintendent of the O.S.B.I., denied that the bureau's 
agents in the strike zone were "excessively armed," noting 
that they carried only one pistol each. Ray contended that 
the state's operatives were "not there to force anybody to 
work, but to prevent anyi; law violations."• 
303 
While the arbitration conference continued in 
Henryetta, the rift between Governor Murray and union 
organizer Fowler was the talk of the streets. The Henryetta 
Daily Free-Lance reported that "despite the more or less 
lurid stories being bruited [sic] about nothing ugly has 
happened." In fact, any hostility that existed seemed to be 
limited to that between Governor Murray and Fowler. The 
McAlester News-Capital noted that at the Governor's 
conference, there were "indications of a friendly spirit." 
While the strike began over the operators cutting wages, the 
main issue at the conference was union recognition. The 
operators remained adamantly opposed to this, stating only 
that they would allow the union miners to return to work 
without prejudice, but at the reduced scale of $3.60 a day. 
A day later the operators offered to return to the 1917 
scale of $5.00 a day, but balked at recognition.q 
The Governor's conference collapsed in failure over the 
recognition issue. Governor Murray then ordered Adjutant 
General Markham to be ready "in case of an emergency." The 
Henryetta Daily Free-Lance predicted that the operators 
would soon reopen, without a contract, and that Governor 
Murray would supply protection. In the lull before the 
stonn, the Free-Lance reported, "everything is serene. 1110 
Union organizer Fowler took his case to the miners of 
the state after the Governor's conference collapsed. 
Speaking at McAlester, Fowler preached for a revival of 
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unionism. He argued that the wage cuts the miners had been 
forced to endure had destroyed purchasing power in the 
mining communities of Oklahoma and that they must combat any 
further reduction in wages. Fowler argued that with their 
wage cuts, the operators had "killed the goose that laid the 
golden egg. '111 
Fowler then turned his comments to the subject of 
Governor Murray. Demanding that the Governor stay out of 
the strike, Fowler criticized Murray for sending an armed 
investigating committee, noting that the arbitration board 
was the only one in history "on which Pistol Petes are 
allowed to sit." Fowler reiterated that Murray was bent on 
forcing the miners to accept "starvation wages." To prove 
his point, Fowler stated that he had a letter that Governor 
Murray had sent to William Jones, superintendent of the Rock 
Island mines at Hartshorne suggesting the miners might 
accept a 40-50 percent wage cut if confronted with a shut-
down. Pointing out that the Governor had accused him of 
stealing the letter, Fowler proceeded to note gleefully 
that he would "rather be the thief than the author." 1e 
After both sides rejected each other's final proposals, 
the operators announced that they would reopen their mines, 
despite the failure to reach an agreement with the union. 
The operators stated they would give preference to former 
workers. Fowler predicted that no more than fifty of 
Henryetta's miners would return to work. The union's worst 
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fear was that there would be trouble when the mines 
reopened, giving Governor Murray the pretext he needed to 
send in troops. When operatives of the state bureau of 
criminal identification arrived in Henryetta "to preserve 
order and prevent lawbreaking," the union quickly promised 
no disorder of any kind. 13 
Henryetta waited anxiously "for the show-down" when the 
operators reopened their mines with skeleton crews. Private 
guards and state operatives patrolled the streets, while six 
hundred miners marched "bareheaded" down Main Street under 
"the Stars and Stripes " to protest the reopening of the 
mines. The crowd was vo cal, but there was " no disorder of 
any kind." When the paraders passed near two hospitals, 
"not a sound was heard as the lines marched past."'" 
The operators at this point considered the dispute 
over . While there were pickets at the mines, they had been 
peaceful. The central contention of the operators was that 
they had successfully rebuffed the union's demand for 
recognit ion, the negoti ations were complete , and i t was t ime 
to resume production. The operators notified state labor 
commissioner W. A. Murphy that they no longer desired state 
mediat i on of the dispute. Murphy had proposed earlier that 
the State Board of Arbitration and Conciliation be convened 
to "consider the walkout. '115 
Mur phy was not so ready to consider the matter at an 
end. He and his assistant t raveled to Henryetta to "look 
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into the situation." Murphy declared that he would take any 
action possible ''to bring about a peaceful settlement of the 
strike. "16 
While the catalyst for the strike had been a wage cut, 
the central issue was recognition of the union. Part of 
that recognition would be the reinstitution of check-
weighmen, selected and paid by the miners. The operators 
had eliminated the position after they broke the union 
during 192~ and 1925. The check-weighmen's role was to 
prevent short-changing of the miners by jointly overseeing 
weighing along with the "weigh boss." The miners considered 
their demand for a check-weighmen to be non-negotiable. 17 
The miners also demanded abolition of the "task" 
system. Under this procedure a miner had to mine eighteen 
thousand pounds of coal daily to earn his day wage. Time-
consuming activities such as "brushing," the clearing away 
of rock and slate, as well as timbering, the installation of 
roof supports, were not paid for. The operators maintained 
that they took such "dead-work" into consideration when they 
set the day wage for "task" positions. The miners argued 
that the "task" system amounted to "slave-driving." With 
the operators refusing to negotiate on these issues, the 
negotiations remained deadlocked. 18 
Only a few days after the operators reopened with 
skeleton crews, dynamite blasts shook the community of 
Dewar. Both miners whose homes were bombed worked as 
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members of a skeleton crew at the Pittsburg-Midway mine near 
Dewar. The blasts not only 11 greatly damaged" the two 
houses, but the "resultant shock was considerable" for the 
miners and their families. Eventually seven suspects were 
arrested in connection with the midnight bombings. In 
another incident a member of a skeleton crew "was struck on 
the head and wounded." Repeated incidents such as these 
made the Governor unresponsive to a petition circulated 
around Henryetta that called for him to remove his "special 
officers" from the district. 19 
Both the operators and the miners had raised the 
stakes. The operators had reopened without a contract, 
while some within the ranks of the miners turned to dynamite 
to press their argument. In the middle was State Labor 
Commissioner Murphy. He declared that the state arbitration 
board would hold hearings and make recommendations, "whether 
anybody abides by our dec is ion or not. "ao 
On the following day the miners at Henryetta held a 
mass meeting, at which five hundred union miners voted 
unanimously to return to work and abide by whatever ruling 
the arbitration board handed down. On all accounts it 
appeared that after a six-week strike, the union had yielded 
to the operators' terms. The miners returned to work at the 
lower $3.60 scale, and even more importantly, they had 
abandoned their demand for recognition of the union. While 
they lost this particular battle, the strike proved the 
union was capable of regrouping to fight again. 
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Alone the 
miners still lacked the strength to bring the operators to 
terms. To do this would require the assistance of the state 
arbitration board. 2 ' 
The arbitration hearings got off to a rocky start. 
Labor Commissioner Murphy noted that "unless we do so it 
would probably cause another walkout." Murphy was referring 
to the operators' decision to keep the men they had reopened 
with. As a result, many strikers found their positions 
filled when they attempted to return to work. This blatant 
discrimination by the operators against union members 
created c onsiderable tension as the arbitration hearings 
began. 22 
First to testify was David Fowler. He gave a detailed 
account of how the miners had reorganized in the past few 
months. Fowler "supplied a rather graphic picture of the 
past six weeks' trouble" to a packed auditorium, according 
to the Henryetta Daily Free-Lance. 23 
Then it was the operators' turn t o tell their side of 
the story. All but one testified that he had operated at a 
loss in recent months. J.C. Reid, who marketed the 
Henryetta district's c oal, testi fi e d that the operators of 
the district had to slash wages to remain competitive with 
the McAlester district where wage cuts had already 
occurred. 2~ 
After the operators tes tif ied, the mine rs o f f e red a 
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stinging rebuttal. They charged the operators with 
discrimination against union members. Also, the miners 
charged the operators with short-weighing as much as four 
hundred and fifty pounds per car-load. Charles Bailey, 
Assistant Mining Inspector, testified that the miners were 
exaggerating, that the operators only short-weighed the 
miner an average of one hundred and fifty pounds per car. 
The operators blamed it all on faulty equipment, which had 
been repaired. 25 
As Labor Commissioner Murphy declared the hearings 
closed, he reminded the participants that he had no 
authority to rule on the union recognition issue. Murphy 
pressed both sides to settle that issue themselves. The 
miners declared that they would abide by the board's ruling, 
whatever it might be. The operators remained mute as to 
their next action.u 
In late December the arbitration board released its 
findings. The board began by criticizing the operators for 
discriminating against those who participated in the strike. 
The board noted that if there was trouble in the future, "it 
will very likely be from that cause." The board then found 
in the union's favor on two points. The members of the 
board advocated abolishing the "task" system and 
reinstituting the check weighmen, both central demands of 
the miners. On the wage issue the board ruled in favor of 
the reduced $3.60 scale, but recommended no further wage 
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cuts for the remainder of the coal season. 27 
As it promised, the union immediately accepted the 
arbitration board's findings. The operators were more 
secretive in their initial reaction. There was no general 
agreement, in fact; the Henryetta Daily Free-Lance reported 
that each operator "will act individually in dealing with 
the report. No group action was taken by the operators." 
But in fact, many of the operators already were implementing 
the board's recommendations. 2 • 
The mediated resolution to the strike was indicative of 
improving relations between the union and the operators. 
Just sitting down at the same table was an achievement in 
itself. From a perspective that you must crawl before you 
can walk, the settlement was a step toward resumption of 
contractual relations.29 
Emboldened by its relative success in the Henryetta 
field, the union expanded into the eastern coal fields of 
Oklahoma in the following months. Twenty locals had been 
established in the McAlester-Hartshorne district by November 
1932. Others locals regrouped at other locations such as 
Wilburton and Shady Point. But as the locals reorganized, 
sporadic violence threatened to derail the process that had 
been so successful in the Henryetta district. 30 
When the miners of the McAlester district struck for 
union recognition, they immediately embarked on a campaign 
of picketing the mines of operators who refused to sign a 
311 
contract with the union. The result was that dozens were 
arrested for picketing. In one incident, the authorities 
arrested eleven strikers for obstructing highways. So many 
were being arrested that feeding the "large numbering thrown 
into the county jail" was becoming a problem, according to 
the McAlester Democrat. 31 
The authorities showed no sign of relenting as Judge 
Hal Johnson of Shawnee issued a permanent injunction against 
District #21 that prohibited mass picketing. Johnson's 
ruling limited pickets to "three men at any one point." The 
ruling made permanent a temporary injunction Johnson issued 
in August. 3 e 
Always a supporter of law and order, Governor Murray 
then took measures to insure that the miners abided by the 
court's rulings. Murray appointed James Springer of 
Stillwater to prosecute violations of the injunction. 
Springer was to assist Pittsburg County Attorney Frank L. 
Watson, according to Governor Murray. A group of miners met 
afterwards with Murray to protest the appointment .'13 
The next day more than three hundred miners gathered at 
Krebs to discuss Judge Johnson's injunction. Those at the 
meeting declared that the injunction was "an effort to take 
away from labor its only weapon of striking back," according 
to an American Federation of Labor representative who spoke 
at the meeting. But little else came of the meeting. 34 
Within a week the mood of the Krebs miners had changed 
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dramatically. The operators of the Osage mine at Krebs 
relented and signed a contract with the union. After the 
parade of cars, "bebannered and beflagged," drove 
triumphantly through town, led by the Krebs Italian band, 
three to four thousand gathered at the Krebs fairgrounds to 
celebrate the occasion. 35 
While the dispute ended peacefully at Krebs, it did not 
at many other locations. Dynamite attacks continued on the 
homes of non-union miners. A miner who worked at the 
Messina mine southeast of McAlester awoke to the sound of a 
dynamite blast a few days after he was warned not to 
continue working at the mine. After a state operative was 
beaten severely, the authorities arrested four men in 
connection with the incident. The state operative had 
accepted a position as foreman at a non-union mine. 0. P. 
Ray, the man in charge of state operatives in the strike 
zone, hinted that he would ask Governor Murray to send state 
troops into the mine area. The union also continued to 
picket non- union mines, despite the district court 
injunction forbidding such activity.36 
The miners tested the authorities' willingness to 
enforce the injunction in early October. After hundreds 
picketed the Little Bolen mine in North McAlester, 0. P. Ray 
ordered the arrest of over one hundred miners. Ray 
indicated that the arrests were the "beginning of an 
intensive clean-up campaign against strikers who persist in 
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illegal picketing of mines and intimidating workers. 1137 
The arrested crowd then marched to the state 
penitentiary. The county jail already was filled to 
capacity, as "scores of arrests had been made prior to the 
wholesale haul" at the Little Bolen mine. Many of the 
picketers had refused bail, leaving the jails full. With no 
vacancies at the county jail, the authorities decided to put 
the Little Bolen picketers in the state's maximum security 
prison, which was located a half-mile from the mine. The 
miners, "with an American flag waving at the head of the 
column ... marched into the front door of the state 
penitentiary." En route to the penitentiary the miners sang 
songs, and other "outbursts of merriment marking the 
parade." After guards screened out women and the under-
aged, a search of the miners went smoothly with only a 
couple pocket knives found. Throughout the process the 
miners seemed to enjoy it all. One guard noted that there 
was no "surliness on the part of the arrested men." Next, 
the miners were treated to a meal of ham, eggs, potatoes, 
bread, and coffee. After being on strike for months, one 
miner remarked that "its the most I've had to eat in 60 
days." This was the attitude of many of the miners. After 
they were released the next day, many of the strikers stated 
that they were pleased with the experience, noting that it 
was their "first square meal" in months. 38 
The miners declared they would return to "the picket 
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line in full force." Fearing trouble, C. A. Burns, head of 
the state bureau of investigation, left Oklahoma City for 
McAlester, equipped with machine guns, tear gas, and spare 
ammunition. The Daily Oklahoman reported that the 
authorities "indicated they would enforce the edict against 
picketing, even if the machine guns and bombs were 
necessary." While the state brought in extra firepower, the 
miners were "augmented by sympathizers" from across the 
state's coal belt. 39 
To show their strength, the miners held a picnic on the 
grounds of the Haileyville ballpark. More than three 
thousand attended. The first speaker the crowd heard was 
Judge E. P. Hill of McAlester. Hill criticized the arrests 
at the Little Bolen mine and noted that the charges had been 
filed by James M. Springer, Governor Murray's special 
prosecutor, and not by the local authorities. Judge Hill 
said that he sympathized with the miners, as long as they 
remained peaceful. After A.F.L. and U.M.W. spokesmen 
addressed the gathering, Constable Grady Anderson rose and 
"spoke a few words" to the crowd. Large segments of the 
local community, including the political leadership, were 
squarely in the miners' corner. "0 
Throughout October a tense stand-off continued in the 
McAlester district. Both sides sustained symbolic 
casualties in the on- going conflict. One by one, the 
operators broke ranks and signed contracts with the union. 
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Each time this occurred, it bolstered the spirits of the 
union miners. But at the same time state operatives 
continued to arrest dozens of union miners as they continued 
to picket the remaining non -union mines."' 
In one incident, twenty-six miners at Pittsburg were 
arrested after they attacked two non-union miners as they 
passed by the Labor Hall, while en route from the mines to 
their homes. One of the non-union miners lost four teeth in 
the incident before the mine superintendent arrived and put 
a stop to the disturbance. 0. P. Ray of the state bureau of 
investigation took the offenders to McAlester for 
arraignment. "2 
In another incident, twenty-five union miners were 
arrested for picketing a non-union mine near Haileyville. 
They faced charges for camping on land adjacent to the 
Messina mine. According to Tom Bost, president of the union 
local, the miners had leased the land and were in the 
process of establishing a community camp. Others miners 
were more honest, indicating that they had pitched their 
tents on the field "so they might picket more 
forcefully. ""3 
By this time the courts and jails of Pittsburg County 
were clogged with miners. The Little Bolen case, the 
Pittsburg fights, the Messina arrests, and a multitude of 
smaller incidents had created such a backlog in the county's 
court system that it had virtually dragged to a halt. In an 
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effort to bring about a settlement, Governor Murray traveled 
to the strike zone. Many in the communities affected by the 
strike feared that Murray would declare martial law if the 
unrest continued.~ .. 
After meeting with a miners' committee in McAlester, 
Governor Murray spoke to a large crowd at Haile}~ille. 
Murray prefaced his comments by declaring to the miners that 
"you may not like what I am going to say but I don't give a 
damn if you do or not." The Governor told the miners that 
they were "mostly right, but partly wrong." Murray urged 
them to refrain from violence, noting that they had a right 
to organize and picket, but "that doesn't mean standing at 
the roadside and shooting at somebody. It doesn't mean 
hitting somebody in the head when he starts to the grocery 
store." .. :~ 
Murray told the crowd at Haileyville that he was 
neither for the strikers nor the operators, but that he was 
"standing on the public policy side." He reminded the union 
miners that his duty was to uphold the law and that "we are 
not going to have anarchy in this state." Murray claimed 
that if the law was not enforced, then it would be "every 
man, women, and child for himself." He continued to 
chastise the union miners, telling them that "you can't cure 
economic trouble by revolution. If your attempt to cure 
economic trouble by revolution, it only makes the trouble 
worse." Murray advised that the best cure for society's 
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ills was "the ballot" and concluded by advising the miners 
to "go on with your union. But you must get it in your head 
that you can't commit violence.""" 
The Governor's pleas to stop the violence had little 
effect. The local papers reported the casualties like 
tallies on a scoreboard. Fist fights, bombings, and 
shootings occurred nearly every day. Meanwhile, the miners 
involved in the Little Bolen arrests were "turned loose." 
Judge A. C. Sewell of McAlester ruled that there was 
insufficient evidence to warrant a trial."7 
The union took its case to the public while the 
violence raged across the coal fields of eastern Oklahoma. 
The miners had complained that the public had heard only the 
operators' and the state government's versions of the 
strike, and not their side. Responding to this criticism, 
the Daily Oklahoman published a series of articles 
presenting the miners' version of the events that had 
transpired since the strike began. The miners argued that 
their primary reason in calling the strike was "mine safety, 
not high pay." They contended that "union regulation over 
working conditions is [the) paramount issue." The union 
miners stated simply that their central demand was a 
"contractual right to share in arranging the working 
conditions surrounding their hazardous occupation. ""9 
Union miners noted that safety in the mines had 
deteriorated substantially since the onset of the open shop 
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campaign in 192~. To buttress their argument, they noted 
that during the fifteen years leading up to the open shop, 
from 1910 to 192~. 108 union miners died in accidents in 
Oklahoma's mines. But in the five years since the 
Jacksonville Agreement expired, 315 non-union mines had died 
in accidents, a rate nine times greater. The miners argued 
that the operators opposed the cost of maintaining mines at 
the standards set by law. They noted that the operators had 
let safety in the mines regress to the point that they were 
permitting the firing of shots while men were in the mines, 
a policy abandoned since the 1890s. Ignoring such 
fundamental safety practices led to accidents like the blast 
at the Little Bolen mine that killed sixty-one men. But the 
union miners did not blame only the operators. They noted 
that the state mine inspectors performed only a 
"perfunctory" role, their reports were little more than 
transcripts of the operators' own comments on conditions in 
their mines, rather than on the basis of rigorous personal 
investigations .49 
The miners cited other evidence of a regression back to 
the robber baron era of Oklahoma coal mining. They noted 
that operators commonly "rob the miners by stealing coal on 
crooked scales," or with "crooked" company weighmen. When 
the miners requested a check-weighman be appointed, the 
operators retaliated by having the request put in written 
form. Then they discharged all those who signed the 
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petition. Finally, the miners demanded an end to being paid 
in scrip, a practice reminiscent of an era many miners 
thought was gone forever. 50 
It was not only the union miners who criticized the 
operators for insensitive treatment of their employees. The 
Red Cross complained that the operators at Pittsburg were 
blocking the distribution of Red Cross flour to union 
miners. The operators contended that it was true they had 
persuaded local Red Cross officials to deny flour to union 
men, arguing that the action was justifiable "on the grounds 
they were voluntarily idle." Only an order from the Red 
Cross national office at St. Louis restored the distribution 
of government flour to those who needed it, regardless of 
their stance in the strike. 51 
The situation seemed hopelessly deadlocked. The miners 
contended that their status was near serfdom and the union 
was their only hope. The operators retorted that unionizing 
the field would be disastrous. Fights, shootings, and 
bombings continued unabated. Fearing violence, both union 
and non-union miners began to travel about only in large 
numbers. This resulted in street confrontations quickly 
deteriorating into mob scenes. In addition, several 
operators' homes were dynamited. While the violence raged, 
the picketing of non-union mines continued.~2 
The miners' tent city that adjoined the Craig Valley 
Coal Company's Messina mine near Haileyville rapidly was 
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becoming a semi-permanent community. In addition to their 
picketing duties, the miners erected a "dancing pavilion at 
the tent colony." The picketers held nightly dances and 
kept "up a loud noise" every night, according to the Daily 
Oklahoman. :sa 
As the dispute dragged on, the miners and the state 
government grew more displeased with the obstinate behavior 
of the operators. The union's chief organizer in the 
district, David Fowler, argued that the open shop operators 
were "doing more to foment communism and bolshevism in the 
United States than any other agency." W. A. Murphy, state 
labor commissioner, blamed the operators for the strike 
lasting more than one hundred days and advised them to sign 
an agreement with the union.:s- While the operators, 
miners, and the state government sought a solution to the 
crisis, forces outside of the state were about to impose a 
settlement. 
The Depression reached its nadir in the spring of 1933. 
Already seriously weakened by competition with the oil and 
gas industries, the Depression dealt a nearly fatal blow to 
Oklahoma's coal industry. One by one, the large railroad 
subsidiary mines closed. The Rock Island mines at 
Hartshorne, the biggest in the state, closed down. When 
operating at full capacity, the Rock Island mines employed 
more than a thousand miners. The miners at Hartshorne sent 
a resolution to newly-inaugurated President Roosevelt 
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requesting that he instruct the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation to provide funding so that the Rock Island 
Railroad could keep the mines open. The plan never got off 
the ground when the firm's officers, noting the low price of 
fuel oil at that time, announced that even with government 
help, it was unlikely the mines would be reopened. J. J. 
Puterbaugh, receiver for five bankrupt mining firms, noted 
that all vlere unprofitable due to economic and labor 
troubles and recommended liquidation of the properties. At 
the few mines that remained open, miners worked an average 
of only ninety-three days annually during 1932 and 1933. 55 
These were the most difficult times ever experienced in 
the coal towns of Oklahoma. With many miners destitute and 
homeless, town leaders organized rabbit hunts to provide 
food for the needy. Local hunters shot thousands of rabbits 
to feed the county, while cold storage firms warehoused the 
meat until it was distributed. In April 1933 Cambria was 
left without electricity after the McApine mines there were 
closed. Judge Harve Melton ordered the mines reopened. 5 • 
By the fall of 1933 conditions in the coal towns of 
Oklahoma were desperate. United States Congressman Wilburn 
Cartwright of McAlester proposed giving the unemployed 
miners of Pittsburg County small tracts of land, ranging 
from two to ten acres. Cartwright argued that this action 
would allow the people "who live in the abandon mining 
section of the county" an opportunity to live as subsistence 
farmers. As a result of Congressman Cartwright's efforts, a 
government agent was dispatched to McAlester to study the 
feasibility of the federal government purchasing subsistence 
homesteads for the unemployed miners, but little came of the 
project.s7 
Despite the slow progress of the New Deal's programs in 
the coal towns of Oklahoma, its impact eventually was 
monumental. The principal domestic measure of the "First 
New Deal" was the National Industrial Recovery Act. In June 
1933 Congress passed Title I of the NIRA, which suspended 
antitrust laws, permitting implementation of industrial 
codes that regulated production, prices, wages, and trade 
practices. To ensure that these efforts to jump-start the 
economy did not trample upon the rights of labor, safeguards 
were included to protect workers. The result was Title I's 
famous Section 7(a), which guaranteed labor's right to 
organize and bargain collectively. 59 
Superficially it appeared as if the legislation had 
effectively brought an end to the open shop movement in 
Oklahoma. Many operators already had conceded and signed 
with the union before passage of the NIRA. It seemed likely 
at this point that the remaining hold-outs would have their 
mines unionized by government edict. There was no doubt 
that Section 7(a) was of benefit to labor, but only if it 
was enforceable. 5 " 
The United Mine Workers perceived Section 7(a) as their 
salvation. 
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In fact, the union had led an intense lobbying 
campaign to insure its inclusion in the legislation. John 
L. Lewis considered Section 7(a) tantamount to a second 
emancipation proclamation. Under this assumption the union 
experienced a nation-wide revival in 1933. Having dwindled 
to sixty thousand members in 1932, more than three hundred 
thousand were added to the membership rolls only a few 
months later. But already business was digging in its heels 
in opposition to the legislation, and the Supreme Court had 
not ruled on its constitutionality.~0 
From the onset business was opposed to Section 7(a). 
Many feared "collective bludgeoning." Some corporations 
flatly prohibited their employees from organizing. Others 
created company unions, hoping to prevent the establishment 
o f independent unions. Over four hundred company unions 
came into existence between 1933 and 1935. Through such 
tactics business fought Section 7(a) to the end. If 
enforced, it would be a major blow to their anti-union 
activities. In fact, the business community's resistance 
to Section 7(a) was a driving force toward passage of the 
National Labor Re 1 ations Act in 19 3 5 . ~ 1 
The purpose of the National Labor Board was to settle 
disputes arising under the NIRA. Established in August 
1933, President Roosevelt named Robert F. Wagner as its 
first chai rman. In February 193~ the Board was authorized 
to hold elections so that employees could c h oose t heir 
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bargaining representatives. In 1935 the entire system was 
changed with the passage of the National Labor Relations 
Act, commonly known as the Wagner Act. The legislation 
created the National Labor Relations Board, but 
unfortunately for labor, the change did little to help its 
cause as business remained adamantly opposed to collective 
bargaining. •e 
It is questionable if Roosevelt ever intended to 
guarantee labor's right to organize and bargain 
collectively. Without an all-out lobbying campaign by the 
United Mine Workers, Section 7(a) might never have been part 
of the NIRA. More likely, it was a bone tossed in the 
direction of organized labor in order to muzzle dissent sure 
to arise from other New Deal measures that were decidedly in 
capital's favor. But passage of the Wagner Act did reaffirm 
the principle of Section 7(a), while at the same time making 
permanent the three-man National Labor Relations Board.&3 
Slowly the legal questions surrounding the New Deal's 
impact upon organized labor filtered through the nation's 
court system. In late 1934 a Federal court ruled Section 
7(a) unconstitutional in the Weirton Steel case. Then in 
May 1935, the Supreme Court ruled the National Recovery Act 
unconstitutional in the landmark Schecter case. Political 
pundits chortled that the NRA's Blue Eagle had been plucked, 
as the case dealt with the poultry industry. But in a major 
victory for the New Deal and for organized labor, the 
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Supreme Court ruled in National Labor Relations Board v. 
Jones and Laughlin Steel Company (1937} that the Wagner Act 
was constitutional. Whether Roosevelt intended it or not, 
the New Deal's reforms granted unions "the stamp of 
legitimacy. "•4 
Union coal miners in Oklahoma did not feel overly 
beholden to the federal government. Many believed they were 
in the process of achieving their goal of union recognition 
before the NIRA and Title I's Section 7(a}. Nor did they 
give blar~et endorsement to NIRA policies. In September 
1933 union coal miners in Oklahoma protested the $3.75 day 
wage established by the federal government's coal code. But 
the NRA code probably helped both the union and the 
operators. Under the NRA the local coal industry recovered 
somewhat; nearly seven hundred men were working in the mines 
around Hartshorne. The Hartshorne Sun reported that "all 
mines are union and operating under the NRA code." A 
District Twenty-One official argued that the nation's coal 
industry had entered a new era in which strikes were to be a 
thing of the past. John L. Britton stated that the union 
would turn to the strike as an option only if an employer 
failed to meet a payroll. & 5 
Britton was a little ahead of the curve when he stated 
that strikes were a thing of the past. Wages for Oklahoma's 
miner rose to $~. 60 by Ap·ril 193~. When NRA Administrator 
Hugh S. Johnson ordered the scale be adjusted downward, 
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first to $4.35, then later to $4.00, it led to a temporary 
shutdown of nearly all the shaft mines in District Twenty-
One." 
By the end of the decade, management-labor relations in 
the Oklahoma coal industry had come full-circle back to 
1903. Faced with the Supreme Court declaring the Wagner Act 
constitutional, the operators still clinging to the open 
shop could no longer refuse to bargain with the miner's 
union. On May 19, 1938, District Twenty-One officials 
signed a union-shop agreement with the operators of the 
district. Thirty-five years after their first agreement in 
Oklahoma, the union and the operators were once again 
contractual partners. 67 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
Within Oklahoma's coal industry the tide of un1onlsm 
ebbed and flowed much like an ocean's tide. There were high 
water marks such as 1903 and the twenty years that followed. 
During this period wages rose steadily from $2.56 a day in 
1903 to $7.50 a day in 192Lr.' At the same time the union's 
demand for check-weighmen eliminated the operators' common 
practice of short-changing miners at the weigh- scale. wt1ile 
improving the standard of living for its membership, the 
union forced elimination of dangerous mining practices that 
emphasized profit over safety, such as "shooting off the 
solid." 
The union pushed for other advances in mine safety. 
These included improved ventilation, rock dusting, and safer 
explosives. All reduced the likelihood of deadly gas and 
coal dust explosions. Another improvement resulted from the 
operators granting the union's demand that they be paid for 
"deadwork. 11 Non-payment for crucial safety measures such as 
timbering had led to countless accidents. Also, the union's 
demand for abolitior. of the infamous "task system" that 
emphasized wages based upon a tonnage rate was a major 
safety a dva nce. No l o nge r would mine r s b e f orced to 
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overlook safety concerns in order to meet a tonnage quota. 
Better training also improved safety in Oklahoma's coal 
mines. The Red Cross and the state's Bureau of Mines 
trained miners in the latest safety practices. The School 
of Mines at Wilburton also contributed to improving safety. 
Although mining remained a dangerous occupation, these 
measures helped reduce accidents in the mines. 
Also slayed by the union sword was the company town 
system and its two central components, the company house and 
store. As a result of the union's victory over the company 
town system, miners bought their own homes, instead of the 
company house being the only housing option. At the same 
time, a multitude of businesses developed in the coal towns 
as the company store faded away, the result of another 
important victory over the operators by the union . 
But there were times when the tide of unionism in the 
Oklahoma coal industry flowed in the operators' favor. The 
evictions of 1894 and the open shop campaign of 1924-27 are 
the most vivid examples. Both times the operators dealt 
severe blows to the union movement among Oklahoma's miners. 
But neither was a lethal blow. Also, it can be argued that 
without active government intervention in both these 
confrontations, the outcome might have been different. 
Without government-supplied injunctions and troops, the 
operators were a less powerful opponent. When the federal 
and state governments stayed neutral , the union o ften won 
its demands at the bargaining table. The strike of 1899-
1903 is perhaps the best example, as all subsequent 
victories ensued from the recognition battle won in 1903. 
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In many ways the union's fortunes paralleled that of 
Oklahoma's coal industry. Union membership grew along with 
the industry in the 1880s and 1890s. From 1900 to 1920 the 
union prospered along with the industry in general. At the 
same time, the union's demise in the 1920s coincided with 
the plight of the state's coal industry. This decades - long 
symbiotic relationship undermines the operators' contention 
that union wages were the reason for the industry's decline. 
A more realistic assessment of the industry's decline, and 
subsequently the union's, was the evolution of the nation's 
industrial infrastructure from a coal-based system to a 
petroleum-based system. This evolution was hastened in 
Oklahoma by the state's relatively thin coal seams. Once 
the easily accessible seams played out, it became difficult 
for the state's coal industry to compete with the oil 
industry and with coal from states like Wyoming, where coal 
lay in fifty-foot seams - (In Oklahoma, coal seams were 
typically four feet thick). Oklahoma's coal industry would 
have declined in the 1920s whether it had been unionized or 
not. But from the miners' perspective, the union was 
essential. 
The union transformed the lives of Oklahoma's miners. 
Unti l their v i ctory in 1903, the mi ners wer e the l ow r ung i n 
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a semi-feudalistic society. Under the protection of the 
union, miners became the political and social leaders of 
their communities. Much of social life in the coal towns 
centered around union-sponsored activities. Going to the 
weekly union meetings was as routine as going to church on 
Sunday. In fact, the union and the church were the two 
primary social institutions for the coal miners. They drew 
their inner strength and ability to persevere against long 
odds from both. After every tragic mine disaster, it was 
the union and the church that provided both spiritual and 
material comfort. From their religious faith the miners 
drew spiritual solace, but they turned to the union for day-
to-day protection from the coal barons. 
The coal fields of Oklahoma were a perfect breeding 
ground for the growth of industrial unionism. Exploited 
b oth above and below ground, the miners saw the union as 
their only hope. Together they could combat not only low 
pay, but the dangerous working conditions 1n the mines. In 
unions, the miners had broken the company t own system and 
the vise-grip the operators had on the coal towns. Coupled 
with government regulation, safety slowly improved in the 
mines, although there were setbacks such as during the 19 25 -
1931 period. 
Changes related to unionization of Oklahoma's coal 
miners included more tha n higher wages, better working 
c onditions , a nd t he d emi s e o f t he c ompa ny town system. 
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There were substantive social and political changes in the 
coal towns that are attributable to the miners organizing. 
Under the union the miners became influential in their 
communities. They went from the low-rung of a semi-feudal 
society to being community leaders in a few short years. 
Many served in elected office, filling offices at both the 
local and state levels. One miner, Pat Hurley, went on to 
serve in President Roosevelt's cabinet. 2 Peter Hanraty was 
influential in state politics for decades. He served as 
mayor of two coal towns, played an important role in the 
framing of the state constitution, and was the Oklahoma's 
first mining inspector. 3 
The union also helped foster amiable race relations in 
the coal towns of Oklahoma. While the operators often 
pitted differing ethnic groups against one another in the 
mines, especially during strikes, the union did much to 
bring the many races together. In fact, the operators 
efforts to forestall ethnic cliques by mixing the differing 
nationalities together had an opposite effect than intended. 
Instead of dividing the miners, it brought them together. 
All races groups were brought together in the union against 
a common foe, the operators. During the many strikes, 
miner s of many r a ces and nat iona l i ties s tood togethe r in 
solidarity. Whether a miner was union or not was much more 
important than his nationality. One Italian miner noted 
that upon h i s arrival i n Oklahoma , t he first question aske d 
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of him was whether he intended to join the union or 
"scab."" Even with their· extremely heterogenous ethnic 
populations, the coal towns were amazingly devoid of racial 
animosity. 
The transition of the coal towns from semi-feudal 
fiefdoms of the coal barons to democratic communities was 
part of a national trend. While this change was in no small 
part due to the efforts of the miners and their union, it 
also was part of the progressive movement that swept across 
the nation from the turn of the century until World War One 
diverted the public's attention. Within this favorable 
political environment the efforts of the miners were made 
easier. The miners found political allies on the local, 
state, and national levels. In fact, the plight of 
Oklahoma's coal miners paralleled closely the national 
political scene. When conservative Republicans were in the 
White House in the 1890s, and again in the 1920s, the miners 
faced off against not only the operators, but presidential 
administrations that often sided with the business 
community. From 1903 to 1922 the union prospered. Not 
coincidentally, this was when the progressive period was at 
its zenith. While the demise of the union in the 1920s was 
a ttributable to competition with oil and gas, and not to a 
return to conservative Republican rule, it certainly did not 
help the union's cause. When the Great Depression occurred 
the nation turned to the Democrats for relief. Roosevelt's 
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New Deal signaled a return to a more favorable political 
environment for unionism. The result was a resurgence of 
the United Mine Workers on a nation-wide scale. Without a 
doubt, national political trends had significant influence 
in Oklahoma's coal towns, despite their geographic 
isolation. 
Oklahoma's miners often were more successful in their 
union activity than their counterparts in other states. 
Oklahoma's miners won recognition of their union long before 
those in West Virginia. Also, the struggle in Oklahoma was 
far less violent than in other states. Oklahoma never 
experienced a massacre such as those at Cripple Creek, 
Ludlow, and at Herrin, names that are synonymous today with 
bloodshed. Violence did accompany every miner's strike in 
Oklahoma, but on a far milder scale than in many other 
states. (See Figure 4.) Neither side found it necessary to 
resort to extreme measures. 
During the golden years of Oklahoma's coal industry, 
from 1903 to 1922, both the operators and the miners enjoyed 
the good times. For nearly twenty years both sides enjoyed 
the benefits of detente. When the industry declined during 
the 1920s, neither side was willing to compromise so that 
the industry could survive. The result was nearly fatal for 
both. While the state's coal industry did recover during 
World War II, it failed to attain its former status. Those 
glory days were gone forever. Still, the union survived -
as did the miners' demands for a say in their own pay and 
working conditions. While Oklahoma's coal industry faded 
away, the spirit of unionism lived on. 
338 
Figure 4 . Mine Strike-Related Violence (1870-1935 1 
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